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Abstract
This thesis aims to trace the development of management accounting systems (MAS) in a
Portuguese bank, where an activity-based costing system (ABC) was trialled for implementation,
as a means to improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of employee activity. The
culture of banking in Portugal has changed significantly over the last 25 years, but at the same
time there are older traditions which remain strong. The purpose of this research was to study how
an imported MAS like ABC is developed and disseminated within a Portuguese banking context.
The research can be classified as a longitudinal study of organisational change using a single case
study. Although based in the interpretive tradition since it is concerned with actors' perceptions,
interpretations and beliefs, it also draws on a Foucault-inspired critical framework of the kind
developed in the work of Hoskin and Macve (e.g. 1986, 1988, 1994, 2000), and in the research
into the financial sector undertaken by Morgan and Sturdy (2000). The particular model
developed here is designed to enable the exploration of the effect of accounting practices on
change from three perspectives — changing structures, changing discourses and the effect of both
of these processes on power relations. It also draws on Fligstein' s (1991) institutional framework
to understand change in terms of the interplay across three relevant institutional contexts — the
organisational field, the state, and the existing strategy and structure of the bank.
The research draws on the literature and on primary data, including 41 in-depth, semi-structured
interviews, and documentary and archive data. The main contributions of the research are related
to the increase of visibility and perceived importance of accounting in the banking sector, and
how accounting is significant beyond its technical roles. The study provides new insights into
how management accounting practices, along with other organisational systems, play an
important role in questioning, visualising, analysing, and measuring implemented strategies.
These practices have an important influence on strategic decision-making, and help to legitimate
action. As the language and practice of management has shifted towards strategy, marketing, and
accounting discourses, patterns of work, organisation and career are being restructured.
Consequently, feelings of insecurity and tension are widespread through the organisation. In this
respect, the present study suggests that political and power issues are very important to explaining
how ABC was implemented, with its resolutions, conflicts and reformulations.
Keywords: implementation of change, accounting roles, activity-based costing, financial
services, case study.
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Confidentiality Agreement
Initial contact was made with the bank where this study was conducted in early January
1998 through a manager from the accounting department. The purpose of this first visit
was to negotiate access. It was agreed with the personnel and the accounting departments
that the bank would remain anonymous. Thus, to comply with that agreement, the bank
will be referred to as 'Banco Lusitano'.
To help maintain confidentiality, proper names of departments within the bank are not
used in this thesis since they may be unique to the bank. There are two key departments in
the bank which I will refer to as the 'accounting department' and the 'organisation
department'. The accounting department has two main functions. First, to prepare
accounting information in compliance with accounting principles and practices
established by the Bank of Portugal that apply to the financial services sector. Second, to
prepare the budget and its control in terms of cost evolution by responsibility centre. The
main function of the organisation department is, as the name implies, the central
organisation of the bank. However, it has other functions such as staff training, customer
relations, and quality control. It also serves as a link between central departments and
commercial network. Thus, it is a department that is strictly connected with the
implementation of several change initiatives.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The protected and highly regulated Portuguese banking sector has been changing, and has
become part of the progressively more integrated European market for financial services.
In 1985 the state started a progressive deregulation process that changed some of the rules
of the sector, characterised by new entrants, a long-term process of mergers, and
expansion into a range of lines of business, such as investment banking, insurance and
leasing. These external changes and the reduction of the financial margins, triggered two
main organisational responses: on the one hand, concerns about efficiency and cost-
awareness, with mergers seen as potential source of cost savings through two effects:
economies of scale and productive efficiency; on the other hand, increasing business
through a higher focus on customers and marketing issues.
Therefore, the present investigation was undertaken in a Portuguese bank facing
significantly more competitive conditions and reshaped by new discourses, particularly
those concerned with 'strategy', 'marketing' and 'change'. The research aims to trace the
development of MAS in a Portuguese bank, where an activity-based costing (ABC)
system was trialled for implementation, as one of a range of initiatives, as a means to
improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of employee activity. To comply
with confidentiality agreements for all research activities, the bank will be referred to as
'Banco Lusitano'. It is a large family-owned Portuguese bank, nationalised following the
fall of the Salazar regime in the 1970s, but reprivatised in the 1990s, at which point the
original family regained control. This was part of a general privatisation of financial
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houses, and this economic shift led, as in other countries, to a greater focus on
profitability, cost control and efficiency and effectiveness of client services than hitherto.
In this respect, an old business culture (dating back before nationalisation, but artificially
prolonged by it) was suddenly confronted with new economic demands.
The objective of this chapter is to adumbrate the nature and scope of the research,
developed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. The chapter is divided into six
sections. Section 1.2 establishes the overall field and summarises previous research.
Section 1.3 provides a statement of the justification for the research. In Section 1.4, the
scope of the research is presented. It includes the research questions and research
methods. Section 1.5 briefly describes the expected research contributions. Finally,
Section 1.6 describes how the thesis is organised.
1.2 Background of the research
Continuous changes in the organisational environment have made organisational change a
key research issue. In recent years, the accounting literature has focused increasingly
upon the ways in which accounting practices interact with and even shape organisational
change, particularly after the call for new more 'relevant' management accounting
systems (MAS) made by Johnson and Kaplan (1987).
Since Kaplan and Johnson published Relevance Lost, where they discuss the new
manufacturing environment and the inadequacies of traditional MAS and set out
prescriptions for the future, activity-based concepts have spread rapidly, especially
through management consultants and practitioner publications. Nevertheless, their claims
were disputed. Motivated by a problem-solving approach, there has been a tendency to
2
offer quick solutions to problems that have not been fully analysed and understood. The
diagnosis of lost competitiveness and the proposed remedies have been generally
accepted and accounting has been reduced to its technical roles that can be manipulated
(cf. Kaplan and Johnson, 1987; Johnson, 1994):
'Accounting as a social and organizational practice is thus stripped down to its crudest, and
most mundane skeletal form. Missed is an opportunity to examine the constitutive power of
accounting that renders it enduring and (on occasion) endearing (Ezzamel, 1994a; Ezzamel
and Bourn, 1990; Ezzamel and Hoskin, 1991)' (Ezzamel eta!., 1997:441).
At a theoretical level some consensus exists that ABC is superior to traditional cost
systems (e.g. Ostrenga, 1990; Brimson, 1991; Brinker, 1991, 1993, 1994). Nevertheless,
at a practical level, many problems arise when firms attempt to implement ABC systems
(e.g. Innes and Mitchell, 1995; Shields, 1995; Malmi, 1997; Friedman and Lyne, 1999).
Researchers have addressed this inconsistency between theory and practice' by shifting
the focus from technical issues to the effect that behaviour issues have on ABC
implementation (e.g. Shields and Young, 1989; Anderson, 1995a; Shields, 1995;
Gosselin, 1997; Krumwiede, 1998a).
The traditional focus in accounting research had portrayed accounting change as an
outcome of rational behaviour to maximise profits through 'better' information (cf.
Hopwood, 1987). This has given way to, or been supplemented by, an increasing range of
research into the 'complex (and often unpredictable) dynamics of change through time'
(Burns, 2000:568). Where Pettigrew (1990:269) had accused conventional research of
being: `ahistorical, aprocessual and acontextual in character', there are now grounds for
saying that there is an increasing body of research that incorporates an historical
'Kaplan and Cooper recognise this inconsistency as they implicitly claim that the reconciliation of theory
and practice might result in ABC practice being reflexively reconsidered.
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dimension into its analyses, and is more generally contextually sensitive, not least to the
ways in which processes are developed via forms of accounting practice.
There are previous studies, undertaken in the financial services sector in Europe, which
have focused on the relation between MAS and organisational change. The study by Cobb
et al. (1995) used Innes and Mitchell's (1990b) factorial model to study a UK-based
division of a multinational bank. Soin (1996) also studied the change process in a UK
clearing bank but drawing on Laughlin's (1991) theoretical framework. Euske and
Riccaboni (1999), using institutional theory (Fligstein, 1991), studied how an Italian bank
managed interdependencies to meet a new environment.
Nevertheless, there is still a lack of empirical research, namely theoretically informed
case studies, into the use and design of accounting systems, to understand the nature of
management accounting practice (Hopwood, 1983; Kaplan, 1984a; Scapens, 1990). If the
emergence of ABC techniques, with all their strengths and limitations, are already well
researched in American and English contexts, there is a lack of published research studies
about MAS in a non-English-speaking context. In particular, little research has focused on
the issues of organisational change and control in Portugal, a country where there has
been rapid economic and social change over the last 25 years. [I have not found published
research although there is ongoing PhD research.] The culture of banking in Portugal has
changed significantly, but at the same time there are older traditions which remain strong.
It will therefore be significant to study how an imported MAS like ABC is developed and
disseminated within a Portuguese bank.
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1.3 Justification for the research
This project may be seen as serving two kinds of objective. First it contributes to the new
mode of more critically-aware research, and is hopefully a useful contribution to the
critical or sceptical wave of research into accounting-based management initiatives.
Second it contributes to our understanding of how such initiatives may develop across
different cultural contexts. This project, in investigating change in a Portuguese context,
needs to show an awareness of cultural contextual issues, as well as the ways in which
banking in Portugal cannot be wholly separated from wider, more global developments.
Arguably this is particularly true for the past decade, when explicit globalising trends in
banking and finance have made Anglo-Saxon banking practices and bank entities much
more a part of Portuguese banking activity. Overall then, the justification for the project is
its contribution to a critical understanding of accounting-based initiatives, as they develop
in a range of new cultural contexts.
1.4 The scope of the research
This research aims to contribute to the understanding of the nature and management of
change in the Portuguese financial services sector and to help generate a new kind of
empirical understanding of how accounting change works in practice in different cultures,
and so to contribute to deepening our understanding of accounting's role in modem
management. Four main objectives can be identified. First, to study the changing banking
context in Portugal during the last 25 years, and the way in which accounting systems
have been utilised by Portuguese banking institutions over this period. The second
objective was to study the development of a contemporary accounting innovation in its
organisational context, with particular reference to the roles MAS can play in the
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organisation and their relationship with strategy. The third objective was to provide a
critical discussion of the development and implementation of the new ABC system: an
MAS which was at the forefront of academic and practitioner debate, it was trialled for
implementation, as a means to improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of
employee activity. The final objective was to trace and analyse how people react to this
initiative, whether supporting or resisting it, and so throw light on the organisational and
behavioural implications of the initiative.
The key research question of the present study is: 'how and why has management
accounting practice changed in the organisation under study, and what were the dynamics
around the ABC proposal as its implementation proceeded?' Sub-questions derived from
the main research question include:
• What conditions led to the change in MAS?
• How do MAS and other change initiatives depend on each other?
• Why has the organisation adopted ABC?
• What were the stated objectives when the new system was designed and how did the
actual design and implementation conform to them?
• What were the roles of the consultants?
• How did the organisation design and implement the new system? What were the
obstacles to change?
• Who were the important participants? How did they participate in the process?
• What were the organisational and behavioural difficulties of the process?
• What were the outcomes? What roles do (and can) MAS play in the organisation?
In order to answer these research questions, a qualitative research design was adopted,
and a longitudinal case study approach, based on a critical-interpretive model was
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developed. Although based in the interpretive tradition since it is concerned with actors'
perceptions, interpretations and beliefs, it also draws on a Foucault-inspired critical
framework of the kind developed in the work of Hoskin and Macve, and in the research
into the financial sector undertaken by Morgan and Sturdy (2000). The particular model
developed here is designed to enable the exploration of the effect of accounting practices
on change from three perspectives — changing structures, changing discourses and the
effect of both of these processes on power relations. It also draws on Fligstein's (1991)
institutional framework to understand change in terms of the interplay across three
relevant institutional contexts — the organisational field, the state, and the existing strategy
and structure of the bank.
1.5 Expected research contributions
The study aspires to make an empirical contribution to research into the development and
implementation of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) systems by observing the ebbs and
flows in the implementation of such a system in a Portuguese bank. In so doing it aims
also to make a contribution in theoretical and methodological areas too. Theoretically, it
looks to build on the recent trend in accounting research to investigate the role and
function of accounting practices on management practice and discourse. This kind of
impact, it is hoped, can be shown in some detail in this Portuguese context, building on
the work of those like Soin (1996) who have investigated ABC in other banking contexts
(in her case in a UK clearing bank), and of those like Lim (2000) who have pursued the
issue of the role of accounting practices on management discourse in other contexts too.
[Lim's work considers the interactive and shaping roles of accounting in the realm of
strategic discourse in a telecommunications company.] The focus on practices has a
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number of possible sources, not least the kind of work into management practice (e.g.
Morgan and Sturdy, 2000), but also the Foucault-inspired work into accounting practice
past and present undertaken by Hoskin and Macve (e.g. 1986; 1988; 2000; cf. Hoskin,
1994).
Methodologically, it is hoped that this work contributes, like that of Soin and Lim among
others, to the kind of in-depth case study work that does not attempt or pretend to
discover generalisable regularities about a technique, in this case ABC, as it is
implemented across different contexts. Instead it attempts to shed light on how far there
may be both differences and underlying shared ideas, assumptions and discourses in the
ways in which a technology such as ABC is implemented. What may be generalisable is
that there is first of all difference (cultural, institutional, organisational), but that given
such difference there are also certain regularities produced precisely because of the
'power' of accounting practice. The detail of the analysis remains to be set out. However,
it is hoped that this kind of approach helps to ground more firmly the idea that the single
case study approach has a validity in its own right, and does not need to pretend it is part
of a quasi-scientific series of empirical studies leading to purported generalisable insights.
1.6 The structure of the thesis
This thesis is organised into seven chapters, the first of which is this introduction. Chapter
Two contains the literature review and Chapter Three a discussion of the research
methodology. The empirical parts of the thesis are contained in Chapters Four to Six,
reflecting the importance of the cultural and historical context within which this particular
ABC initiative took place. Finally, Chapter Seven offers my conclusions.
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Looking at the contents in a little more detail, this first introductory chapter presents the
rationale for and background to the research, its contributions and purpose. Chapter Two,
Literature Review, pays particular attention to the evolution from activity-based costing
(ABC as a product cost system) to activity-based management (ABM as a system that
focuses on process management), and critically discusses the development and evolution
of the activity accounting literature. Chapter Three, Research Methodology, outlines the
approach adopted to understand the nature and management of change in this particular
Portuguese financial services context. The research takes the form of a qualitative inquiry,
using a longitudinal case study in order to evaluate critically how the new management
accounting system was developed and disseminated within this particular Portuguese
banking site. Attention is also paid here to relevant literature concerned with new or post-
positivist approaches to studying accounting-based change.
Chapter Four, The Portuguese Economy, provides an account of developments in the
Portuguese economy generally, and the financial services sector specifically, over the past
three decades. This setting is explored historically in terms of the role, institutions and the
state, played within a dynamic sector which pioneered the process of liberalisation,
deregulation, and privatisation that transformed a state-dominated economy into a modern
European economy. Particular attention is given to the changes of the past decade, when
banks in Portugal began to see themselves much more as part of a global banking
network, both in terms of their acquisition policies and in being more open to Anglo-
Saxon trends in banking. Change initiatives, focussed increasingly on controlling costs
(and therefore headcount), became part of the local banking culture, as they had in the US
and UK from the 1980s on.
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This then leads to a more detailed discussion in Chapter Five, Case Study, of the events
in the bank studied here following its re-privatisation, putting the ABC initiative into a
context of earlier 'change initiatives', with significant input from outside consultants over
the period from 1992 on. It then presents a summary of some of the reasoning given for
the decision to implement ABC, and describes the organisational efforts to co-ordinate
the ABC project. Chapter Six, Case Study Findings, goes in more detail into the way in
which the ABC initiative played out over time, in the context of these earlier initiatives,
but also in a current context where two different departments were striving to 'own' the
initiative (or to own such success as it had), and to extend their dominion over each other
and within the bank more generally. The actions and reactions of key players in these
departments and the various impacts of the initiative in the bank more widely, are the
focus here. In this way, the chapter attempts to identify the range of ways in which
accounting has been implicated in reconfiguring activity within the bank over the past
few years. Finally, Chapter Seven presents the Conclusions that may be drawn from the
project, whilst noting the limitations on the research and directions for further research.
There are a number of Figures and Tables in the chapters that are designed to help clarify
some of the complex information to be presented here. There are also some Appendices at
the end, to provide information on data sources, and details of the research interviews.
With that summary of the contents and rationale of this study, I now pass to consider in
my literature review the development of ABC, ABM and their associated literatures, as a
first basis for defining the significance and value of this particular study.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
It is arguable that management accounting is at a critical stage in its development. First
there are technical reasons for such a claim. Many recent debates and criticisms
concerning management accounting systems (MAS) recognise that the competitive
environment is changing in major ways, for example, through technological
developments and the globalisation of markets (Schonberger, 1986; Hayes, et al. 1988).
This has increased competition and has led to shorter product-life cycles. These changes
have been argued to demand a more flexible approach to organising company activities
(Bromwich and Bhimani, 1989). It is argued that these changes have led to important
modifications in cost structures and cost behaviour in a way that means that conventional
management accounting techniques must fail to provide relevant data for companies
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Howell and Soucy, 1988). Furthermore, it is claimed that
conventional management accounting data are 'too late, too aggregated and too distorted
to be relevant for planning and control decisions' (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987:1).
This new wave of technical critique and innovation is often dated to the publication of
Johnson and Kaplan's 1987 book, Relevance Lost. While this may be too simplistic, there
has clearly been, as we shall see, an intensification of innovatory claims and approaches
for reforming MAS over the ensuing period. At the same time, it is clear that, with the
concomitant development of a new kind of 'critical accounting' research paradigm,
research and reflection has not been restricted to a technicist model. As we shall also see
in this chapter, this research strand has had some significant observations to make both on
11
the technical adequacy of new approaches like ABC and on the extent to which technicist
views have underplayed or ignored historical and cultural factors and their influence on
technical innovations.
But let me begin by reflecting on the emergence and early development of the ABC
phenomenon, before going on to contextualise it in terms of its technical adequacy and of
the wider critical and theoretical observations that have been made about the ABC
phenomenon. In this way, it is hoped that this chapter will present a solid base, grounded
in the relevant literature, for understanding the significance of the ABC initiative studied
here, and the reasons for the methodological approach to be adopted. [The latter of course
is the subject of Chapter Three.]
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 attempts to summarise the
emergence of ABC, and the extent to which it was a new discourse and a means of
promoting a new relevance for MAS. Section 2.3 puts ABC into the context of other
recent developments in MAS, including the way it has been incorporated into approaches
such as Strategic Cost Management, and to new ways of combining financial and non-
financial performance measurement, even where such approaches may not at first sight
have focussed to the same extent on 'activity' as a key category (e.g. Balanced
Scorecard). The literature concerned with the technical adequacy of ABC systems is also
addressed to identify the major critiques that have been made of the assumptions and
claims of activity based accounting. Finally, it also considers the wider critical and
theoretical work that has considered ABC in its strengths and weaknesses as an aspect of
the contemporary development of both accounting innovation and accounting research.
Section 2.4 then turns to consider the literature on the development of activity accounting
12
in the financial service sector, focussing on three major case studies on activity-based
costing and change in banks. Finally, Section 2.5 locates this research in the literature and
summarises the main issues raised in the literature review.
2.2 The emergence of activity-based costing: a new discourse and a major
catalyst for change in MAS research and practice?
It is now widely accepted that ABC is not as 'original' as its proponents, Robert Kaplan
and Robin Cooper, may have seemed to imply in some of their early papers. Proposals to
use an activity or transaction-based approach to cost allocation can be seen to date back to
earlier times before the relevance debate (Vatter, 1945; Longman and Schiff, 1955;
Drucker, 1963; Staubus, 1971; Shillinglaw, 1982). More recently, Miller and Vollman
(1985) had suggested that output volume may not drive overhead costs in modern
manufacturing companies; but that rather, in the 'hidden factory' the real driving force
comes from transactions:
'These transactions involve exchange of materials and/or information necessary to move
production along but do not directly result in physical products. Rather, these transactions are
responsible for aspects of the "augmented product," or "bundle of goods," that customers
purchase — such aspects as on-time delivery, quality, variety, and improved design' (p.144).
This kind of work was not purely academic nor without impact. Miller and Vollman, for
instance, were specifically proposing not only a new way of costing using transactions but
also of managing those transactions.
'[If] transactions are responsible for most overhead costs in the hidden factory, then the key
to managing overheads is to control the transactions that drive them. By managing
transactions, we mean thinking consciously and carefully about which transactions are
appropriate and which are not and about how to do the important transactions most
effectively' (p.145, italics in original).
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Nonetheless, the impact of ABC or activity accounting can be seen to have been
considerable, following on the back of the remarkable success of Relevance Lost, and the
pioneering technical work, out of Harvard Business School, undertaken by Kaplan and
Cooper through the publication of a series of case studies, notably in the Harvard
Business Review. In these studies strong claims were made for the advantages of Activity
Based Costing over conventional product-costing systems, and the rhetoric of 'Harvard
innovation' was no doubt significant in translating academic work into the practitioner
world, and so popularising activity accounting amongst both practitioners and academics.
From these 'successful' stories there were distilled a series of 'recipes for success'
circulated increasingly in academic and practitioner books and journals, at conferences,
workshops and via consultancy work.
In this process ABC itself evolved, and moved from being focussed on getting the
'correct cost' for products (and thus making correct strategic decisions about profitable
and unprofitable lines of business) to having a focus on co-ordinating all the activities of
an organisation in the most effective way. In this guise ABC increasingly became
Activity-Based Management (ABM), which as a system could enable you to move
beyond a product focus definitely.
If we stay with a focus on Kaplan, who is clearly a key figure here, not just for his work
on ABC but for his earlier work on advanced forms of management accounting and
subsequently for his work with Norton on the Balanced Scorecard, we may see an internal
evolution in his work over the years just before the formulation of ABC/ABM.
During the 1980s, Kaplan had published several polemical papers on the state of
management accounting. One strand of this critique was then crystallised in the book with
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the accounting historian, Thomas Johnson, Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of
Management Accounting, where they described the historical development of
management accounting, and its failure to be effective across the twentieth century in a
variety of ways. They argue that in the new competitive environment, managers now
needed a new kind of information that conventional management accounting practices did
not provide. This argument requires some more amplification because it is so crucial to
defining the themes and parameters of what we may call 'the relevance debate' (cf.
Ezzamel et al., 1990; Loft, 1995).
2.2.1 The relevance debate
The failure to adapt conventional MAS to changes in the new competitive environment
was seen as an important reason for the competitive decline of Western industry (Johnson
and Kaplan, 1987; Berliner and Brimson, 1988). Johnson and Kaplan justify this failure
with their belief that it is possible to manage companies by the numbers. Johnson
(1991b:A5.2) claims that companies feel able to 'both plan and control their affairs with
accounting information that is compiled for financial reporting purposes'. Furthermore,
management accounting became subservient to financial accounting, which was designed
primarily for external reporting. The lost of relevance of management accounting was a
case of 'putting the cart before the horse':
'Financial information about business results — the chart — became the prime object of
managers' attention. Managers quickly lost sight of the horse — the underlying forces that
produce financial results' (ibid.:A5.2).
Several other authors (e.g. Brimson, 1986; Maskell, 1989a-d; Bromwich, 1990; Simons,
1990) also discussed problems resulting from the fact that information needs were driven
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by financial reporting requirements. However, their analysis did not go unchallenged, for
instance, Johnson and Kaplan have been criticised for their theoretical approach, their
historical analysis and for the conclusions they draw. Loft (1995) provides an overview of
these criticisms. She maintains that Kaplan and Johnson's description of management
accounting development to the (apparently) problematic present is debatable, since
'questions can be raised about the validity of their historical explanations which rely on
assumptions of underlying economic rationalities. In Johnson and Kaplan's world view,
employees of the firm are 'merely' a factor of production with a cost to be minimised, ...this
explanation helps to mystify the origins of management accounting, which like other
management techniques, acts primarily as a means of controlling labour' (Loft, 1995:41-42).
Further, there has been criticism from within the labour process approach. This approach
focuses on how MAS can be seen as having developed primarily as a way of controlling
labour, and therefore assumes that MAS are not neutral nechanisms for making
production more efficient but the necessary practical means through which capital is
enabled to exploit labour on a regular and systematic basis. Building on the work of
Braverman (1974), Hopper et al. (1987), and Hopper and Armstrong (1991) have
developed a critique on this model. So Hopper et al. (1987) dispute Kaplan and Johnson's
argument that cost accounting changes are continuous and an inevitable consequence of
economic and technological imperatives. Instead, they claim that cost accounting changes
are discontinuous and shaped by social conflict and the needs of companies to control
labour. Consequently for them the development of MAS can better be explained by
changes in labour processes. Hopper and Armstrong (1991) broaden the basis of critical
attack by developing a critique of the transaction cost framework which underpins
Johnson and Kaplan's book, and by outlining an alternative labour process history of
United States cost and management accounting.
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Still another line of critical thinking has been brought to bear on the ABC problematic,
inspired by the theoretical approach of Michel Foucault (1977) which brought a new
attention to the ways in which forms of specialist knowledge in the 'human sciences' may
have significant 'power effects'. On that basis, some of this work has argued that the
knowledge created through MAS is one mode of exercising a 'disciplinary' power, which
is in part a disciplining of activity in particular time and space 'configurations', but which
is able to act as such a disciplining 'power' through the application of specialist
'disciplinary' knowledge. Accounting, according to Hoskin and Macve (1986, 1994) is a
particularly significant form of 'disciplinary' power, because of the way that it puts
financial and non-financial numbers to work to shape and appraise human activity in
organisational contexts. From this kind of perspective, the introduction of MAS can be
seen in terms of 'governing the calculable person' through a disciplinary web of control,
based on prescribing and evaluating performance via feedback and feedforward
performance measurement systems.
A diverse group of scholars reflect this line of thinking, including Hopwood and Miller
(1994), Loft (1994) and Miller and O'Leary (1994), in addition to Hoskin and Macve. It
is important therefore to note that there is a range of possible historical explanations
grounded in the work of Foucault. Here the work of Loft (1986), Bhimani (1993), and
Miller and O'Leary (1993) would not fully subscribe to the approach just outlined.
At the same time, such an approach is particularly valuable in the context of this project.
For the approach ensures that an adequate recognition of historical and other contextual
factors will be brought into consideration, while it also provides a valuable
methodological focus on the role played by accounting practices, both in the nineteenth
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century and today, in enabling different forms of management control and accountability
to be exercised. The particular practices identified in the work of Hoskin and Macve are
such small-scale practices, also identified by Foucault, as those of surveillance and
normalising judgement, encapsulated in the modern practices of written and numerically
graded examination. Such examining and grading practices, when applied in the context
of factory and office, take shape as the distinctive system of 'managing by the numbers'
found in all the new knowledge systems of management accounting, developed from the
nineteenth century on. ABC of course as an approach to tracking and improving 'activity'
is just such a system, albeit a distinctive modern variation on older approaches. In sum,
as Ezzamel et al. (1990:164, italics in original) put it: 'managing by the numbers is the
essence of accountability, and the manifestation of the power of the new knowledge'
(some form of accounting is unavoidable). They therefore criticise Kaplan and Johnson's
historical analysis as failing to understand what MAS were about from the outset. The old
systems, like the new ones of today, never had an economic rational relevance of the kind
that Johnson and Kaplan propose. There was therefore no such 'relevance' to lose.
Instead, the systems were and are all about enabling the effective coordination of and
accountability for activity, via the practices of managing by the numbers. Thus one may
see, as an alternative to ABC, the importation of techniques that have been successful in
Japan as an equally adequate solution to the problems of MAS. On that basis, Ezzamel et
al. argue that Kaplan and Johnson have ignored the socio-political context of the
problems and remedies they present. Its proponents are therefore all too likely to see ABC
solutions as being generally implementable, something that can be tested in a study such
as this. Here it will be important to be aware of certain specific kinds of contextual
influence, 'especially how managerial beliefs and discourses are related to the changing
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constitution of what is deemed to be legitimate and sound business knowledge' (Hopper,
1994:497). Ezzamel et al. (1990:165) contend that, since 'managing by the numbers' is a
historically embedded and integral part of modern organisational life, we should be
looking beyond the search for putatively successful techniques to a deeper level of
analysis. There
'we should be thinking systematically about the underlying accounting problem that has been
there from the outset. How best can we make the accounting numbers work within the overall
system of control so that they become really effective complementary and interlocking ways
of both describing and driving real-world performance while being aware of and responsive
to the ways that a population of calculable persons change and evolves?'.
This project hopes to contribute in a small way to advancing that level of analysis. Insofar
as it does, it may help address one assumption that has all too often compromised
attempts to address the relation between strengths and weaknesses in MAS. Under this
assumption, management accounting is seen in some underlying sense as subservient to
financial accounting. This may be because external reporting is the public face of
accounting, and so the 'ultimate' set of numbers that management needs to manage in
order to satisfy the accountability requirements of markets, shareholders and analysts. It
may be because at the technical level management accounting numbers are more ad hoc
and provisional, and so less apparently solid or 'real'. But under the disciplinary approach
just outlined, it is fundamentally misleading. This is not because the approach wants to
assert an opposite priority for management accounting over financial. But its findings
reinforce the view articulated by Chandler's history of the genesis of management in The
Visible Hand (1977, pp. 1 ff.), that the development of 'modern business enterprise'
follows on from the invention of the practices of 'administrative coordination'. These
practices integrally involve the deployment of forms of accounting that prescribe and
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track human performance, producing a new kind of 'disciplinary' business entity, where
the various knowledge disciplines of accounting develop in new forms. Consequently,
what one sees is a general new power of accounting, which begins historically when older
forms of accountability focussed on the past use of physical entities (the 'good' use of
assets, the suppression of pilfering and fraud, etc.) are supplemented by forms of 'human
accounting' which focus on both past and future performance. Accountability in this
world comes, with the development of modern financial and management accounting
systems, to cover both financial and non-financial performance measurement. It then
develops as a system in which managing the financial numbers becomes paramount, as
just noted. But this is a system in which the management accounting breakthroughs come
first, and in which there is always a complementarily between a particular financial
accounting approach and some form of MAS. The development of ABC and ABM (and
of other extensions of 'old MAS' like the Balanced Scorecard) therefore need to be
understood in this kind of frame of understanding, not in one where management
accounting is seen as essentially a secondary feature.
We may see the beginnings of the kind of critically informed research that may, as it
builds up, contribute to undermining this assumption, from the ground up. In addition to
the work by Soin (1996) and Lim (2000) already cited, some of the work by Hopper and a
range of co-writers, and by Ezzamel and Willmott and theirs, are in this area2. One of the
earliest of such studies was undertaken by Hopper et al. (1992) into six large UK
companies in diverse industries. Here there was 'no clear evidence of external reporting
conventions or accounting standards being cited as adversely affecting management
2 Some of the key works by these teams include Hopper et al. (1992), Ezzamel (1994b), Ezzamel et al.
(1997), Ezzamel eta!. (2001a, 2001b).
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accounting systems' (p. 310). Interestingly, there are signs that research informed by
other less critical perspectives may contribute to this change in perception. To mention
just one, a postal questionnaire to qualified management accountants working in UK
industrial and con-imercial companies about the interactions between external financial
reporting and management information and decision-making reached similar conclusions.
'The survey has disclosed little evidence of a generally held belief that external reporting
dominates internal accounting' (Joseph et al., 1996:90).
This initial part of my literature survey has attempted to identify some of the major
perceptions of ABC, both from its protagonists and those with critically informed
concerns about what it 'means' or signifies. In retrospect, it is perhaps important, if not
contingent, that this particular new approach developed at the same time as the new
approach known as 'critical accounting' was being articulated. This meant that while an
appeal to history could be made by Johnson and Kaplan, as a clarion call to developing a
new more 'relevant' form of MAS, history could be invoked to argue (Ezzamel et al.,
1990) that the real value of MAS was never in being 'relevant' in the sense that
Relevance Lost would argue.
At the same time, this initial review indicates that there are more areas where ABC might
be critiqued than purely in terms of its historical emergence. Roslender (1996) offers a
useful summary that identifies four major areas of concern where Johnson and Kaplan's
work has been seen as less than convincing. First, there appears to be limited evidence of
technical developments within MAS being used to respond effectively to competitive
environment changes3 . Second, there is considerable doubt as to whether MAS are in
3 Scapens (1994) admits that accounting practices — as institutionalised routines — are generally slow to
change and this may explain the lag in terms of response to changes in the environment.
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practice dependent on financial reporting demands. Third, this kind of research has been
based on 'simplistic economics-based models of the outside world' (p.535), which have
often been held in too unquestioning a way. Finally, it may be argued that managing by
the numbers has developed as a 'perversion' of the role and nature of MAS, which needs
to rediscover a concern with developing more appropriate (effective/constructive) ways of
combining business activity with accounting numbers.
If this offers a general introduction to the ABC phenomenon, and to some of the
significant ways in which it has been seen in the literature, let me pass now to considering
the more technical literature, and its key arguments.
2.2.2 Activity-based costing as emergent technical breakthrough
Here I want to consider ABC as a technical innovation within the field of management
accounting discourse, since to succeed as a new initiative it had to 'talk the talk' of
management accounting effectively. Here the way in which Kaplan, as a leading
management accounting researcher, could hook into one of the great management
accounting conundrums, how to make sense of 'overhead costs', was crucial.
According to Kaplan's general argument, which comes from the heart of management
accounting orthodoxy, management cost systems should address three different functions:
inventory valuation for financial reporting purposes, operational control for performance
and productivity evaluation, and individual product cost measurement. He then
recognises, appropriately, that 'no single system can adequately answer the demands
made by the diverse functions of the cost systems' (Kaplan, 1988:66). But he then goes
on to focus on the overhead problem as the key problem to be addressed. So, while the
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first objective is arguably fulfilled adequately by conventional MAS, such systems do not
explain what the shop floor manager should do to improve performance, and they tend to
distort product costs for strategic and marketing purposes, particularly in high overhead
contexts (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987).
This overall analysis is what 'clears the space' for the new, if now familiar, ABC
analysis. As we know, conventional product-costing systems (cost centre method) are
based on a two-stage procedure. First, the consumption of direct resources is traced to
products (direct costs) and cost centres (indirect costs). The costs in auxiliary cost centres
are allocated to the main cost centres. In the second stage the indirect costs of the main
cost centres are assigned to cost objects (e.g., products or services) through volume-
related criteria such as direct labour hours, machine hours or materials consumption.
The Kaplan 'turn' on the overheads problem is to argue that wherever possible, even
recognising that cost allocation is a judgement (i.e. 'arbitrary') issue, the objective should
be to use judgement to identify cause-and-effect relationships. Kaplan argued that
identifying the key activities that 'drive' indirect costs was the means to identifying such
cause-effect relationships. Further, in the complex, multi-product environment of modern
business enterprise, the allocation of hitherto 'indirect' costs could be tied more directly
to products, thus leading to significant reduction in the distortions in product cost
calculations. Today every Management Accounting textbook has a demonstration of how
a product or service with low direct labour hours/costs but high demands in terms of
previously 'indirect' or overhead costs can be seen in its 'true' light as costly and
dangerous, if an ABC system is adopted.
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At the same time, ABC as a technical accounting system remains based on a two-stage
procedure. Overhead costs are first charged to cost pools, based on those activities that
have been identified as causing such costs 4. These costs are then attached to product lines
via cost drivers which reflect the way in which each particular product line draws on the
activity whose costs are collected in a particular cost pool. As Cooper (1990:59) puts it,
'the first stage determines the cost of activities (this stage relies on the assertion that activities
cause costs). The second stage determines the cost of products, customers or any other cost
object for that matter (this stage relies on the assertion that products or customers consume
activities)'.
The accounting argument behind this proposal is that conventional MAS go wrong in
allocating overhead costs on the basis of a product's consumption of direct activities (e.g.
labour hours or machine hours). As the textbook examples show, any such approach will
tend to overcost high volume products and undercost those low volume ones where the
consumption of indirect activities turns out to be much higher (Cooper and Kaplan,
1991)5.
However, this general approach can be turned around, once it is accepted that the ABC
analysis has effectively got at the causal relations between activities and costs at an entity
level. There is now no reason why the focus on products may not be substituted by a
focus on the control of activities in general. At this level ABC can begin to become ABM
(Activity-Based Management) where, regardless of generating product costs 'right', new
4 Such analysis typically involves the following facets: study an organisation or a department in order to
find what activities are done, how many people perform those activities, how much time they spend, and
what resources are required. Over time, one key technical development has been to limit the number of
drivers used, to maintain focus on key relationships and enable effective management. Early approaches
frequently identified fifty or more key 'drivers', which proved too many to manage an ABC system
effectively in practice.
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financial and non-financial performance measures can be developed to control processes
and quality effectively (Maskell, 1989 a-d). In the ABM approach, activities can now be
controlled at a series of organisational levels, beginning with those definable as occurring
at the local department level, and then moving up through an appropriate series of higher
levels to those that are definable as 'entity-wide'. Potentially, the approach may now be
used in complementary ways. ABM may run the business, while ABC may still be used
to cost a product correctly over its life cycle since, given the continuing business
environment where life cycles are becoming shorter, leaving less time to recoup a bad
pricing decision (Brimson, 1986).
If we compare ABC with traditional costing overall, therefore, there is a similar approach
in both systems since both use a two-stage process (see Figure 2.1). However, according
to its proponents, ABC provides a framework for 'achieving the two overhead costing
objectives of cost pool homogeneity and a cause/effect relationship between absorption
bases and costs' (Innes and Mitchell, 1998:24). Accordingly, ABC has been put forward
as the solution to many of the problems of modern businesses in competitive
environments. This is because conventional MAS gives 'too little attention to internal
cost controls, matches revenue and expenses improperly, and emphasises conservative
inventory valuation at the expense of management reporting' (Peavey, 1990:31).
I hope that this is a fair yet critically-informed summary of the technical beginnings of
ABC. Its great strength was to make overhead activities visible and controllable in a new
5 It is further argued that recent competitive environmental changes tend to raise overhead costs and
decreased direct costs, thus exacerbating the effects of any distortions in product cost calculations made
using direct allocation methods. This can be 'catastrophic' in a world where it 'is more accurate to say that
overhead drives labour costs than vice-versa' (Nanni et al., 1988:43).
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way, via activity analysis (see footnote 4), and thus to provide managers with new
performance measures (Raffish and Turney, 1991). At the same time, there were several
technical objections that could be quickly levelled against it. For instance, it was not
clear, once one went beyond the studies of the ABC boosters, that there was any strong
evidence of increased accuracy through implementing ABC (Bromwich and Bimanhi,
1989). More fundamentally, as a technical fix the new approach to attributing costs could
not fully overcome the 'judgement' problem. There was a judgement being made that
causal relations could be established. But there were two problems with this. First there
would always be some costs (e.g. head office costs) that had to remain 'arbitrary'
allocations, where there was no causal relation either to individual products or to different
(lower) entity levels (Wells, 1994). Second it was not necessarily clear that it was
possible in a complex, multi-product, constantly changing environment that supposedly
causal relations were causal. There are inevitably complex interactions between the
activities in different departments and unintended consequences of apparently simple
causal relations. One sign of that complexity was the way in which (see footnote 4) the
number of key 'causal' activities had to be limited if ABC was to be an effective
management system (cf. Anderson, 1995a; Cooper, 1996; Foster and Swenson, 1997;
Gosselin, 1997; Ittner et al., 1997). The ABC move was therefore a bold attempt to deal
with the practical problems of management. But the claim of causality was arguably at
least in part rhetorical. ABC, in this respect, could be argued not to be a major break with
the past, but just one more refinement of conventional MAS. So Horngren and others
would argue that in effect it just has more absorption rates, which it then applies, via its
version of the two-step model, in exactly the same way as conventional costing
(Horngren, 1989; Shillinglaw, 1989; Kennedy, 1996).
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The role of rhetoric is arguably also significant in the development of ABM. In one early
approach to what would become ABM, Johnson argued that companies should manage
activities rather than costs (Johnson, 1988; Ostrenga, 1990), the principle being that
activities consume resources and products consume activities. He maintained that
'activity-based information would focus managers' attention on underlying causes
(drivers) of cost and profit unlike the distant, often distorted financial echoes of those
causes that appear in traditional cost and performance reports' (Johnson, 1988:24-25).
But Johnson then, in a 1991 article, goes on to justify the new approach via an analogy
with Plato's Allegory of the Cave. In this analogy, Johnson compares the relationship
between ABM and post-1950's financial management to the condition of the prisoners in
Plato's Republic, who have lived all their lives in an underground cave. The only images
the prisoners see are the distorted shadows of people on the other side of a barrier,
projected onto the roof of the cave by the light of a fire. The first time they are allowed
out of the cave into the open is the first time they see objects and each other clearly.
Johnson links the standard costing numbers to the shadows on the wall projected by
management accountants working behind a barrier, manipulating objects and resources to
create the shadows. For the people living in the cave (managers), these numbers represent
the only reality they have ever experienced. Only after being exposed to the light of the
real world outside (ABM) are they able to see the true objects and resources that were
previously only known to them as the distorted shadows on the wall. Johnson concludes
that ABM allows managers to observe the real activities and resources consumed, and to
take decisions based on a new vision of reality that was not previously available to them.
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He maintains that as long as managers use the distorted numbers to take decisions on the
activities of the business, their decisions are likely to be flawed, and result only in
improvements in the distorted numbers. Only by using an accurate vision of the
companies' activities can they hope to make good decisions. Companies' competitiveness
and long-term profitability have declined because the use of these distorted numbers
'motivates people to sustain output in order to achieve cost targets. It encourages managers to
achieve financial cost targets by producing output for its own sake, instead of encouraging
them to focus on the one key to competitive operations and long-term profitability — namely,
empowering people to efficiently satisfy customer wants' (Johnson, 1991a:231)6.
It is a powerful piece of writing. But it no more proves that the new numbers are 'true'
than does the claim of causality advanced for the superiority of ABC initially.
The continuing problem for ABM may be illustrated by referring to Brimson's
methodology (1991:11) for the implementation of an accounting-based activity
management system. There are now six steps:
1. 'Determine enterprise activities.
2. Determine activity cost and performance. Performance is measured as the cost per
output, time to perform the activity, and the quality of the output.
3. Determine the output of the activity. An activity measure (output) is the factor by
which the cost of the process varies most directly.
4. Trace activity cost to cost objectives. Activity costs are traced to cost objectives such
as products, processes, and orders based on the usage of the activity.
5. Determine corporate short-range and long-term goals (critical success factors). This
requires an understanding of the current cost structure, which indicates how
effectively operating activities deliver value to the customer.
6 It is argued that there is a tendency to focus on short term profits, rather than pursuing long term strategies
of investment and research into more effective and efficient manufacturing systems (Hayes and Abernathy,
1980).
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6. Evaluate activity effectiveness and efficiency. Knowing the critical success factors
(step 5) enables a company to examine what it is now doing (step 4) and the
relationship of that action to achieving those goals'.
Steps 1 to 4 are arguably the ABC method. Its expansion via steps 5 and 6 describes the
broader scope of ABM methodology, which allows managers to use the information from
ABC for decision making.
However, there are two sorts of problem here. First, there is a problem implied by
locating the determination of goals at Stage 5. This suggests a tendency to start from
current practice. Yet current practice may be highly dysfunctional in terms of
implementing an activity-based approach. It is not clear in the methodology how such an
endemic problem is overcome. The second problem concerns the degree to which
interactions and unintended consequences are being overlooked. For instance, how are
contextual issues to be recognised as posing a problem for the implementation of ABM
(whether these be firm-specific or more general cultural or economic issues)?
That is one issue that this study hopes to address. However, let me conclude this section
with a reflection on what has happened at a technical level for Johnson and Kaplan, post
Relevance Lost.
2.2.3 Beyond the 'relevance' debate
Johnson, who of course was never an exponent of ABC as such, has moved totally away
from a belief in accounting's transformative powers. Instead he has gone on to argue that
accounting is the problem in the work summarised in his book Relevance Regained —
From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Empowerment (1992a), and a series of related articles. He
now claims that accounting can only provide a top-down control, and that therefore ABC
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may improve cost information by using activities to allocate costs, but it does so without
providing information on how customers are satisfied or processes are stable and efficient
(Johnson, 1992b). He now focuses on three features: customers, quality and employees,
and argues that 'what matters in business is to create fulfilling jobs and survive by
profitably satisfying customers' needs (without harming society or the environment)'
(Johnson, 1992b:28).
Johnson's theme now is that 'relevance was not lost by using improper accounting
information to manage. It was lost by improperly using accounting information to control
business operations' (Johnson, 1992a:31). The problem is that managers manage results -
not processes. It is vital to understand 'customer power' and 'worker power'. Companies
should stop managers and employees from attempting to manipulate processes in order to
achieve accounting targets (ibid.), and managers should understand the differences
between managing by remote control and practices that will lead to flexibility and
customer satisfaction. He argues that the solution is total quality management (TQM)
which involves teamwork and 'empowered' workers. It is also important to change
education. ABC now, for Johnson (1994), is part of the problem, not the solution.
This about-turn by Johnson is intriguing, not least for the way it suggests that there were
unresolved tensions in the collaboration with Kaplan. [It is perhaps worth noting that
ABC as such is never referred to in their 1987 book, even though the book is widely
perceived as the launch-pad for the ABC 'revolution'.] At the same time, it is not clear
how influential this approach has been or will be. Ezzamel (1994b) offers a response to
Johnson that indicates how far accounting remains embedded within systems of
management and worker 'power' even when the aspiration is to move beyond it. Building
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on the Ezzamel et al. (1990) analysis, he argues for a deeper appreciation of what it is that
accounting is doing, in which it is important to build a critical understanding of
accounting's power effects. Accounting, as a form of exercising power within
organisations, may never have been irrelevant, and may have a deeper relevance than that
raised in the debate so far. On this basis, he disagrees with Johnson's contention that
TQM can be a solution where accounting fails. On the contrary, he argues, the TQM
literature has neither been sufficiently reflective or critical, so this is at best a 'problem-
solution' approach which tries to give quick solutions to problems that may not yet have
been fully articulated. As such, the approach fails to grasp that it may be an inferior, or
less effective, way of exercising the kind of power that accounting has exercised. For
instance, he argues that many of the techniques used by TQM are similar to those used in
accounting (in that they still impose 'managing by numbers', now based on non-financial
numbers), and that consequently, 'TQM does not promote any real concern for
understanding and managing organisational processes' (Ezzamel, 1994b:276). Finally, he
suggests that 'while the limitations of MAS are increasingly, but slowly, being
recognised, those of TQM have for the most part been masked by uncritical exhortations
of what TQM is capable of delivering' (p. 279). Accounting approaches may thus be
more realistically placed to engineer significant change in the future. Ezzamel continues
to argue that it is essential to build on the existent critique of the power of accounting and
recognise that accounting is not a neutral and passive mirror of the organisation but rather
a set of practices through which organisational reality is constituted and shaped (cf.
Morgan, 1988).
We may contrast the fortunes of Johnson's later work with those of Kaplan. Kaplan has
not abandoned the belief in developing better and more effective accounting systems,
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even though he has conceded (1992) that ABC is not 'magic', but only one of many
information systems to help managers. However, he maintains that this system has several
advantages. First, it can be part of the improvement process. It gives a cost/benefit
analysis when it is necessary to achieve quality or other improvements. Second, it can be
linked to performance measurement. After having identified the process drivers for a
critical activity, it is possible to put measures in place to improve those process drivers in
terms of efficiency. In addition, it can help one to understand operating cost consequences
and improve supplier relationships. For Kaplan, it is vital to distinguish between low-
price and low-cost suppliers. The cost of receiving, inspecting, storing and moving
materials should be linked with supplier prices. Finally, ABC can help identify the
segments and customers that can be satisfied profitably.
At the same time, Kaplan has become particularly associated with a different kind of
'logical step' beyond ABC, the Balanced Scorecard, which may be seen as an attempt to
capture the range of what goes on as 'activity' in a different way, by combining financial
and non-financial measurements to produce a control system that theoretically combines
the best of both worlds.
The aim here is to develop a more strategic kind of performance measurement system that
goes across the old financial accounting / management accounting divide, by combining
financial measures that tell 'whether the company's strategy, implementation, and
execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement' (Kaplan and Norton, 1992:77),
with non-financial measures tracking customer satisfaction, internal business processes,
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and the company's ability to learn and improve7 . Kaplan and Norton (1996a:75) state that
'the scorecard addresses a deficiency in traditional management systems: their inability to
link a company's long-term strategy with its short-term actions'. Here, the idea is to
identify the key external and internal factors that will ensure both short and long-term
financial success (see Figure 2.2). Kaplan and Norton claim that this approach enables a
company not only to know the results of actions already taken, but also to monitor
progress in building the capabilities they will need for continued growth. A Balanced
Scorecard overcomes key barriers to strategy implementation by making the strategy
specific and actionable, engaging everyone to set stretch targets and resource allocation
plans that specifically relate to the strategy, and by providing strategic feedback and
learning (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b).
Given the two very different paths that these two founders of the focus on activities have
taken, and the fact that neither of them is now involved directly with ABC or ABM, one
might conclude that this is an area whose time has passed. Yet this is clearly not the case,
either in terms of the practice of management or the theorising that surrounds it. ABC
has, on the one hand, continued to flourish as a key technique in the consultancy armoury,
as is evidenced by its application in the case considered below. On the other, there has
continued to be considerable critical intellectual concern with its adequacy and
significance (e.g. Armstrong, 2002). This, I suggest, is because of the way that ABC took
on the underlying problem of indirect or overhead costs in a new and high-profile way by
7 This is not the only call for non-financial measures (cf. Vaivio (1999) for a review of previous calls for
including non-financial measures into MAS). In several European countries, the extensive use of a reporting
system — The Tableau de Bord — that tries to model the internal operations of the organisation and relate
them to its environment, also applies a variety of non-financial indicators (e.g. Lebas, 1994, 1996; Roberts,
1995). A few authors have questioned the novelty of the Balanced Scorecard due to its similarities with the
Tableau de Bord (Lebas, 1994; Epstein and Manzoni, 1998).
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Figure 2.2 — Balanced Scorecard
Financial
'To succeed financially, how should we appear
to our shareholders?'
• Revenue growth
• Return on investment (ROI)
• Residual income
• Residual cash flow
• Economic value added (EVA)
Customer
'To achieve our vision, how should we appear to
our customers?'
• Market share
• Customer satisfaction
• Customer retention (loyalty)
• Customer service
• Customer profitability
Internal Business Process
'To satisfy our shareholders and customers, what
business processes must we excel at?'
• Throughput time
• Process quality
• Reduction in waste
• Delivery
Learning and Growth
'To achieve our vision how will we sustain our
ability to change and improve?'
• Number of new products
• Time spent talking with clients
• Employee capabilities
• Innovation measures
Source: Adapted from Kaplan and Norton (1996a:76)
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claiming to discern cause-effect relations. The approach did not necessarily have to be
'correct'; it was valuable nonetheless as a way out of a theoretical logjam. At the same
time, it can be seen as having paved the way for new kinds of connection between
management and accounting at the practical level, as exemplified both by Kaplan's move
on and Johnson's. Each has broached what were previously significant if tacit discursive
boundaries: the former between management and financial accounting discourse, the
latter between accounting and operations management discourse. Both have contributed
thereby to what may be seen as more general broadening and deepening of management
accounting discourse. Such a view has recently been articulated by Luklca and Granlund
(2002), and it is to the nature of this discursive change that I now turn.
2.3 The broadening and deepening of 'old management accounting
discourse'
Lukka and Granlund (2002) argue that one can discern three strands to management
accounting research over the past generation, each of which has its own distinctive role,
but all of which together need to be seen as complementary or even symbiotic. First there
is the traditional technical kind of MAS research. Second there is a significant strand of
consulting research. Third there is the critical strand of research. Each has its particular
content interests, research methods, argumentation styles, and each has a distinctive kind
of conclusion or 'results'. But none of the three can be considered in isolation, since there
are interactions between them. Clearly there is a strong connection, in the work of people
like Kaplan and Johnson, between 'basic' and consultancy work. But each is drawing on a
form of critique too. Critical work may seem a long way from consultancy, but as its
insights become incorporated into more mainstream thinking, critical work cannot always
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avoid being taken up as part of consultancy thinking. Lukka and Granlund therefore
present a way of seeing how these approaches are all variously implicated in a new kind
of broader and deeper management accounting discourse. They begin at the most applied
end, consultancy.
2.3.1 Consulting research: 'wider ripples in the pond'
The strong emphasis on practicability and its prescriptive and propagating style with
empirical evidence from case studies is, they argue, typical of 'consulting research'. This
genre of research was clearly dominant in the early stage of ABC literature when costing
was the primary concern. The literature dominated by Relevance Last <Johnson and
Kaplan, 1987)8 includes situations where conventional costing systems were inadequate
and the information provided was unreliable (e.g. Kaplan, 1984b, 1988; Cooper, 1987;
Cooper and Kaplan, 1988a), and ABC was discussed as a solution to those problems (e.g.
Cooper, 1988a, 1988b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992; Cooper and Kaplan, 1988b, 1992;
Johnson, 1988; Kaplan, 1988; Drury, 1989; Jeans and Morrow, 1989; Green et al., 1991;
Committee and Grinnell, 1992; Hirsch and Nibbelin, 1992; MacArthur, 1992). This series
of papers provides easy-to-read, practical contributions as it helps to identify when and if
ABC is needed, and provides suggestions for the number and kind of cost pools and cost
drivers that should be used. A significant amount of the literature was published mainly in
professionally-oriented journals such as Harvard Business Review, Journal of Cost
Management, Management Accounting (US), and Management Accounting (UK).
8 Kaplan (1998:90) refers to his own research as 'innovation action research' as it helps organisations to
implement a new idea. Innovation action research is first used 'to develop the theory, and then to examine
the feasibility of applying the theory'. As scholars actively engage in helping organisations, they 'learn not
only about the idea itself and how to improve it, but also about the conditions for successful implementation
in organizations'.
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During this period, a series of case studies describing ABC were published. Harvard
Business School published a set of case studies, many of which were written by Cooper
and Kaplan. The book The Design of Cost Management Systems: Text, Cases, and
Readings (Cooper and Kaplan, 1991) includes several, now well-known cases. Johnson
and Loewe (1987), Berland et al. (1990), Geitzmann (1991), and Brinker (1991, 1993,
1994) also provide examples of companies using activity-based techniques with relative
success. However, these case studies are alleged to be 'too brief, too managerial, too close
to behavioral and external factors, unduly atheoretical, and hence inadequate for
unravelling managerial processes and problems' (Hopper et al., 2001:278). The case
studies were mainly undertaken in manufacturing, although articles describing ABC in
other sectors also exist (e.g. Rotch, 1990; Sephton and Ward, 1990; Menzano, 1991;
Antos, 1992). The emphasis on costing was clearly dominant with almost no reference to
other uses of activity-based data. At this early stage, the main debate around ABC ideas
and assumptions was the result of two articles by Piper and Walley (1990, 1991) which
intensely criticised the internal logic of ABC and its relevance for management decision-
making. Cooper (1990) provides a response to those critiques.
However, several authors adopted a different approach at this stage. They were associated
with the Computer Aided Manufacturing — International (CAM-I) and their emphasis on
costing was less. Instead, they focused their attention on the use of ABC information for
cost management, often establishing a close link with: TQM (e.g. Brimson, 1986, 1988,
1991; Berliner and Brimson, 1988; Turney, 1989, 1991b; Turney and Reeve, 1990;
Raffish and Turney, 1991), just-in-time (e.g. Foster and Horngren, 1988; Morrow and
Haze11, 1992), continuous improvement (e.g. Turney and Reeve, 1990; Greenwood and
Reeve, 1992), and modern manufacturing systems (e.g. Turney, 1989). In addition,
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Johnson (1988, 1990) considered activity-based techniques from a TQM perspective. This
was the starting point for the debate that followed the publication of Relevance Regained
(Johnson 1992a, 1992b; Kaplan, 1992). From this debate resulted the abandonment of
costing as the ultimate objective since the advocates moved from ABC to ABM (Cooper
et al., 1992a, 1992b). Furthermore, Johnson, who earlier considered ABC to be the key to
continuous improvement of profitability (1988), now warns that it has gone too far, since
'accounting information is not capable of guiding companies toward competitiveness and
long-term profitability' (Johnson, 1992b:31).
However, even after 1992, the literature kept focusing on product costing and profitability
(e.g. Gammell and McNair, 1994; Kaplan, 1994; Dedera, 1996; Wiersman, 1996). There
has been an increasing number of articles describing the transition of ABC to other
activity-based techniques such as ABM (e.g. Drumheller, 1993; Turney, 1993; Cooper,
1994; Keys, 1994; Mecimore and Bell, 1995; Selto, 1995; Reeve, 1996; Cokins, 1999) or
activity-based budgeting (e.g. Connolly and Ashworth, 1994; Kaplan, 1994; Mason, B.,
1996; BOrjesson, 1997; Grasso, 1997; Cooper and Kaplan, 1998; Block and Carr, 1999;
Brimson and Antos, 1999, Bleeker, 2001). Articles often discuss its links with: TQM (e.g.
Carlson and Young, 1993; Turney, 1993; Marshall, 1995), Economic Value Added (e.g.
Hubbell, 1996a, 1996b), and the theory of constraints/throughput accounting (e.g.
Salafatinos, 1995; MacArthur, 1996, Coate and Frey, 1999; Huang, 1999; Corbett, 2000).
Bjomenak and Mitchell (1999) suggest that the focus of ABC literature has recently
changed from ABC to ABM. Consulting companies also helped to make this shift and
close links between ABC and ABM (e.g. Mabberley, 1992; Mabberley, 1997; Player and
Keys, 1999; Player and Lacerda, 1999). Attention has also shifted to new ways of
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combining financial and non-financial performance measures. There has been less of a
focus on 'activity' as a key category. The development of the Balanced Scorecard
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) has increased debate over the
importance of non-financial performance indicators. The chief editors (Stenzel and
Stenzel, 2001:3) of the Journal of Cost Management assert that:
It]raditional financial practices are the structural cornerstone of business operations. As
functions of process, the focus of traditional practices is usually quantitative. As business
thinking evolves, however, best practice has increasingly included the qualitative to account
for the human element. In short, along the developmental road through quality principles,
process initiatives, and the information revolution, people represent the competitive edge of
that future'.
The editorial reflects the proliferation of articles about the Balanced Scorecard and the
'growing in prominence' of non-financial measures (Curtis and Ellis, 1997; Kaplan and
Norton, 1997; Borgstrom, 2000; Syfert and Schumacher, 2000; Thor, 2000; Gooderham,
2001; Neely and Adams, 2001; Niven, 2001).
Lukka and Granlund (2000:172) conclude that consulting research is oriented towards the
construction of a market to ABC, the aim is 'selling to readers technologies, which would
increase the quality of organisations' cost allocation models and thereby support their
management'. However, the methods used are not rigorous and 'can be criticised due to
their one-sided views and Jesuitical 'aim justifies the means' mentality' (p.173).
2.3.1.1 Strategic cost management
As the debate has broadened, so have proposed solutions. In addition to the Balanced
Scorecard mentioned above, Shank and Govindarajan (1993) have argued for a new kind
of 'strategic cost management' as the next step forward. They argue that this is a more
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appropriate way of connecting a better understanding of internal processes and their cost
behaviour to the wider concern with positioning a company strategically with respect to
its competitors. They draw on Porter's (1985) value chain analysis, which was already an
accounting-dependent approach, since the 'values' attributable to different points on the
'chain' were calculated from accounting numbers, which they believe can be incorporated
here to enable companies to develop strategy more effectively for competitive advantage.
Porter had described the value chain as an analytic tool which `disaggregates a firm into
its strategically relevant activities in order to understand the behavior of costs and the
existing and potential sources of differentiation' (p.33). Shank and Govindarajan
(1989:40) show how to combine better internal cost management, via activity analysis,
with a value chain approach. They see this as involving three major steps:
1. 'Define the firm's value chain and assign costs and assets to value activities.
2. Investigate the cost drivers regulating each value activity.
3. Examine possibilities to build sustainable competitive advantage either through
controlling cost drivers or by reconfiguring the value chain.'
The terminology of 'cost drivers' is significant here. To describe the value chain, the
company must first define the physically and technologically distinct activities carried out
by the company. These activities are separated into primary and support activities. The
former directly relates to the provision of the product or service, its distribution to the
customer and after-sale assistance. The latter enables the primary activities to take place
by providing purchased inputs, human resources, technology, and other functions.
Divided out in this way: 'The value chain displays total value, and consists of value
activities and margin' (ibid.:38).
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Through careful analysis of the value chain and the company's strengths via this Strategic
Cost Management approach, Shank and Govindarajan contend that managers should be
able to make better decisions where they can best exploit the company's strengths for
competitive advantage (ibid.). They may also develop strategic partnerships with
customers, distribution channels, or other suppliers, to create links that will ultimately
create value for the customer.
In all work such as this, the linkage is increasingly clear and strong between consultancy
work and basic technical research. There can also be an almost promiscuous
dissemination of new connections. Johnson for instance has not simply gone down the
operations management route. In joint work with Sapp, (Johnson and Sapp, 1992:184-
185), he moves towards suggesting that the management information system for the
future should enable managers to analyse the value chain by focusing their attention 'on
the underlying causes of cost and profits. It comprises any relevant information about the
processes across the entire chain of value — design, engineering, sourcing, production,
distribution, marketing and after-sale service' and identify activities that 'consume
resources but do not add value to the customer'. They believe that 'a firm must sell
products that satisfy customers by meeting global standards for quality, flexibility,
service, dependability and price; and those products must cost less than customers are
willing to pay for the value received' (p. 179).
Or again, in his most recent book, Profit Beyond Measures: Extraordinary Results
Through Attention to Work and People (Johnson and Broms, 2000) he and Broms claim
that, rather than managing by results, companies need to manage by means. In this
version of the new consultancy discourse, companies need to concentrate on encouraging
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employees to develop their creative talents so that they can best serve customer needs.
The authors cite the examples of Toyota and the Swedish truck manufacturer Scania that,
instead of being driven to meet preconceived accounting targets, have achieved superior
performance by following three principles that guide living systems — self-organisation,
interdependence and diversity9.
What we have then is a range of connections between consultancy and 'basic' research,
where key authors feel no significant difficulty in theorising and recommending a variety
of linked approaches. This applies to ABC as well. Here Kaplan has continued to
collaborate with Cooper, and in that work a new 'deeper' rationale for the use of ABC
emerges, as this approach and other systems like it are seen as part of an internal
evolution in the logic of MAS. In this context Kaplan and Cooper (1998) can assert that
the next stage is to design and integrate ABC systems and systems for operational
learning and improvement.
2.3.1.2 Recent developments in management accounting systems
To this end, they present a four-stage model of MAS evolution. In Stage I, MAS were not
even adequate for periodic financial reporting because of poor internal controls that did
not record transactions or record them incorrectly. Most companies today have an MAS
that has reached Stage II, where cost information is available for valuing inventory and
9 However, Hopper (1994:506) disputes these claims: 'Johnson, in his advocacy of human relations and
more Japanese oriented methods may be overoptimistic about the prospects of concensual change.
Essentially, Johnson is making a plea for corporate governance along earlier human relations lines. From
the ethical and humanitarean perspective there is much commend in his proposals. Yet, they share the
defects of earlier relations analyses as they ignore issues of ideology, power, conflict and the role of social
and economic institutions'.
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calculating the cost of goods sold for financial reporting 10. Kaplan and Cooper now see
their initial ABC proposals as advocating that companies should develop Stage III MAS,
wherein they retained their existing Stage 11 MAS to prepare financial reports, and
implemented ABC systems for process improvement activities, and providing useful
information for strategic decisions. However, they now claim that ABC systems are not
sufficient to ensure the twin goals of strategic vision and effective short-term operational
decision-making and control. Other MAS are necessary to provide feedback on
operational learning and improvement. This (to date ultimate) Stage IV in the evolution of
MAS can enable cost and performance measurement information to become integrated.
So if the Balanced Scorecard is one form of such integration, it is by implication not the
only one. Building on the ABC tradition, Kaplan and Cooper recommend that
management should
'calculate product and customer costs with standard activity cost driver rates and actual
activity cost driver quantities. In parallel with the ABC system, the operational control system
monitors the efficiency with which activities are performed and the actual prices of resources
used to perform activities' (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998:300).
When changes are detected, the operational control system can send a signal to the ABC
system to update activity cost driver rates. The ABC system can then be used to establish
the budget for supplying resources to perform activities. The operational control system
uses this budget for monitoring spending in responsibility centres. The data from both
systems can also be used for periodic financial reports.
10 These are the systems that Johnson and Kaplan criticised for allowing continued dominance by financial
reporting rules, thus rendering MAS information irrelevant for managerial purposes.
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In this approach, one may see aspects of critical understanding alongside the basic
research and consultancy discourses. There is an internal logic to accounting technical
development which can only appear across time, so that history leads us upwards towards
better solutions. Thus, according to Kaplan and Cooper (1998), the future of MAS
development can be secured via an upgrade of ABC systems to incorporate additional
features, namely 'measurement of resource and activity capacity, accurate assignment of
all business — and corporate — level expenses through the use of secondary and primary
activities, incorporation of the cost of capital, and comprehensive measurements of life
cycle costs and profitability' (p. 322). The operational improvement system monitors a
company's resource consumption but also, the efficiency, quality, and responsiveness of
departments and processes. The ABC system reports the cost of activities and processes,
and the cost and profitability of products, services and customers. Furthermore, 'virtually
all organizational expenses become variable and subject to management's control'
(Cooper and Kaplan, 1998:119).
Now this approach like all the others offers hostages to fortune. For instance, one may
observe that it remains unclear how in practice the new operational improvement system
is supposed to identify activities at all levels in a way that is both comprehensive and
discrete (e.g. controlling for the interactions between activities) and how it is to measure
'life cycle costs and profitability' effectively when the changing and competitive
environment renders cycles so unpredictable. It remains unclear how the expanded cost
and activity control system is supposed to produce 'numbers you can trust', to quote an
earlier Kaplan and Cooper phrase, and how it can be effectively integrated, in real time,
with the ABC system. It is also unclear, despite the rhetoric of historical evolution,
whether this approach does overcome the objection that Kaplan himself has made, that
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this kind of reconciliation between operating information and cost systems is not (yet)
feasible". At the same time, it shows just how far consultancy discourse has moved
towards implicating aspects of both technical and 'critical' discourse within it.
2.3.2 Basic research: theory development
This is not, as Lukka and Granlund observe, to say that consultancy and basic discourses
cannot be differentiated. The aim of 'basic research' remains to describe, explain and
understand in a 'neutral' fashion and with scientific rigour, how and why ABC is used12.
Authors of basic research in the ABC field therefore will tend to analyse its nature,
functioning, effects and diffusion, without raising significant critical questions about it.
The objective is to contribute to and extend existing understandings and theories of
management accounting phenomena (Luklca and Granlund, 2002). Key publication
forums for this genre of research, which is largely though not exclusively US-based and
focussed, include the Journal of Management Accounting Research, Management
Accounting Research and The Accounting Review.
Within this discursive frame, they argue that the use of different research methods
differentiates ABC literature into four sub-genres: conceptual research, mathematical
modelling, statistical studies, and case studies. The aim of conceptual research is to
clarify the concepts of ABC and compare it with conventional practices (e.g. Innes and
Mitchell, 1990a; Boons et al., 1992; Israelson, 1994; Bescos and Mendoza, 1995). The
aim of mathematical modelling research is to analyse cost behaviour in different kinds of
operational environments, and to mathematically construct models that predict cost
11 As noted before, Kaplan (1988:66) claims that 'no single system can adequately answer the demands
made by the diverse functions of the cost systems'.
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behaviour (e.g. Noreen, 1991; Babad and Balachandran, 1993; Datar and Gupta, 1994;
Balachandran et al., 1997). Statistical studies use questionnaires for data collection. They
focus on the prevalence of ABC within countries or business sectors, and user opinions
on ABC (e.g. Innes and Mitchell, 1991a, 1991b, 1995; Innes et al., 2000), success and
satisfaction with ABC implementations (e.g. Anderson, 1995a; Shields, 1995; Swenson,
1995; ICrumwiede, 1998a), and the nature of ABC diffusion (e.g. Bjornenak, 1997;
Gosselin, 1997; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Anderson and Young, 1999;
Malmi, 1999). The aim of case studies is to describe and explain, at the level of individual
companies, why and how ABC has been implemented (e.g. Bhimani and Pigott, 1992;
Malmi, 1997). This sub-genre of research permits more in-depth analysis of the practices
of a company, and adds 'to theory by examining and discussing issues such as power
games around ABC projects, accountability relationships and the changes in them in
relation to new ABC systems, and the unintended consequences of ABC
implementations' (Lukka and Granlund, 2002:176).
This last sub-genre is important in relation to this study. As already indicated in Chapter
One, this study does not see itself as located within the US mode of 'basic' research.
Therefore while it is a study of one particular case, it is not intended to be a contribution
to that research mode, in particular insofar as such case-based research is seen as a
cumulative process of adding to a theory which therefore remains in place and
unexamined. At the same time, at the level of techniques and concerns it is clearly linked
to these studies, insofar as it also is concerned with power games, accountability
relationships and unintended consequences. The difference remains at the level of how
12 This is to the extent that any research can adopt a truly neutral stance (cf. Baker and Bettner, 1997). Basic
research does not try to sell the ideas around ABC, but does not tend to fundamentally criticise them either.
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this whole process is theorised. Under the basic model, accounting technique remains
fundamentally neutral rather than problematic yet powerful, as it does under the approach
being developed here. Therefore there are procedural similarities, but that level of
similarity should not be allowed to obscure the significant level of difference in approach
and forms of analysis.
This level of difference is recognised by Luklca and Granlund, who conclude (2000:178)
that basic research is oriented towards theory development using a 'standard format'
where there is no fundamental theoretical questioning of accounting as technique in play.
Instead there is 'a thorough link to earlier literature/theory (ex ante), the presentation of
the problem setting, analysis based on scientific techniques, presentation of results vis-a-
vis earlier knowledge (ex post)'. Such work can allow a heterogeneous set of knowledge
and research methods, but it is set up on a scientistic kind of model which tends to avoid
'audacious claims and generalisations without extensive, systematic evidence on which to
base such claims' (p.177).
2.3.2.1 New Directions in Management Accounting Research and the debate on ABC
Given this understanding of the gaps between accounting discourses, it is perhaps not
surprising that researchers have theorised some form of 'gap' between management
accounting theory and practice (cf. Kaplan, 1984a, 1985; Dunk, 1989; Horngren, 1989;
Shillinglaw, 1989; Lowry, 1990; Emore and Ness, 1991; Scapens, 1991). One implication
of Lukka and Granlund's analysis is that this should perhaps be seen as a series of gaps
within and across discursive positions, which therefore lead easily to a widespread if
diffuse dissatisfaction with product cost and management accounting techniques (cf. Bork
and Morgan, 1993). We arguably now inhabit a situation where a considerable number of
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innovations 13 have emerged in the field of management accounting during the last two
decades (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998) and with ABC as one of the most
important. There is inevitably, in the current state of research and publication, a
flourishing activity accounting literature spanning the basic research/consultancy divide
and consisting mainly of prescriptive books and papers describing how to implement
ABC/ABM and listing its potential benefits when replacing 'outdated' conventional MAS
(e.g. Bruns and Kaplan, 1987; Ostrenga, 1990; Brimson, 1991; Cooper and Kaplan, 1991;
Raffish and Turney, 1991; Tumey, 1991a, 1996; Brinker, 1991, 1993, 1994; Roberts and
Silvester, 1996). Within this literature, there is also a range of sceptical and critical
studies, e.g. pointing out that relatively few organisations seem to be switching to ABC
and those that decide to do so have experienced significant problems (Innes and Mitchell,
1991a, 1995, 1998; Cobb et al., 1992, 1995; Cooper et al., 1992a; Miller et al., 1992;
Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994; Anderson, 1995a; Shields,
1995; Roberts and Silvester, 1996; Innes et al, 2000).
Overall, therefore, the jury remains out on just what the success of ABC has been and
may be. Studies in several countries now indicate that the diffusion process for ABC has
not been intense despite strong advocacy. In the UK, surveys report adoption rates around
10 to 20 per cent (Drury et al., 1993; Innes and Mitchell, 1991a, 1995; Innes et al., 2000).
Innes et al. conclude that adoption rates are significantly higher among larger companies
and among those from the financial sector. Similar or lower adoption rates were found in
other European countries (Ask et al., 1996; Bruggeman et al., 1996; Israelsen et al., 1996;
Scherrer, 1996; Virtanen et al., 1996; Clarke et al., 1999), and in Canada (Armitage and
13 Bradfort and Kent (1977) define innovation as the successful introduction of ideas, perceived as new, into
a given social system. Diffusion is the process of spreading or disseminating the innovation (Bjornenak,
1997).
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Nicholson, 1993). At the same time this may only signify that the take-up of ABC is more
gradual, with a mix of early and later adopters. Surveys in the USA may be taken as
indicating such a pattern. For example, Green and Amenkhienan (1992) reported that 45
per cent of the companies used ABC to some extent. Hrisak (1996) reported a figure of 53
per cent and Shim and Stagliano (1997), asking a slightly wider question, reported that 27
per cent of companies had fully or partially implemented it and 38 per cent were planning
to do so.
It is unsurprising then that questions remain on how far ABC succeeds in bridging the
theory/practice gap. Some authors have claimed that the virtues of ABC have been
exaggerated (Staubus, 1990; Piper and Walley, 1990, 1991), while Johnson (1992b:26)
argued that the 'selling' of ABC should be 'redirected and slowed down, if not stopped
altogether'. More recently Bjomenak (1997) observed that we still have little research-
generated understanding of the relative significance of factors supposedly leading to the
successful adoption of ABC. Factors having a significant impact have included company
size (Innes and Mitchell, 1995; Ask et al., 1996; Innes et al., 2000), business sector (Innes
and Mitchell, 1995; Innes et al., 2000), cost structure (Bjomenak, 1997), and product
diversity (Malmi, 1996). Factors have been identified as supposedly militating against
adoption (cf. Innes et al. 2000), these include the fact that the design, implementation,
operation and updating of the systems is expensive and time consuming in terms of staff
and resources (cf. Cobb et al., 1992; Ma1mi, 1997). There is the possibility that people are
50
awaiting the 'test of time', wanting to see whether ABC may be a fad or fashion 14 (cf.
Bjornenak, 1997; Gosselin, 1997; Malmi, 1999). There is the possibility that its relevance
for decision-making may be perceived as occurring only in very restrictive conditions (cf.
Noreen, 1991). As Malmi (1999) has recently reiterated, change may be expected to occur
if the new system is seen as leading to better decisions, and if the expected benefits are
seen as exceeding the cost of its implementation (Feltham, 1972; Demski, 1980). But it is
not clear, at any given moment, when those conditions will be seen as having been met,
or which companies are likely or about to become adopters.
In the context of the project envisaged here, this work is of great value, to the point that
the project would not be 'thinkable' without the existence of this research tradition. At the
same time, the insights offered by the research to date are not sufficient to define this
project. It is apparent that within the 'basic' and 'consultancy' paradigms a range of
views has been and will continue to be taken up. But the very fact of this variability
indicates that it is not essential to hold any one of the positions taken up so far within
these paradigms in looking to understand the theoretical and practical strengths and
weaknesses of the ABC approach. It is therefore proposed to consider the impact and
relevance of more wide-ranging and critically informed research approaches that have
engaged with the ABC problematic. These include approaches concerned with
highlighting the role of social, organisational and behavioural factors in the implementing
14 Fashions and fads in management have been the subject of growing discussion in recent years (e.g.
Abrahamson, 1991, 1996; Kieser, 1997; Benders and van Veen, 2001). For instance, Benders and van Veen
(2001:40) claim that to understand the popularity of ABC, it is necessary to study the discourse, and the
organisational changes taking place: 'The organizational changes are then not simply the result of fashion
setters imposing beliefs on fashion followers, as Abrahamson's diffusionistic account would have us
believe, but instead are linked to the ways in which actors make use of the discourse around the concept and
enact that. Fashion users are not simply setters and followers, but actors who use their own judgements and
start from their own interests to decide how to enact fashionable rhetoric (cf. Kieser, 1997:62). Managers
will not blindly copy concepts to their own situation but are capable of producing new content and
associations'.
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of various kinds of accounting-based management change. They also include approaches
that are grounded in alternative philosophical approaches to the positivism or nave
realism of orthodox basic/technical research. The intention is to enable a more critical but
practically-based analysis to be developed when considering the Portuguese case
discussed below.
2.3.2.2 Organisational and behavioural issues on ABC
There is a tendency in reviews of research to make a distinction between mainstream and
critical approaches to accounting, but my analysis here would suggest that it is not always
easy to make hard and fast distinctions between such approaches. There can be a critical
dimension to work that focuses on such technical issues as the complexity of ABC
systems, and the problems involved in data collection, the selection of activities and cost
drivers, and the residual need for reciprocal cost allocations (Roberts and Silvester, 1996;
Innes and Mitchell, 1998; Armstrong, 2002). Researchers who are apparently mainstream
may make critical claims about the failure of ABC advocates to recognise the
organisational roles that accounting can play besides helping decision-making, neglecting
its motivational role (e.g. Merchant and Shields, 1993). It is not clear that such work
should be denied the critical label, just because more overtly 'critical' research focuses on
issues such as power, domination and ideology (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990, 1991;
Armstrong, 1991; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Scapens and Macintosh, 1996; Tinker
and Niemark, 1987; Macintosh, 1990).
Taking all this work together, instead of labelling it as 'different', one may suggest that it
contributes in different ways to an ongoing critical discourse around ABC. More
specifically, all this work contributes to making a case that, in the implementation of
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accounting-led change, technical innovation is only ever a necessary condition, not a
sufficient one for effective change.
Along these lines, Atkinson (1987) had already pointed out that cost allocation decisions
are affected by political, behavioural and organisational factors in addition to economic
ones. More recent investigations into the factors affecting the successful implementation
of ABC have increasingly indicated the significance of organisational and behavioural
issues15.
For instance, Shields and Young (1989) have argued that the key precondition for success
is a change in corporate philosophy from managing by the numbers to managing by
commitment to continuous improvement. Their 'Seven Cs Model' breaks this down into
seven key factors (all beginning with 'C'), including Corporate culture, a Champion in
top management, Commitment, Controls, Compensation and Continuous education.
Brewer (1998) has suggested an eighth 'C': national culture16.
But this is not the only such recipe-based approach to factor in organisational issues.
Indeed the importance of this type of analysis is implicitly underlined by the fact that
Kaplan himself has engaged in it, combining with his Harvard colleague Argyris, to
consider possible reasons for employer resistance to ABC (Argyris and Kaplan, 1994).
Drawing on Argyris' earlier work (1985, 1990), this paper argues that barriers to change
15 Such studies include Shields and Young, 1989; Innes and Mitchell, 1990a; Bhimani and Pigott, 1992;
Cobb et al, 1993; Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Anderson, 1995a; Shields, 1995; Player and Keys, 1995 a-c;
Roberts and Silvester, 1996; Shields and McEwen, 1996; Malmi, 1997; Krumwiede, 1998a. Further detail
of the factors for a 'successful' ABC implementation is given in Appendix I. Although not central to the
discussion here, the material is presented there on the ground that it is important background information to
the case study analysis proposed here.
16 Brewer therefore moves beyond an inherent US-centrism in much 'recipe for success' research. He
argues that in this way, besides 'tailoring ABC implementation approaches to cultural contexts, change
management programmes can be sensitized to cultural issues, thereby improving the 'fit' between people
and the principles of ABC' (p. 257).
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arise 'from the defensive routines that participants trigger to protect themselves from
experiencing embarrassment and threat from new ideas' (Argyris and Kaplan, 1994:83).
They then suggest that three phased organisationally-sensitive steps to implementation
may reduce resistance to change. First, managers should be informed of the internal
consistency and external validity of ABC through seminars and publications. Second,
they should ensure that influential individuals become sponsors and champions of ABC.
Finally, they should align the incentives that will result from internal commitment to the
new system and promoting external ways of persuading individuals to use it.
[Interestingly, this recipe draws on certain 'C's: those of Communication, Championing
and Compensation.]
There is a range of studies that are similar in approach. Anderson (1995a) and
Krumwiede (1998a) draw on an information technology implementation approach
developed by Cooper and Zmud (1990), which involves a questionnaire survey, in this
case circulated to key accounting department personnel. The Anderson (1995a) survey,
which studied the ABC implementation process at General Motors, concluded that key
success factors differed and varied in importance at different stages of implementation.
The Krumwiede (1998a) analysis divided the factors affecting the success or failure of
implementation into two sets — contextual and organisational. Contextual factors he
defined as those related to the user, organisation, technology, task and environment.
Organisational factors were those related to the human relations and interactions
involved. His findings also support the view that the impact varies depending on the
particular stage of implementation.
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Other studies offer further suggestions for key significant factors, depending on the
organisational context, economic climate, etc. Shields (1995) concludes that the main
factors affecting success or failure are top management support accompanied by a fair
amount of pressure, linkage to competitive strategies and other major initiatives, linkage
to performance and compensation, an intensive programme of education and training,
non-accounting ownership, and adequate resources for the process of designing and
implementing ABC. Staubus (1990) suggests that there is a problem of 'emotional costs'
which include the costs of trying to overcome resistance to change. But the net
impression is of a research paradigm simply committed to accumulating more factors (cf.
Lammert and Ehrsam, 1987; Campi, 1992; Shields and McEwen, 1996; Campbell et al.,
1997). By implication, if implementation attempt 'A' fails, either factor 'X' must have
been omitted, or not considered at the right moment, or not in the right combination with
factors 'Y' and 'Z'. This is a game full of endless possibilities, but one where it is not
clear that there is ever a definitive conclusion. In addition, given the survey approach,
there are, as Krumweide (1998a) points out, certain limitations imposed by the lack of
contextual information and opportunity for interview-style questioning. There is also the
danger of selective perception given that so many respondents have been controllers and
accounting managers (Krumwiede, 1998a).
Malmi's observation seems apposite, namely that too often: 'factor models fail to address
both the competing and complementing ways of obtaining information and controlling
activities in organizations, and the existence of many stakeholders in the ABC
implementation process' (Malmi, 1997:460). It is to deal with that kind of problem that
case studies offer particular opportunities. Because they are able, if appropriately
constructed, to deal with the questions of motivation, of interpersonal or departmental
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conflict, and to investigate reasons for resistance or acceptance, they can go beyond an
approach that looks for 'factors' to generate a more nuanced and arguably realistic kind of
understanding. Here human interactions may be seen less as a response to 'factors' acting
as stimuli, and instead the outcome of actions, plans, motivations and decisions which
may range from being highly conscious to unconscious, in a context where individuals
and groups may actively compete and conspire for dominance or advantage. Such case
studies can be one way of answering the call for a better understanding of the rationales
of accounting change set out in the programmatic 1980 article in Accounting,
Organizations and Society (Burchell et al., 1980), which is often seen as the launch-pad
for the critical accounting paradigm (cf. Hopwood, 1978, 1987).
In this kind of approach, it follows, as Hopwood (1984:185) alerts us, that 'the
consequences of accounting do not necessarily have a close and automatic relationship
with the aims in the name of which it is introduced'. Such an approach is particularly
appropriate in the ABC context, where such strong claims have been made for its
technical superiority. An immediate consideration, for a study taking a more critically
aware approach, is how far the supposedly technical change has more structural
implications, e.g. on the disposition of organisational power. In one early study on these
lines Bhimani and Pigott (1992) concluded that, following the implementation of an ABC
system, the accounting function was perceived as having a much more visible and active
role in ongoing day-to-day management, with consequential effects on the perceived
authority and power of line managers.
This kind of case study approach does not only shift the focus of analysis, but also alters
the very vocabulary used in the course of analysis, e.g. from factors and causes to motives
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and reasons. But it also shifts the frame of analysis from an implicit top-management
perspective, where success and failure are the key concerns, to a more global framing,
where the actions of all relevant players can become objects of attention, and where
analysis that is arguably more dispassionate can tolerate uncovering various levels and
kinds of explanation. This kind of work therefore bridges the final gap to which Lukka
and Granlund draw attention — between 'basic' and 'critical' research.
2.3.3 'Critical' research: paradigm or frame of mind?
One way of seeing critical research is as an activist approach concerned with the
promotion of social change. It may also be more widely characterised as an approach that
draws on one or more 'critical' philosophical or sociological traditions of thought. But it
may also be more widely characterised as an approach that draws on some kind of
philosophical or sociological tradition that by its approach to defining and contextualising
problems sees technical change as located within wider dynamics. Such work may or may
not be committed directly to social or organisational change, but its theoretical grounding
means that it will, given the influence of philosophy, social theory, sociology, political
economy or organisation theory, recognise the need to address critically the complex
social and organisational ramifications that accounting systems may have (Lukka and
Granlund, 2002).
There have arguably two main strands or streams of critical work in the accounting
literature over the past two decades. One draws more directly from a Germanic
Enlightenment philosophical tradition going back to Hegel and Kant, and including work
in the Marxist and Critical Theory traditions, the latter leading down, via the Frankfurt
School, to the work of Habermas (see for instance Laughlin, 1987, 1988). Such work can,
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within this tradition, occupy very disparate theoretical positions, for instance the Marxist
work of Tinker and his various co-writers can be differentiated from the work of (David)
Cooper, Hopper, and the more Habermas-inspired work of Broadbent and Laughlin. But
in all this work critical theory can, as Laughlin puts it, be seen as being used as
'a vehicle through which understanding about reality can be achieved and transformation of
concrete institutions occur ... It is the view that the present is not satisfactory, that reality
could be better than it is, and that ... critical theory can create this improvement which marks
out this thinking as essentially critical' (Laughlin, 1987:482).
A rather different strand of work has developed out of the Enlightenment tradition, via a
more French-inspired take on reason and modernity, particularly drawing on the work of
Foucault (e.g. Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988, 2000; Loft, 1986, 1988; Miller and
O'Leary, 1987, 1993). This kind of work cannot be totally divorced from the German
approach, not least because both approaches draw on the same Enlightenment tradition,
and on the older `logocentric' tradition of reason that leads back to Plato and Aristotle.
Further, some of those who work from the Marxist and Critical Theory traditions, e.g.
Cooper or Macintosh, have also worked within this French one. Nevertheless there are
some important differences, which have often been identified as having a greater direct
concern with issues of power and knowledge and their interrelations, and with a
commitment to locating particular power-knowledge relations in their historical context
(cf. Stewart, 1992 for a review of Foucault's influence on accounting history).
In reviewing the French-inspired work in accounting, an impression should not be given
that this is exclusively Foucauldian. Critical accounting research has also been
considerably influenced by, for instance, Bourdieu (e.g. Lee, 1995; Williams and
Rodgers, 1995; Lukka and Kasanen, 1996) and Latour (e.g. Preston et al., 1992; Robson,
1992; Chua, 1995; Mouritsen, 1999; Briers and Chua, 2001). From Bourdieu, researchers
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have picked up on the importance of the role of powerful 'knowledge agents' in the
modern world and the way in which such agents capture 'cultural capital', and been able
to reflect on how managers and accountants succeed in playing this kind of game.
Drawing on Latour, researchers have focussed on how accountants and managers
constitute networks of knowledge experts, and how as actors in such networks they can
negotiate and increase accounting's social and organisational power".
At the same time, the most utilised theorist is clearly Foucault, perhaps because his focus
on power-knowledge interrelations focuses on what he calls micro-technologies that
combine forms of surveillance with what he calls (1977: 177) 'normalising judgement'.
Accounting, both in its financial and management forms, fits very well as a technology
that combines these procedures, and thereby enables certain forms of value and valuing to
be widely disseminated.
Much Foucault-derived work focuses on how surveillance and (management) judgement
produces a kind of `panoptic' control across the workplace. In a typical overview,
Williams (1998:56) claims that Foucault's focus on the relationship between power and
knowledge can be used to characterise accounting/management relations in the following
terms. Management Accounting Systems 'can be regarded as a set of discursive practices
and the manager can be seen in these terms as a docile and obedient automaton who
controls subordinates according to the rules, and is himself controlled in the same way to
produce financial returns'.
17 Bourdieu himself drew attention (e.g. 1988) to how scientific fields are often dominated by an 6lite that
controls the production and publication of research findings, thus becoming 'filters of information' (Lukka
and Kasanen, 1996). Latour (1987) has analysed social processes of science construction through networks.
One spin-off from his work is actor network theory which is concerned with the processes by which
scientific disputes become closed, ideas accepted, tools and methods adopted: the 'translation' process.
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Such a characterisation draws on a widespread reading of Foucault's Discipline and
Punish (1977), which is a book largely devoted to a consideration of how the modern
prison, like other institutions such as factories and schools, 'disciplines' and 'reforms'
individuals and populations. But it is also possible to go beyond this kind of
characterisation, and to develop a Foucault-based approach that does not see power as a
top-down exercise on 'docile bodies' and which also does not necessarily assume that
'discourse' is so closely identified with 'practices'.
This kind of approach, as in the work of Hoskin and Macve, starts from a rather different
reading of Foucault, which draws particularly on the central part of the section on
Discipline in Discipline and Punish, 'The Means of Correct Training' (1977: 170ff). Here
Foucault, in elaborating his analysis of how hierarchical surveillance and normalising
judgement are combined in the modem world, focuses on the role of such micro-practices
as writing and examining, even arguing (1977: 185) that 'the superimposition of the
power relations and the knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible
brilliance'. His analysis then observes that these examining practices not only produce the
'docile bodies' of the disciplined modern population, but also produce the expertise of the
'human sciences', and the experts who generate the new kind of 'disciplinary' knowledge
that such sciences represent.
Hoskin and Macve have on that basis argued (e.g. 1986; 1988; 1994) that management is
a distinctively powerful form of human science, in which accounting is a particularly
significant 'disciplinary' technology, in a double sense. For while accounting does
contribute to disciplining workforces, e.g. through standard costing systems (cf. Miller
Latour himself has now distanced himself from ANT, but it has proved useful in understanding the
interactions of large business entities, through its focus on how the actions of actors (e.g. cosmopolitan and
-
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and O'Leary, 1987), it also flourishes precisely because it is such a powerful expert
knowledge.
In this reading of Foucault, therefore, the power exercised by accounting is not a simple
top-down power, it is also bottom-up, as managers and workers pursue 'success' as
individuals by introjecting accounting-set targets. Far from simply being forced to act by
a repressive negative power, they embody a productive or positive mode of power, as
they actively aspire to succeed within the new kind of systems that 'manage by the
numbers'. Also, MAS is not simply a 'discursive practice', as Williams (1998) would
have it. Instead the categories of 'discourse' and 'practice' need to be distinguished (cf.
Hoskin, 1994). Accounting systems operate via a set of interlinked practices, which
Hoskin and Macve identify as the practices of writing, examining and numerical grading.
Once systems deploying such practices are in place, whether one is looking at an older
MAS or a newer ABC system, there are discursive effects.
Here Foucault's concept of 'discourse' can be drawn upon (Hoskin, 1994), a concept
which argues that discourse refers to the range of things that in a given era and context
get said (and do not get said). What is then interesting is how and how far, with a change
such as ABC, what gets said (and written) changes to a new range of things. In such a
conceptualisation, the concern is largely with how a change at the level of practices may
engender a change at the level of discourse, something that could perhaps be read off
from the Bhimani and Pigott (1992) study mentioned above. Such a change process, once
underway, may of course also operate in the other direction. Again referring to the
literature reviewed above, one may see, as the ABC model is rolled out in academic
local) are tied together in intersecting, interorganisational networks (Briers and Chua, 2001).
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journals, a change at the level of the discourse of 'basic' research taking place. This shifts
the range of what is said in consultancy discourse, and proves a key means through which
the ABC practice developed in the research world can be disseminated and put into
practice in particular companies and sectors, and refined in that process.
One kind of outcome, as Hopper (1994:498) points out, is that the context of new
initiatives becomes more visible. As he sees it:
'Mlle major contribution of the Foucauldians is to show how transformations in cost
accounting, including ABC, are related to broader socio-political debates and the history of
ideas and modes of social governance'.
Another is to give a more informed basis for understanding why certain implementation
approaches succeed and others do not. In this regard, Foucault-inspired work can have a
practical impact as well as providing a critical-theoretical understanding. But perhaps the
most important outcome, in this context, is to provide a specific theoretically informed
basis for understanding how and why accounting can be so powerful in the modem
managerial world.
In this respect, the argument made in Ezzamel et al. (1990) is of particular significance
for a study focussed on ABC, even though strictly speaking that paper is a critique of
Relevance Lost, and therefore, as has been noted, not of ABC as such. The argument
developed from Hoskin and Macve's Foucault-influenced history of management's
genesis is that management accounting never had a relevance to lose, at least not of the
kind that Johnson and Kaplan propose. Their book argues an economic-rational case for
management's invention, i.e. it appeared when the complexity of business activity
reached a point where it was economically preferable to internalise transaction costs
instead of maintaining market relations (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, Ch. 1).
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But as Ezzamel et al. (1990) point out (cf. Hoskin and Macve, 1988), the historical record
shows that this is not what happened. Such complexity had already occurred in Britain in
the First Industrial Revolution, but no modern management systems were developed.
Further, the people involved in developing the first management systems in the US, at the
Springfield Armory and on two of the US railroads (cf. Chandler, 1977), were not
businessmen at all but graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point. What these
men brought to bear was not economic rationalism, but high-level knowledge expertise in
the engineering and science disciplines, plus experience of a highly disciplinary system of
'human coordination' introduced at West Point in 1817 by a new Superintendent, Thayer.
What they contributed to business practice was the practices of writing, examining and
grading, and a commitment to disciplinary expertise to improve internal coordination.
The first management accounting systems designed to track costs and human
performance were developed in these sites, via the application of the practices of writing,
examining and grading to older forms of stewardship accounting.
This, they argue, is the genesis of managing by the numbers, and the continuing
commitment of businesses to forms of MAS shows the continuing relevance of
management as 'disciplinary system' that disciplines workforces via the expert sub-
disciplines that make up management today. What one observes therefore in the
development of techniques like ABC, which do engage in a new and effective way with
the overhead problem, is an intensification of this disciplinary regime, both in the sense of
generating more efficiency and effectiveness across activities, and in the sense of
implanting the knowledge discipline of accounting more centrally at the heart of business.
It is hoped that this study may, among other things, contribute to deepening this kind of
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understanding of how business operates, and thereby prove to have a practical as well as
theoretical benefit.
Johnson and Kaplan's (1987) work has clearly been highly influential. It has become a
launch-pad for a wide range of reflections on the history and current status of
management accounting (e.g. Hopper et al., 1987; Ezzamel et al., 1990; Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991; Lowry, 1993; Hopper, 1994; Vollmers, 1995). In many of these ABC is
perceived as one of the instruments used to support the prevailing status quo in society
(cf. Hopper, 1994; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Lukka and Granlund, 2002). Going further,
Armstrong (1991) argues that such accounting systems are often dysfunctional for
business, but are 'successful' in accruing status and power to those who run the
accounting systems within a given organisation, as they are the key providers of the
information through which the activities of others are monitored and controlled.
In sum, Lukka and Granlund (2000:180) conclude that critical research typically
combines some form of conceptual analysis with a literature or archival-based study, and
that its main objective 'is to increase the reader's awareness of the suppressing influence
of accounting (and managerial) technology'. That is certainly the case for much of the
literature just reviewed whether it draws upon the German or French traditions. The effect
of such research on the practical operations of business is therefore very limited, or at best
indirect as (or if) a critical understanding of accounting becomes more widespread.
At the same time, there is work that draws from both traditions that is closer to the 'real
world' of business, e.g. through the undertaking of empirical studies of what goes on at
64
various levels in organisations, up to and including top management 18 . The recent work of
Ezzamel and Willmott (e.g. Ezzamel et al., 2001a; 2001b) for instance traces how top
financial management is enacted, and sheds new light on how finance directors act and
see the world. The work of Broadbent and Laughlin (e.g. Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998;
1999) draws on a Habermasian perspective to diagnose the roles of accounting in
promoting and maintaining the 'New Public Management'. Finally the Foucault-based
approach developed by Hoskin and Macve also offers a basis for undertaking empirically-
based but critically aware research, as for instance in the work of Lim (2000) into the
ways in which accounting practices shape strategic discourse, even though management
may not be aware of how this occurs.
It is hoped that this study, informed by a critical awareness of the positive power of
accounting, can also trace some of the ways in which accounting practices have such
significant organisational effects, and on that basis possibly identify and propose practical
ways for improving implementation. However, there is one more set of research studies
for review before that possibility can be more fully evaluated: those studies which have
already undertaken empirical study into the implementation of ABC in the sector I intend
to study, financial services.
18 Broadbent (2002:443) provides a review of the state of critical accounting in England, recognising that
critical accounting 'is not separate from accounting practice in general. Instead, it is simply a means of
reflecting or interacting with accounting information in order to challenge the understandings that are
conventionally generated'.
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2.4 Activity accounting in the financial services sector
The financial services sector is one that has developed dramatically on a global level over
the past two decades. There has been a concentration towards fewer and larger entities
both at a global level, with the growth of global capital and money markets, and in many
countries at a national level as well. Here the US has been a conspicuous mover of
change, with the final revoking in the 1980s of 1930s laws, passed after the 1929 Wall
Street Crash, setting regional limits to banking conglomerates.
One major outcome in the process of concentration, which has been largely prosecuted
through merger and acquisition activity, has been an intensified focus on revenue
generation alongside cost and manpower control in banks of all sizes. There has been a
search for more effective organisational forms to deliver these two objectives. Mabberley
(1997:2) has summarised the situation as follows:
`[m]arkets are becoming increasingly competitive as institutions fight for profitable business
and technology and deregulation allows other organizations to enter the markets. The
constraints on profits and the need to find new ways to improve performance and compete
successfully in the highly competitive financial services industry creates a need for the ability
to review existing performance in relation to the external environment and identify ways to
improve revenues or refocus costs to ensure greater profitability in both the short and longer
term'.
Banking is arguably a sector where approaches like ABC, with its focus on making
overhead costs visible, were always likely to be seen as attractive. The classic or
traditional bank structure has depended on a separation between front office and back
office staff, which has meant that the activity of the latter in particular has been difficult
to allocate to specific products or services. Further, the traditional branch structure, where
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the local manager has been responsible for the local set of front and back office staff and
has been the key point of contact for local customers, has reinforced the overhead
problem, and the consequent difficulty in capturing the costs of products and customers.
Hence the traditional cost management approach, found in many different countries, of
concentrating on the total cost/revenue ratio as the best index of bank 'efficiency'.
This context has led Sephton and Ward (1990:29) to observe that the situation of financial
institutions is very like that of manufacturing industry, with both showing the
characteristics that should make adoption of ABC attractive, namely:
• 'highly competitive market;
• diversity of products, processes and customers;
• significant overhead costs not easily assigned to individual products;
• demands on overhead resources placed by individual products and customers not
proportional to volume'.
They go on to highlight three areas where ABC can benefit financial institutions. First, it
can calculate 'meaningful' product costs. Second, this can then help dramatically in
analysing profitability and understanding cost behaviour as part of the strategic
management project. Third, it becomes possible to develop more effective budgeting,
forecasting and performance measurement systems in traditional 'overhead' departments.
Since, as they argue, financial institutions' services do not have cost information
requirements for external financial reporting or stock valuation, the major purposes for
ABC introduction will be decision-making and cost control.
The potential for ABC to effect major beneficial change has therefore been seen as
extremely promising. Mabberley (1992: 4) gives a classic statement of the benefits to the
management system, once:
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`[m]anagers are concentrating their attention on the costs that they can manage and beginning
to link the cost/benefit analysis to the value chain. Thus, they are focusing on those activities
that add value and, hence, differentiate their products and services or delivery capability from
that offered by the competition in a way that maximises the return to the organisation as a
whole'.
This localised benefit ends up producing a global win for the organisation as a whole, as
the ABC system
'leads to a better understanding of cost/resource management, emphasising the lag between
spending and consumption by analysing the factors that cause the initial expenditure and
monitoring the consumption of resources and capacity utilisation. It does not control the
business, but simply provides information that influences the decision makers in the
management process by providing indicators that demonstrate the cost utilisation within the
organisation' (Mabberly, 1992:16).
In such ways, the basic and consultancy discourses came, in the early 1990s, to exercise a
considerable fascination for the banking sector, both within the US and internationally.
One does not have to buy into everything said in such discourses: for instance one can
see, for those operating from the more critical perspectives just reviewed, that the claim
that the accounting system 'does not control the business' might be questionable at least.
The issue of just what effects ABC might have is, they might well argue, one for a more
critically aware and reflective analysis, based on an appropriately intensive form of
empirical study.
However what one can reasonably say, on the basis of this kind of analysis, is that there
was a considerable interest in the possibility of ABC adoption in the financial sector, and
there were clear and pressing reasons why this should have been so. Survey-based
research may leave unclear precisely what motives banks had where they decided to
implement an ABC approach, but they can show us that there was a high adoption rate in
the financial sector during the 1990s, particularly among larger entities (e.g. Innes and
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Mitchell, 1995, 2000). The reasons for such adoption may include the increasing
competitiveness in the sector, or it may more simply be a result of there being a number
of large organisations in the sector, all with the resources to implement substantial and
costly change initiatives. Fashion and fad factors often lead to a 'follow-my-leader'
adoption of new approaches, and the influence of consultants and practical 'how-to'
guides in locations like the Harvard Business Review may have been significant too (cf.
Mabberly, 1992, 1997). At the same time, it is important to recall that ABC was always
going to present itself as a far superior way of managing costs and activities to traditional
overhead-based MAS systems (cf. Innes and Mitchell, 1997).
There have been a number of case studies which have then gone on to investigate more
closely just how successful ABC has been in practice, with a particular focus on the
relations between MAS and organisational change. These have been grounded in different
theoretical traditions, and this is important in evaluating their significance. At the same
time, they all share in enabling us to get beyond the rhetoric of success and establish a
more considered approach to evaluating just what happens with this kind of MAS-based
change. This is in part because all of them contribute to countering the weaknesses of so
much would-be-scientific management research, the tendency identified by Pettigrew
(e.g. 1985, 1987) towards being acontextual, ahistorical, and aprocessual. All, by having
a more longitudinal dimension enable the research `to link the content, contexts, and
processes of change over time to explain the differential achievement of change
objectives' (Pettigrew, 1990:268).
But in addition all enable us to reflect on the extent to which MAS systems in general, as
well as ABC specifically, do actually structure and control the organisation as a whole.
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One implication that can be drawn from the literature on the banking sector already cited
is that ABC is at least part of engineering a major restructuring. Banks that can (or
believe that they can) cost products accurately can make new kinds of product-focussed
strategic decisions. They can, as it is apparent the sector has, move away from a branch
focus towards a more central strategic command structure, where the branch manager and
his/her team can be accountable to various kinds of targets. The branch may have an
overall revenue or profit target. This can be broken down into sub-targets, e.g. number of
product X sold, profit on product line Y, number of key customer contacts, etc. The
identification of profitable (and unprofitable) customers in terms of the activity costs
different types incur can be developed. Internally, a focus on reducing time spent on
certain activities and a re-engineering of worker roles, to incorporate a range of back
office and front office activities, becomes feasible. No one bank may follow exactly the
same pattern of activities as its close competitors. However a general restructuring across
the sector, driven by what the new accounting system makes possible at the micro-level,
is one kind of effect of ABC that more longitudinal, case-study research may be able to
capture.
In the following section I wish to consider more closely three particular case studies, all
of them undertaken in the financial services sector in Europe, in part for what they can
tell us empirically, but also to note how different each of them is in its theoretical
grounding. This is not necessarily a weakness. On the contrary, it shows how open good
case study work is to a range of theoretical approaches. This study indeed, as will be
shown in more detail in Chapter Three, draws on their theoretical insights in developing
its own theoretical position. I propose to discuss these studies, by Cobb et al. (1995), Soin
(1996) and Euske and Riccaboni (1999) in the order of their publication.
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2.4.1 Mapping the 'factors of change': ABC in a UK division of a multinational
bank
The study by Cobb et al. (1995) focussed on one U.K.-based division of a multinational
bank. It is perhaps the least 'theoretical' of the three studies, in the sense that it does not
explicitly adopt a theoretical framework, but simply builds on the kind of apparently
atheoretical approach of much survey-based work, by working with the Innes and
Mitchell factorial approach (e.g. 1990b) to change initiatives. That model had identified
three kinds of factor as influencing management accounting change: motivators (which
influence change in a general manner), catalysts (which trigger the change process to
start), and facilitators (defined as the conditions that are necessary but not sufficient for
change to occur). Innes and Mitchell's own conclusion was that management accounting
change occurs through the interaction of these three types of variables.
The Cobb et al. study focused specifically at the level of the management accounting
reports generated within the division, to track changes in the reports, and then to
investigate via interview the perceptions that managers and accountants had as to why
those changes had occurred. They then looked to relate those changes to the context and
process of change. This did not lead to any great theoretical reformulation. However they
did refine Innes and Mitchell's (1990b) model in certain respects, concluding that what
they defined as 'environmental pressures', both external and internal, had a considerable
impact on the way in which change took place in the division. As they put it:
'In 1989 the Bank's external environment was changing in three main areas... Firstly, the
globalization of the Division's markets through the use of increasingly sophisticated
technology meant that products had to be delivered to a much bigger market-place against
more competitors. Secondly, the advances in technology had also led to lower operating costs
for competitors, increasing the pressure on the Division's margins. The third feature was the
increasing pace of new product introduction, again mainly a function of the advances in
technology. Thus the Division had to become more innovative to compete.
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The internal environment of the Bank was also changing. There was the pressure of financial
imperatives from the Bank which, like most banks, had suffered a considerable amount of bad
debts. This increased the pressure on the Division to improve results to help offset these
losses. Also, in due course, initiatives by new senior managers created new information
needs. To respond to these pressures the Division's management needed information about its
cost structure and product profitability — information that was not then available from the
MAS ' (Cobb et al., 1995:169).
It is perhaps not surprising that this kind of factor-based approach does not see the
accounting system as particularly active as a shaper of change. Instead an expanding
range of factors is seen as coming into play as the study progresses. Among other internal
factors, they notice the influence of key individuals, staff attitudes to change, and the role
of accounting staff turnover. They note additionally that many planned changes were
either delayed or did not happen due to changes in priorities. This led Cobb et al. to posit
further key factors which they identified as 'leaders of change', 'barriers to change', and
the 'momentum of change' (see Figure 2.3). In other words, they were tracking a process
in which forms of resistance were becoming increasingly visible, and where it also
became apparent that the initiative was 'failing', at least in the terms of conventional
consultancy discourse.
Overall then, this study is very useful at showing what a longitudinal study can uncover.
However its focus on 'factors' makes it difficult for the authors to reflect in a more
integrative or distanced way on what is going on as the project is rolled out. The roles of
key individuals, the issue of attitudes, the phenomenon of staff turnover are not subject to
the kind of more in-depth analysis that might raise issues of power and resistance. The
accounting change model as developed by Cobb et al. remains interesting, but unable to
go into such questions, perhaps because it allows analysis to remain relatively ahistorical
and acontextual. This factor-based model has little space for events, motives and conflict.
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Motivators:
Globalisation
Product innovation
Catalysts:
Pressure on margins
Individuals Facilitators:
I.T.
Accounting staff
Barriers to change:
Changing priorities
Accounting staff
Staff attitudes to change
Figure 2.3 — Accounting change model
Source: Cobb et al. (1995:173)
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2.4.2 Theorising ABC implementation: tracing the 'pathways of change':
The study by Soin is in one respect similar, since this too was investigating a change
process where competitive pressures drove changes and the response was to focus on cost
structures, in this instance in a U.K. clearing bank. However, Soin is able to take a more
distanced and reflective view on the events that took place in her longitudinal study,
through drawing on a Habermasian theoretical perspective. The particular approach she
used drew on the method of 'middle range thinking' (Laughlin, 1995) and on the
development of 'skeletal' theoretical models (Laughlin, 1991). Laughlin's approach here
begins form Habermas's hermeneutic concern with humans as beings who interpret the
world to make sense of it. It therefore conceptualises organisations as an amalgam of
interpretative schemes (out of which are constructed the underlying sets of values and
beliefs of individuals within the organisation) and design archetypes (which shape an
organisation's structures and management systems, including its accounting systems).
The interpretative schemes (see Figure 2.4) are the 'highest' level in this
conceptualisation, and also the most intangible, incorporating beliefs and values, sense of
purpose and the metarules behind specifically articulated rules and procedures. From
these are derived the design archetypes, and then below these, at the most tangible and
visible level are the organisations sub-systems, which will include such elements as
buildings, people, machines, money, etc. At any given point in time, there is some kind of
dynamic balance between interpretive schemes, design archetypes, and sub-systems that
holds the organisation together and makes it a coherent whole.
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Level 1
Beliefs, Values and Norms
Level 2
Mission / Purpose
Level 3
Metarules
A
balance/
coherence
V
Interpretative
Schemes
intangible
•
Figure 2.4 — Accounting change model
Design
Archetype
Organization Structure, Decision
Processes, Communication System
balance/
coherence
x
Sub-systems Tangible Organizational Elements
tangible
Source: Laughlin (1991:211)
75
This, however, says nothing about the specific nature or robustness of the balance that
obtains at a given moment. Thus an environmental disturbance may develop, and may
prove sufficiently significant to generate a shift in the existing dynamic balance, to the
extent that people in the organisation, however reluctantly, are forced to rebalance the
previously 'inert' characteristics of organisational life (Soin, 1995).
Laughlin (1991) develops four 'pathways' that characterise the way that organisational
change may occur within this model: rebuttal, reorientation, colonisation and evolution.
The first two, for him, constitute forms of first-order change, the second forms of second-
order change. First-order change is here defined as less significant and transformative. It
may involve shifts in managerial arrangements but does not affect the interpretive
schemes (Laughlin et al., 1994). However second-order change is more fundamental,
affecting the interpretative schemes and thus penetrating deeply into the 'genetic code' of
an organisation, with lasting effects on its future nature and functioning.
Within this overall schema, the two models of first-order change are rebuttal (where
disturbance is deflected) and reorientation (where disturbance cannot be rebutted, has to
be accepted and internalised, but in such a way that does not affect the real 'heart' of the
organisation). The models of second-order change are colonisation (where change is not
chosen but forced on the organisation) and evolution (where change is deliberately chosen
and accepted freely by all organisation participants)19.
Soin uses this model to trace how the effects of ABC are in some respects fundamentally
transformative, in a way that Cobb et al. (1995) could not. Her approach enables her to
19 Broadbent (1992) asserts that these are simply heuristic devices to provide a framework of possibilities.
Actually they may be oscillations on a pathway, or different parts of the organisation may progress at
different paces, on different pathways, or in contradictory ways (cf. Laughlin et al., 1994).
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analyse how ABC is initially promoted as a major solution to long-standing banking
problems, and how its implementation is then resisted in ways that largely subvert that
initial view, But in addition along the way she is able to trace how the new kind of
accounting does have discursive effects on what gets said, as well as practical ones in
terms of organising the sub-systems and re-shaping things at the design archetype level.
On this basis, she concludes (1996:291-292) that ABC 'is more than a technical
phenomenon: it has social and behavioural implications and was intimately involved in
the creation of meanings: meaning relating to the notion of costs, efficiency and
rationalisation'.
Soin's approach begins to show how accounting can play powerful roles in the process of
organisational change. In this case, ABC is both a response to and a facilitator of
organisational change, helping to shift perceptions and understandings of the notion of
cost. It creates a new discourse and gives visibility, particularly in the bank's clearing
department, to things not previously visible that have now become available for
calculative practice and economic-decision making (cf. Hopwood, 1990). The study is
able to identify resistance, but the approach is able, through its more distanced and
theoretically grounded approach, to go beyond a view that would treat it as irrational
resistance. Instead, ABC 'can be construed as a device through which the powerful were
observing the less powerful, and in that context, one can understand the resistance to it,
particularly from the middle management' (Soin, 1998:17).
Soin's study therefore shows the value of a theoretically informed case study. The
empirical work gives a deeper and more nuanced set of insights into the implementation
process. At the same time, it contributes to the deepening of the theoretical model, e.g.
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through highlighting the issue of cultural fragmentation as it turns out that organisational
members do not necessarily hold identical sets of interpretative schemes (cf. Broadbent,
1992). The issue of power is also thrown into relief (cf. Richardson et al., 1996), as the
empirical research shows how those with the authority to force acceptance of the design
archetype and the required cultural change use their power position to force change.
2.4.3 Using 'institutional theory' in an ABC study: managing interdependencies
to meet a new environment
The study by Euske and Riccaboni (1999) differs in its cultural and geographical location,
being a longitudinal study of an Italian bank, specifically one of the first large state-
owned banks to be privatised in Italy. Once again, one can note the presence of
environmental disturbance from financial markets — market globalisation, deregulation by
the Bank of Italy, and a new law giving all the banks the authority to operate in any
financial sector. Finally, the study also adds to the theoretical richness of the work in this
area, through using institutional theory. To this end, the authors draw on the work of
Fligstein (1991) to explain the process of change and also to understand the roles of
management control systems in managing internal and external interdependencies.
Fligstein's approach has argued that the manager of an organisation has to be concerned
with three domains in which (1991: 312): 'rules are created, meaningful actions occur,
power relations are formed, and concrete forms of social organizations are set in place'.
The three domains are 'the existing strategy and structure of the organization, the set of
organizations comprising the organizational field, and the state'.
This kind of study arguably contributes at the other end of the spectrum to the
Habermasian approach developed by Soin. In her analysis, with its stress on the world as
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a place of interpretation, it was possible to get down close to the meanings that people
were making of the change process and to trace forms of resistance and the reasons for
them. Under the Fligstein approach, the role of wider social and economic domains in
shaping change and its potential success is thrown into sharper relief. Such an approach
can bring out a valuable and important complementary set of insights as we seek to
understand the change process.
Euske and Riccaboni's study concludes that a key element in the evolution of the
management control system and in the management of the interdependencies between
different groups is the role of the top manager (cf. Fligstein, 1990). At one level this is a
fairly traditional management-focussed conclusion. However, it is a traditional conclusion
which recognises that there is more to the success (or otherwise) of top management than
mere force of character or 'leadership'. Instead 'the context, history, and personalities
seem to provide the data to explain much of the behavior of the use and evolution of the
management control system' (Euske and Riccaboni, 1999:479).
2.4.4 Accounting and organisational change
Hopwood (1983:302-303) long ago argued that 'there is a very real need for theoretically
informed studies of both the use and design of accounting systems' and that 'studies of
accounting change also could do much to illustrate the nature of the diverse forces, both
internal and external to the organization, that are operating on the accounting craft'.
Those needs remain, particularly in an emerging field such as this, where the intention is
to study the implementation of fairly new MAS in the financial services sector.
Hopefully, this thesis will help to move us further away from the situation described by
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Spicer (1992:4), where 'only a few studies have looked in detail at changes in internal
accounting systems in response to major realignments of the competitive environment'.
If there is one final reflection to be made before closing this chapter, it might be helpful to
recall Hopwood's (1990) observation concerning the three major organisational roles that
accounting can have.
As Hopwood puts it, accounting first creates a certain kind of 'visibility' in the
organisation. It 'can influence perceptions, change language and infuse dialogue, thereby
permeating the ways in which priorities, concerns and worries, and new possibilities for
action are expressed' (p.9). Second, accounting functions as a calculative practice. It 'is
implicated in the objectification of phenomena, of making appear real and seemingly
precise those things that would otherwise reside in the realm of the abstract' (p.9). Third,
accounting plays an active part in creating the world as a domain of economic action.
Here accounting practice engenders a discursive shift, where new things get written, said
and thought (Hopwood, 1990:11). So accounting
'can play a role in strategically changing managerial awareness away from the problems of
just internal interdependencies towards a view of the external positioning of the organisation
or a particular segment of organisation. The language, pressures and requirements of the
marketplace can be infused into the organisation as a result of a strategic realignment of
organisational structures, internal patterns of organisational segmentation and flows of
information, including accounting information'.
Such changes do not then remain trapped at the level of the organisation. Accounting,
through promoting this kind of economic discourse as being valuable, can even play a
major role in making the world 'more economic':
'The language of efficiency, value for money, cost effectiveness and the market has entered
into political debate. Organisations are being changed in the name of such an economic
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vocabulary and, as this happens, new calls are being made for the extension of modes of
economic calculation to objectify and operationalise the abstract concepts in the name of
which change is occurring (Hopwood, 1990:15)'.
The case study that is undertaken here attempts to bear this kind of observation in mind,
at the same time that it is concerned to reflect accurately what goes on at the micro-level
in the particular organisation studied.
2.5 Conclusion
This literature review has attempted to review the main areas of research in the ABC area,
and to summarise in a balanced way the main parameters of the debates that have
developed on and around ABC and its implementation. It has also attempted to reflect on
the research approaches used to date in a way that is fair and which at the same time will
enable this study to draw on the various strengths of the different approaches summarised.
I would add a brief final summary as follows.
Relevance Lost (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) has attracted much attention in part because
it was identifying a real problem or crisis in management accounting, and in part because
of its controversial features. Their description of the historical development of
management accounting, their assumption to justify its loss of relevance and their
recommendations for improving current practices have, as we have seen, been criticised
by academics on a range of grounds (e.g. Hopper et al., 1987; Ezzamel et al., 1990;
Hopper and Armstrong, 1991). At the same time, they have described a major change
process with real effects for accounting, as they have discussed the new manufacturing
environment and the inadequacies of traditional MAS and set out prescriptions for the
future. It is apparent that over the past decade activity-based accounting concepts have
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spread rapidly, especially via management consultants and practitioner publications.
There has been a widespread consensus that ABC is superior to conventional cost systems
(e.g. Ostrenga, 1990; Brimson, 1991; Brinker, 1991, 1993, 1994) in the way that it
provides more numerous and appropriate bases for measuring the costs of activities in
order to provide more accurate product costs. But that consensus has had to be qualified.
'It is not however, a panacea which will solve all of management's cost information
needs per se' (Innes and Mitchell, 1998:34).
The literature indicates that at a practical level, various kinds of problem have arisen
when organisations have attempted to implement ABC systems (e.g. Innes and Mitchell,
1995; Shields, 1995; Malmi, 1997; Friedman and Lyne, 1999). One strand of research has
addressed this inconsistency between theory and practice by shifting the focus from
technical issues to the effect that behaviour issues have on ABC implementation (e.g.
Shields and Young, 1989; Anderson, 1995a; Shields, 1995; Gosselin, 1997; Krumwiede,
1998a).
A range of second-generation technical approaches is arguably now being disseminated.
Ferrara argued over a decade ago that: 'Much research remains to be done concerning
how a firm should integrate corporate strategy, cost driver analysis, and life cycle costing
into its cost/management accounting system' (Ferrara, 1990:52). Arguably, it is the
crystallisation of earlier one-off technical innovations, focusing on the term 'activity',
which is now presented as an integrated solution to large-scale management problems. It
is not clear as yet, however, that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
There remain concerns about ABC implementation, e.g. over the cost/benefit ratio of
ABC/ABM systems, since they are expensive to design, install and maintain. There are
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not simply initial consultancy and design costs, but ongoing costs of maintenance and
improving the system. Furthermore, as with most major investments made to engineer
significant organisational change of a kind that is likely to arouse fear of redundancy and
resistance, the level of resources required is not easy to cost with any confidence. There
are too many interactions between technical accounting and organisational factors. What
one may say given the existing body of knowledge concerning the theoretical and
practical problems associated with implementing an ABM system is that management
accountants should be participating in these discussions. As McNair et al. (1990:36) put
it,
li]nterpreting the financial and nonfinancial signals of the business and responding to them,
even when they disagree, is a management issue, not an accounting issue. As part of the
management team, management accountants can be an invaluable source of information.
They can help operating managers focus on the right activities for continuous improvement
and provide feedback on how those activities were managed'.
At the same time, we can see, from the more critical literature (and from the comments of
Hopwood just referred to) that it is often not that easy to differentiate 'management' from
'accounting' issues in this kind of way. For accounting systems will be embedded within,
and may be actively shaping, the practice and discourse of management. This study
therefore hopes to draw on the range of approaches reviewed here, whether they emanate
from the technical basic field, the consultancy field, or the critical field, as is appropriate
to the prosecution of this case study. Clearly there is a rich body of work, across these
fields, on which this study is able to draw as it moves forward, as its next step, into the
methodology chapter.
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3 Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology adopted in this research to understand the nature
and management of management accounting change in the Portuguese financial services.
Methodology refers not only to the processes used to carry out the research, but also how
the dialogue between theory and practice is constructed. A research methodology is a
strategy of inquiry that moves from underlying philosophical assumptions to research
design and data collection. One should consider one's own values and beliefs about the
nature of society and the social sciences, as research approaches and the understandings
of social phenomena differ according to one's assumptions about those phenomena
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985).
Epistemologically, the research is broadly interpretive and critical in its assumptions that
practices, and in particular in this context management accounting practices, are not
natural phenomena but socially and historically constructed by groups and individuals
operating as social actors. The interplay between social and individual levels of action is
therefore of key interest, as is the way in which meaning is constructed intersubjectively
in the organisational context under study. In addition, as an interpretive yet historically
aware study of managerial innovation, it hopes to contribute to the generation of a new
kind of empirical understanding of how accounting change works in practice in different
cultures, and in that way to help deepen our theoretical understanding of accounting's role
in modern management.
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The research can be classified as a longitudinal in-depth study of organisational change in
a single organisational context. Case studies can be seen as contributing to our
understanding of the differences and similarities between organisations and cultures,
rather than to a monolithic and scientific 'body of management knowledge'. On that
basis, the aim here is not to contribute to a supposedly scientific establishment of
ahistorical and acontextual 'factors' in 'successful management'. Instead this is more of
an exploratory case, extending a critical and interpretive form of analysis to a new
cultural context, and looking to contribute to our understanding of management and
cultural difference, through identifying possible reasons for the ways in which accounting
practices change across time and space. More specifically, it has a focus on management
accounting practices, as it looks at the changing context for banking in the Portuguese
financial services sector and how managers who are involved in change use internal
accounting system tools to facilitate the change process.
Finally, concerning the process of theoretical development experienced in undertaking
this research project, it is fair to say that, rather than imposing a priori a theoretical
framework, the worked proceeded through engaging with a range of theoretical
possibilities which were expanded, revised, abandoned or supplemented in a iterative
research process, moving back and forth from data collection to analysis. The approach
was therefore one which attempted to recognise how theory both informs and is
developed by empirical data. It is a necessary means of making sense of a complex and
uncertain human world; yet, while being regarded as an important starting point for case
study research, it needs also to be 'capable of being challenged and refined as a result of
the research process' (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996:88).
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The objective of this chapter is to clarify the ontological and epistemological foundations
of the research, justify the research methodology, outline the research design selected,
and present the data collection techniques used to achieve the key research aims of this
study. The chapter is divided into nine sections. Section 3.2 justifies the theoretical
paradigm and methodology adopted to respond to the research problem. Section 3.3
presents the research framework used to analyse the significance of MAS in the context
of organisational change. In Section 3.4, the research design, a longitudinal case study, is
developed. Issues relating to the rationale for the use of a single case study and criteria to
choose the site are discussed. Section 3.5 presents the research procedures used in the
study, putting forward the procedures of data collection and methods of data analysis.
Section 3.6 focuses on issues of reliability and validity. Section 3.7 discusses the
limitations of the methodology and Section 3.8 raises ethical issues. Finally, Section 3.9
summarises the main issues discussed in the chapter.
3.2 Rationale for the theoretical paradigm and research methodology
A researcher needs to be clear about the ontological and epistemological roots of his or
her research. Ontology concerns the 'nature of being' so is widely taken to constitute the
underlying stance to the nature of the phenomena to be investigated (Hopper and Powell,
1985), referring particularly to the assumptions made by a given approach to social
science enquiry about the nature of human being and reality. Epistemology concerns the
'nature of knowledge', and the researcher's views of what constitutes knowledge about
the phenomena under investigation (ibid.). It refers to the assumptions about the ways in
which it is possible to gain knowledge of 'reality', Sc. what can be known and what
criteria can be applied to information to qualify it as knowledge rather than belief.
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Implicitly epistemology engages with the reflexive problem of how the knower, as human
being, can know a world that is also human. In approaches such as functionalism this
problem is widely assumed to be dealt with by the functionalist method, although in more
'critical' approaches it is seen as requiring more explicit reflective engagement (and one
of functionalism's failings is seen as its failure systematically to undertake such
engagement). Social and organisational research therefore has to make assumptions about
'human nature' or the nature of human activity and about the ways in which that activity
can be understood. Ontological and epistemological issues thus cannot be ignored. In
particular, given the reflexive problem, it is important to recognise that 'all empirical
research will be partial, despite any truth claims to the contrary, and thus it would be
better to be clear about the biases and exclusions before launching into the empirical
detail' (Laughlin, 1995:65).
Authors such as Burrell and Morgan (1979), and in the accounting literature, Hopper and
Powell (1985), Chua (1986) and Laughlin and Lowe (1990) have helped to make explicit
the various ontological and theoretical assumptions underpinning much organisational
analysis. In terms of accounting research an increasing level of theoretical reflection has
addressed such issues in recent years. Laughlin (1995:69), for instance, claims that the
interest in empirical research in accounting has 'generated a range of intellectual
borrowing from social and political thought'. Broadbent (1992:343) notes 'numerous
approaches available to those who wish to study accounting in organisations', while
acknowledging that 'much of the work which has been carried out in both the
organisational and accounting spheres can be located in the functional paradigm (Hopper
and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Laughlin and Lowe, 1990)'. However, as fieldwork and
case study research have increased, simple theories of organisations can be seen to have
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become inadequate and alternative theories necessary to provide a research framework
that can explain and integrate empirical work.
Hopper and Powell (1985:429) point out that theoretical and philosophical assumptions
underlie any research — 'there is no such thing as a totally objective or value free
investigation. ... researchers into the management sciences should consider their own
values and beliefs concerning the nature of society and the social sciences'. From their
perspective, an initial theoretical construct, views on the nature of society, tends to make
two alternative approaches possible: one grounded in regulation (stability), the other in
radical change (interests, conflict, and power). Depending on how one sees society's
nature, a particular view on the 'objective' nature of reality, knowledge and human action
will follow, as will a view on how we act 'subjectively'.
This was one of the earliest articulations of a more critical-interpretive approach in the
accounting research community. There is now widespread debate concerning the
assumptions that researchers hold about ontology (i.e. concrete existence versus
individual consciousness), epistemology (observation versus interpretation), human
nature (determinism versus autonomy) and methodology (scientific method versus
hermeneutics), often drawing on Burrell and Morgan's (1979) typology, which argued
that organisational analysis had to adopt one of four incommensurable ways of seeing or
paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. Chua
(1986) was one of the first within accounting research to argue that argues that this
classification is problematic if not inadequate for a field such as accounting where the
object of analysis is both quantitative and qualitative. Given that so much quantitative
research falls into their 'functionalist' category, it is not clear what purchase or legitimacy
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more critical work can get, since it can so easily be defined as marginal, unrealistic or
irrelevant. In this respect, the claim that there are in general mutually exclusive and
incommensurable dichotomies is arguably inapplicable to this field of research analysis.
Second arguing for a difference between the radical structuralist and humanist paradigms
is unhelpful since in working to develop critique spanning the quantitative/qualitative
divide and focussing on both social and individual levels of analysis, it may be necessary
to draw on aspects of both. Third, the framework encourages a latent relativism
concerning truth and reason, which is not helpful when engaging with a field where
calculative techniques and mathematical correctness are integral issues. Finally, the
approach implies some epistemological equivalence between the fields of sociology and
management (and by extension accounting) given that the authors believe it is possible to
transplant the paradigm framework from sociology. Yet the kind of epistemological
issues just raised suggest that for accounting at least the assumption of equivalence will
not hold. In a similar way, Hopper and Powell (1985:432)20 argue that Burrell and
Morgan's framework `create[s] a dichotomy between 'objective' and 'subjective'
approaches, even though the dimension relating to social science assumptions was
constructed as a continuum (see Morgan and Smircich, 1980). They, like Chua, therefore
argue for a different tripartite categorisation of types of research. Going back to the
assumption of a continuum between objective and subjective approaches, they divide
research into the organisational and social aspects of accounting into 'three main
categories — functional, interpretive, and radical'. The latter two 'straddle Burrell and
Morgan's mutually exclusive frames of reference'. Furthermore, they sub-divide the
20 See also Chua (1986), Laughlin and Lowe (1990), and Macintosh (1994).
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functional literature 'into three sub-groups — objectivism, social systems theory, and
pluralism'.
Since then, Burrell and Morgan's categories have been extended or revised in other ways
within the literature. For instance, Macintosh (1994) distinguishes five theories or
paradigms used by current researchers and thus five possible ways of approaching the
study of organisations: structural functionalism; interpretivism; radical structuralism;
radical humanism; and postmodernism. They cannot all be adopted simultaneously; yet
one may not wish to adopt any one of them exclusively. Taking an overall view,
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1990:559) have argued that one can 'profitably use multi-
theoretical perspectives to understand differing facets of accounting and to question the
presumptions of both the traditional and emergent schools of thought'.
Perhaps the most important outcome from this theoretical development is that there is
now a much deeper, more reflective debate about the assumptions that underpin the area
of accounting, and the way in which MAS work and what they do. No longer is what
Chua (1986) defines as 'mainstream accounting thought' able to proceed unchallenged, as
if there is no alternative way of seeing. We now have sets of assumptions for what she
calls two alternative world-views — the interpretive and the critical (see Table 3.1).
For the purpose of this study, it is important to note first that there is no total agreement
on the typologies of research approaches. At the same time, there is a general recognition
that there is an established research approach or tradition, variously defined by its
supporters and opponents as functionalist/scientific/quantitative/scientistic, but that this is
not the only possible approach or tradition. The literature review in Chapter Two arguably
makes the case for such a conclusion with respect to the ABC research field. Within this
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context, this project adopts an approach that draws upon work undertaken in those other
traditions, in particular interpretive and critical forms of work.
In drawing upon interpretivist work, it is adopting an ontological position in which 'social
reality is regarded as the product of processes by which social actors together negotiate
the meanings for actions and situations; it is a complex of socially constructed meanings'
(Blaikie, 1993:96). It assumes that reality is produced and reproduced by social actors
through meaning-making activities (which may be more or less consciously undertaken
by different individuals and groups). Consequently, in any social situation there may be
multiple realities. Blonde's position is therefore that reality 'is a preinterpreted,
intersubjective world of cultural objects, meanings and social institutions' (p. 203).
Epistemologically, knowledge is seen to be derived from everyday concepts and
meanings from the point of views of people within the system. Therefore, social
researchers enter sites to re-work and 're-word' socially constructed meanings and so
reconstruct these meanings in social scientific language. In this way a redescription of the
everyday social world is developed into a theoretical understanding and discourse.
In drawing upon work coming from within a critical framework, this ontological position
is not necessarily modified in any significant way, for as Blailcie (1993) observes, work
from within critical theoretical frameworks can often share a similar ontology. In his
characterisation, reality is again seen to be socially constructed, but '[c]ognitive interests
— strategies for interpreting life experiences — determine the objects of reality. The world
is not a universe of facts which exist independently of the observer; theoretical
assumptions are embedded in theoretical constructs and common-sense thinking' (p.97).
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As noted in Chapter Two, certain work in the accounting field which has been undertaken
from Foucauldian and Habermasian perspectives may be seen as not dissimilar in terms
of their ontological and epistemological approaches. Foucault-inspired work is typically
more 'critical', Habermasian as more 'interpretive'. But the kind of approach undertaken
by Hoskin and Macve (cf. Hoskin, 1994) is centrally concerned with issues of
interpretation in its commitment to analysis of 'discursive regularities and changes' and
the ways in which both are the product of different ways of engaging with practices. At
the same time, work from within a Habermasian perspective, like that of Broadbent and
Laughlin is concerned with making visible different meanings not as a purely acontextual
hermeneutic exercise. Instead, as with Habermas's own agenda, the objective is to
promote via understanding the adoption of more rational ways of seeing, thus enabling
more enlightened change.
The present research sees itself as being located at this kind of point, where interpretive
and critical approaches meet and overlap. It aims to trace the development of MAS in a
Portuguese bank where an ABC system is being trialled, ostensibly as a means to improve
the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of employee activity. The focus of this research
is to explain the bank's actions and reactions in a context of wider change in the
economic environment of banking, with specific commitments to matching both global
and local cost efficiency challenges, leading to a new significance and visibility for MAS
in the organisational context. In this approach, accounting is necessarily seen as a set of
technologies with their own technical coherence and rationality, but whose
implementation is socially constructed, not independent of social, organisational and
political actors. The social activity that is tracked here is the result of an interplay
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between social and technical structures and practices and human agency (Roberts and
Scapens, 1985; Hopper et al., 1987; Neimark, 1990; Hoskin, 1994).
At the same time, it is recognised that 'social reality is always framed through values,
interests, and perspectives, and an open and continuous appraisal of these is necessary for
empirical observation' (Smith et al., 1988:117). The study is therefore concerned to see
how practices, particularly older and newer accounting practices, have effects on shaping
values, interests and perspectives, exploring change through three lenses — the impact on
changing structures, on changing discourses, and on the interplays between new
structures and discourses and new kinds of power relations.
In this way, the study hopes to indicate how far management accounting practices
influence strategic decision-making and enable the legitimation of action. Accounting is
therefore understood not as a neutral (if powerful) discourse, and even less as a simple aid
to technical problem solving, but instead as a knowledge-based means of exercising
power (Macintosh, 1994; Hoskin, 1994). Thus it clearly engages with the problems that
Lauglin has defined (1999) as central to critical accounting research21.
21 Laughlin (1999:73) defines critical accounting as la] critical understanding of the role of accounting
processes and practices and the accounting profession in the functioning of society and organisations with
an intention to use that understanding to engage (where appropriate) in changing these processes, practices
and the profession'. He recognises this definition is debatable, however four key elements in critical
accounting can be identified. First, critical accounting is always contextual. Second, the ultimate aim of
accounting is not to understand. Furthermore, it is evaluate, engage, and change. [Opinions diverge on this.
Some researchers critically expose and leave it to others to engage, evaluate and change, while others are
heavily involved in the change project]. Third, 'critical accounting is concerned with the functioning of the
accounting profession, practices and processes at both a "macro" societal, government, regulatory,
professional level as well as "micro" level of institutions and organisations' (p. 74). Fourth, it requires
'intellectual borrowings' from other disciplines to guide how to address the complex agendas.
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Such a study can be seen as being aligned with both postmodernist and post-structuralist
ways of seeing. It is close to postmodernism insofar as it focuses, as Creswell (1998:79)
puts it, its critiques on 'changing ways of thinking rather than on calling for action based
on these changes'. It is close to post-structuralism insofar as it contributes to moving
away from seeing reason purely as an atemporal value and instead sees its dominant
forms, at any given moment, as contested and questionable, as in the case of the modern
scientific approaches to understanding the human world.
Again postmodernism and post-structuralism, rather than being seen as allied to a
particular theory, may be considered a family of perspectives that have some
commonalties. Creswell (1998:79) claims that some of the interrelated characteristics that
define postmodernism include:
'knowledge claims must be set within the conditions of the world today and in the multiple
perspectives of class, race, gender, and other group affiliations. These conditions are well
articulated by individuals such as Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Giroux, and Freire (Bloland,
1995). These are negative conditions, and they show themselves in the presence of
hierarchies, power and control by individuals in these hierarchies, and the multiple meanings
of language. Also included in the conditions are the importance of different discourses, the
importance of marginalized people and groups (the "other"), the presence of "meta-
narratives" or universals that hold true regardless of the social conditions, and the need to
"deconstruct" texts in terms of both reading and writing, examining and bringing to the
surface concealed hierarchies as well as dominations, oppositions, inconsistencies, and
contradictions (Bloland, 1995; Stringer, 1993)'.
Just as it is not necessary to postulate a firm boundary between interpretive and critical
perspectives, so it can be helpful not to make the postmodern/post-structural divide too
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absolute22 . The most important thing is arguably to have a clear and internally coherent
ontological and epistemological position, within which a particular critical-interpretive
position can be articulated. So, as we have seen, an interpretive framework can be
extended to issues such as power, legitimation, domination (Chua, 1988) or discourse
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990). The 'social' and the 'political' can be considered jointly
in the realm of accounting knowledge. As Humphrey and Scapens (1996:101) have put it:
'in a world in which reality is socially constructed and knowledge is temporal, the task for
those seeking to enhance understanding and explanation is continuous, and the emphasis
must remain on criticism and not justification and verification'. Finally, and above all,
accounting researchers need 'to argue the merits of their chosen perspectives, to defend
their position and be equally prepared to be contradicted' (Laughlin, 1995:77).
3.3 Towards a theoretical framework for bank sector research
As just argued, this research consciously draws on a range of theoretical approaches in
order to understand the relations between MAS and organisational change. Within the
critical and interpretive frame of reference it wishes to adopt, it has found of particular
help two approaches which at first sight may appear rather different, but which have both
been used to apply research into management and accounting change to the banking
sector. The first is a largely Foucault-derived approach into the relations between
management practices and discourses developed by Morgan and Sturdy (2000), and
applied by them to the financial services sector. The second is the institution-theory
approach developed by Fligstein and applied, as noted in the last chapter, by Euske and
22 In this respect, one does not want to make too much of the fact that neither Foucault nor Derrida would
necessarily accept the `postmodernist' label, and that each had major quarrels with the work of the other.
What Creswell summarises is how there is a shared set of concerns at work. It is perhaps not surprising that
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Riccaboni to understand change in the Italian banking sector. In line with the philosophy
sketched out in the previous section, this study draws on what it sees as valuable insights
from each of these approaches. The Morgan and Sturdy approach provides a way of
ensuring that a focus on practices can be developed and maintained in undertaking and
analysing the fieldwork. The Fligstein approach helps to ensure that wider factors, e.g. the
roles of organisational fields and the state, are kept in view in understanding why certain
forms of control are dominant in the management world, and how change comes about. In
the process of moving from data to reflection and back, these approaches were felt to
offer particular benefits in attempting to develop a fruitful and distinctive new way of
analysing the significance of MAS in the context of organisational change.
3.3.1 Practices, Discourses and Organisational change
The recent work by Morgan and Sturdy (2000) claims that organisational change can be
studied from at least three different perspectives: managerialist, political and social
(though for 'the social', one could perhaps read 'the critical'). The managerialist approach
offers prescriptions and techniques to help managers engineer change and control. In this
way, the change process is reduced to a technical task that can only fail because of a lack
of ability or persistence on the part of managers. This approach has long been criticised,
however, for its weak analytical framework for understanding how and why organisations
change (Pettigrew, 1995; Molinsky, 1999; Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). In response, the
political approach attempts to understand the change process rather than simply prescribe
how to achieve change, with Pettigrew's work providing a significant advance in the
study of organisational change. He criticises the `acontextual, atheoretical and
some have found ways of drawing on their different approaches to develop new theorisations of accounting
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aprocessual' nature of mainstream organisational change literature (Pettigrew, 1987:655)
and proposes that 'theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should
explore the contexts, content, and processes of change together with their
interconnectedness through time' (1990, p. 268). More specifically, Pettigrew argues that
in order to understand the complexity and resistance found in organisational change
situations, one should combine a processual and historical view of organisations, thereby
developing a richer and better contextualised viewpoint which links the inner and outer
contexts of change. As he sees it, managers operate within a social context with some
scope for choice. At the same time, opportunities for action are limited by prior historical
circumstances, including previous internal organisational structures and decisions, and
external events and processes.
This is clearly a richer analytical approach than that adopted by managerialists. However,
some critics have suggested that the political approach is not sufficient in practice. Here
Morgan and Sturdy (2000:18) observe that even authors who adopt the political approach
often 'find themselves drawn into an uncritical managerialist framework, whereby the
politics of the change process is examined using essentially the same categories of
understanding as the actors themselves (which are invariably managerial)'. They
therefore propose a 'social' or 'critical' approach which examines the 'languages,
concepts, categories and their associated practices which actors adopt to make sense of,
construct and act in the world' (p. 18). This approach can be termed 'critical' since it is
based in contemporary European critical theorising, and in particular, the work of Michel
Foucault. The term discourse is used here in the pioneering sense used by Foucault, with
a focus on the 'range of things said' at any given time in a particular 'discursive field',
and management problematics (e.g. Ezzamel and Hoskin, 2002).
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and on the ways in which such 'things said' are the product of particular practices of
communicating, learning, coordinating, controlling and so on — practices of inclusion and
exclusion23.
The approach that Morgan and Sturdy articulate follows on from Foucault and the work
just cited (see footnote 23) as arguing that we are, as historically situated beings, always
already within discourse, as we begin as actors to explain ourselves, our actions and
organisations to ourselves and others. In the third person,
Iblodies of knowledge are constructed which are often transmitted and translated by
organizational participants into routines and procedures which, in turn, constitute or
contribute towards the construction of new or adapted lcnowledges and practices. These
bodies of knowledge become languages through which people speak about and understand
organizational processes' (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000:18-19).
23 Foucault suggests that discourse refers to what is said at a particular time in a particular context out of all
that might be said (cf. Hoskin, 1994). 'Discourse is based on the principle that everything is never said. ...
On the basis of the grammar and of the wealth of vocabulary available at a given period, there are, in total,
relatively few things that are said' (Foucault, 1972:119-120). He describes the nature of discourse most
extensively in 'The Order of Discourse' (1981), characterising it as the 'order' that comes before each of
the supposedly prior categories of language defined by Saussure — langue' (the given 'language' of a
particular place and time) and 'parole' (the word one speaks) — as the condition of the existence of both.
'Ever since the sophists' tricks and influence were excluded... .Western thought seems to have made sure
that the act of discoursing should appear to be no more than a certain bridging between thinking and
speaking — a thought dressed in its signs and made visible by means of words (i.e. parole) or conversely the
very structures of language (i.e. langue) put into action and producing a meaning-effect' (Foucault,
1981:65). However, the reality of discourse is to be already there as the means through which we learn to
speak and then extrapolate such super-categories as 'a language' or even 'language as such'. Discourse in
this sense is only producible from non-discursive practices and apparatuses (practices of exclusion and
inclusion, reward and sanction, institutional apparatus such as universities or 'societies of discourse').
Discourse has therefore been widely appropriated as a tool for understanding organisations in ways that
more or less faithfully reflect this distinctive approach. Thus, for Miller (1997:32), Foucault uses discourse
'to analyse diverse configurations of assumptions, categories, logics, claims and modes of articulation'.
Alternatively, discourse is seen more as a 'framework and a logic of reasoning that, through its penetration
of social practice, systematically forms its objects than as any use of language in a social context' (Alvesson
and Skiildberg, 2000:224). The attempt here is to retain Foucault's sense of the way in which discourse is
not purely social, since it is what shapes the differences of individual idiosyncratic statement, and is not
purely linguistic, being always a product of practices.
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In this process, there are always principles of exclusion, reducing almost to zero the
likelihood that certain things will be said — the principle of prohibition — the view of
certain things as 'mad', but also as Foucault observes (1981:55), a 'will to truth' resting
on institutional supports, pedagogy, libraries, learned societies and laboratories. This
excludes certain possibilities as unlikely or implausible, leaving only certain other
possibilities as 'acceptable understandings of the world'. This critical approach can
arguably offer a new range of insights into how dominant forms of 'true organisational
discourse' (e.g., concerning strategy and change) are constructed, insights that can
complement and yet extend those offered by such approaches as institutional theory,
psychodynamic theory or Marxism (see, for a positive take on how Foucauldian work can
complement Marx, Hoskin, 1994).
Here the objective is to apply the Morgan and Sturdy approach not just to the financial
services sector but to the roles of accounting in banking specifically. Here the study
draws on Hoskin and Macve's identification of certain secondary practices as being at the
heart of accounting and management (sc. writing, examining and grading) and looks to
see how far such practices do shape the discursive field of modern management (cf.
Hoskin and Macve, 1994). However, it is felt crucial to recognise that such practices only
operate in a wider institutional framework, where a range of expert (disciplinary)
knowledges are at work. It is here that the insights that have been developed through
institutional theory can be particularly valuable in order to understand the particular role
played by MAS in organisational change.
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3.3.2 The focus on practices and institutional theory
In recent years, institutional theory has proven to be a valuable way of analysing the
importance of MAS in managing internal and external interdependencies (Otley, 1994;
Euske and Riccaboni, 1999). To ensure growth and profitability, owners and managers
must ensure that organisational processes are performed smoothly and predictably.
Internal interdependencies are typically seen in the institutional approach as constructed
primarily through processes of hierarchy and motivation. Typically, three types of
internal control problems are identified: the relationship between management and
workers, the separation of ownership and control, and the division of labour between
different levels of management. External interdependencies are largely seen as
constructed through interactions with competitors, suppliers, capital markets and the state
(Fligstein and Freeland, 1995).
In this approach, there has been a dynamic view of organisations as forming a system
tending towards some kind of equilibrium until or unless external shocks force change.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) had argued that managers usually attempt to make an
organisation isomorphic with the prevailing institutional logic of the organisational field24
since there are powerful forces that lead organisations to become more similar to one
another. Isomorphism is a 'constraining process that forces one unit in a population to
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions' (p. 149). This
institutional perspective helps to explain the apparent homogeneity of organisational
forms and practices. However, it also needs to address how and why organisations and
organisational fields change.
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In response to the problem thus posed, Fligstein (1991) has developed an institutionally-
based approach that argues that the ability to change the course of an organisation
depends on a complex set of actions, both internal and external to it. He claims that there
are three relevant institutional contexts in which 'rules are created, meaningful actions
occur, power relations are formed, and concrete forms of social organization are set in
place' (Fligstein, 1991:312). These are: the set of organisations in the organisational field,
the state, and the existing strategy and structure of the organisation. Change is to be
understood in terms of the interplay across these contexts.
The approach therefore usefully operationalises Pettigrew's insights about the importance
of the relationship between inner and outer contexts. First, as noted above, organisations
are embedded in larger groups of organisations, thereby defining an organisational field.
The other organisations are most often competitors but can also be suppliers or
distributors. Organisational fields can therefore be thought of as the result of mutual
recognition by actors in different firms of their interdependence. Second, the state sets the
rules for any given organisational field that define what organisations can do and the
limits of legal behaviour. Third, at any given time, individual organisations will have in
place a set of strategies, structures, technologies, and physical limits that shape and
constrain their actions.
This helps to explain how stability may be more common but never guaranteed. Looking
at each of these contexts more closely, Fligstein (1990) argues that the function of
organisational fields is, above all, to promote stability. They are set to benefit their most
24 DiMaggio and Powell (1983:148) define the organisational field as 'those organizations that, in the
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers,
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products'.
102
powerful members. The relative size of organisations gives their actors differential power
to dictate the actions of others, but from the point of view of actors in less powerful
organisations, the reason to support the dominant organisations revolves around survival.
'Being a member of the field, albeit a dependent one, is one way to survive. While
competition continues to exist, it is no longer predatory' (Fligstein, 1990:6). For these
reasons, once a set of relationships and rules are established (as a stable organisational
field), it is in the interest of all organisations in the field to maintain that situation,
preserving some distribution of power and resources. However, if a shock is perceived,
actors will need to adapt. Such action will affect the field, possibly in a transformative
manner. However, such effects will not take place without interaction within and across
the other two defined contexts.
The second sphere, the state, is also made up of organisations, institutions and practices.
Each organisation has agenda settled by the political actors who also control them, and by
economic and social forces that influence the political process. The state is an important
force in the economy because it defines the rules by which actions in the economy are
carried out. It regulates industries, sets taxes and employment laws, and so forth. It also
affects the economy by consuming products/services, influencing the business cycle, and
redistributing income through its taxation and social expenditure policies. Although the
relationship between the state and large organisations often ends up serving the interests
of the companies, the state also acts in its own interests and as a mediator of interests. At
a moment of shock, the state may seize an opportunity to impose new regulations or
exploit the disruption in the normal equilibrium of the organisational field.
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Third, actors who are in control in organisations base that control on existing
organisational strategy and structure. Organisations therefore frequently experience
internal power struggles over their objectives and resources. Those who control the
resources use them to impose their view. At the same time, change in an organisation
requires taking risks. Fligstein (1991) claims that because environments are always
murky, actors have to interpret their environment, both within and beyond the
organisation. Access to the truth of things cannot be guaranteed. Authors therefore have
to propose a solution that is bounded by the internal logic of the organisation, their
knowledge, how they perceive the world, and what they conceive as appropriate
organisational behaviour. To carry out the solution, the actors must thus have the power
to act (ibid.). The author also argues that actors have their own view of the world, and
unless some shock occurs that changes their world, they will continue to act in a certain
fashion. However, this means that the source of ideas for change can emerge from the
position an actor has within the organisation. This might provide arguments or
interpretations that would alter the organisation's course by offering a particular
construction of, and a new kind of solution to, that crisis. The individual who leads the
organisation is therefore extremely important from the institutional perspective.
This framework is highly valuable, since it constrains a Foucauldian approach from
simply seeing change as socially determined, or the role of the individual as trivial. It also
stresses the integral importance of practices of exclusion and constraint (e.g. through the
role of state regulation) in the development of any organisational change. This is one
major reason for drawing on the institutional body of work here. At the same time, it does
leave certain questions somewhat unresolved. A theory of inherent equilibrium, disturbed
only by external shocks, does not in itself where 'equilibrium' comes from and how it is
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maintained. In the approach followed here, the role of practices is seen at work in shaping
both dominant ways of acting and speaking and forms of resistance. This means that
equilibrium is always provisional, maintained in 'normal' circumstances through being
more visible and audible, and so ensuring that discursively that forms of resistance have
little right to speak. When circumstances for whatever reason change, the shock event is
however not 'causal'. It is instead the occasion for the resistance that is already there to
become visible and audible. From this perspective, no special privilege is given to a state
of equilibrium, nor is there a need to see shocks as external. They may instead be
considered as predictable and endemic, as integral aspects of what gets said and done by
actors in engaging with the practices of management, just as much as the apparently more
normal and dependable moments and actions of equilibrium.
Further, we can look at particular kinds of contemporary managerialist discourse for
manifestations of a need to gain control and maintain equilibrium in a world where both
are provisional and have the potential to be lost.
3.3.3 Understanding the role of practices in a world of new nnanagerialist
discourses
Organisational and economic contexts are increasingly seen by key managerial actors as
complex and uncertain. The days of management as a science that imposes order through
the exercise of certain essential truths have gone. One development has been the
articulation of new and sophisticated discourses that are perceived to re-establish a sense
of stability and control. Insofar as they succeed in constructing the business world's
complexity in their own image, they establish the truth of their presuppositions. Such new
managerialist discourses include strategy and marketing, and, while their significance
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needs to be recognised, their strengths and weaknesses also need to be comprehended in
developing a critical-interpretive understanding. Here Morgan and Sturdy again offer
some initial steps towards such an understanding.
Strategy has emerged over the past two generations as a dominant top-management
discourse for looking at the world, making sense of complex futures and offering a form
of rational control over contexts. 'Strategy has become the main language through which
actors make sense of, respond to and thereby help realize changes. It has become an over-
arching framework for actors and organizations, providing a language of 'truth' to make
sense of the world' (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000:122). Strategy typically generates a set of
neatly co-ordinated (and often picturable) frameworks 25 that assist the process of deciding
and implementing specific strategic plans. Strategy complements these closed systems of
planning-based control with a series of objective techniques to measure performance,
tracking it against strategic goals and providing feedback. Management consultants now
play a key role as the carriers and interpreters of strategy discourse, offering 'tailored'
and 'practical' solutions, `self-reliance', and the development of political skills to draw
upon when conditions of stability are being undermined (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000).
Strategy thus establishes a crucial link with marketing discourse, which has emerged as a
key way of connecting the coordinated and managed inner context of the organisation
with the less manageable, fluctuating outer context. Competitive pressures have
increasingly forced companies to address better the needs of consumers. Marketing
provides mechanisms for understanding consumer needs, for segmenting them, and
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designing products and offers that exploit the relative efficacy and efficiency of particular
distribution channels. This last step is crucial because meeting the needs of customers is
only relevant and valuable so long as it can be done profitably. This creates tensions
within marketing. At the same time, it drives marketing into the arms of strategy as it is
forced to focus on identifying potentially profitable consumers and/or selecting profitable
products or services. Much marketing activity concerns the avoidance of competition and
the dominance of markets, that is, 'marketing benefits the firm not by satisfying
customers but by establishing quasi-monopolistic power over them' (cf. Whittington and
Whipp, 1992:54).
This work ensures that the significance of such discourses can be recognised and
appreciated when tracking the dynamics of change in the fieldwork process. At the same
time, a Foucault-based approach does not look to privilege these discourses uncritically.
In a sense the emergence of these new discourses is not new. It is purely a modern,
formalised way of ensuring that the basic financial ratio between revenues and costs is
maximised far as possible at any given time and over time. The discourses say new
things, but within a disciplinary frame of knowledge. Disciplinary expertise is required to
enable maximisation, not least within the organisational field in which all players find
themselves that is populated by strategy and marketing experts and their knowledge. Any
initial competitive advantage is 'competed away'. Meanwhile there is no departure from
the distinctive focus of banking on the underlying revenue-cost ratio.
25 There are several examples of this set of frameworks. The SWOT model helps to identify the
environmental strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The STEP model focus attention in the
social, technological, economic and political aspects of the environment that influence an organisation.
Boston Consulting Group matrix illustrates the need for a balanced portfolio of businesses. Porter's (1980)
five-forces model assists to understand how profitable an industry can be.
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It is here that a new approach to understanding the role of MAS has something to offer.
Even as strategy and marketing reach a mutually supportive position of discursive
dominance, they continue to incorporate features of resistance. The critical literature on
strategy indicates the extent to which strategy is a rhetoric of rationalisation, and even a
logical contradiction in espousing rational planning (based on analysis of past events and
trends) as a basis for succeeding in a future which will differ from the past both on
probabilistic and logical grounds 26. In addition, what emerges when one considers what
strategy and marketing focus on — revenue streams, profitability, return on investment,
economic value added — is the centrality of accounting practices and numbers to the
articulation and maintenance of these apparently dominant discourses.
The theoretical framework for this research into the banking sector has hopefully now
been clarified. It draws on the Foucauldian kind of approach articulated in Hoskin and
Macve and applied in this sector by Morgan and Sturdy. It attempts to ensure that wider
institutional dynamics affecting change are captured through reference to the Fligstein
approach developed in this sector by Euske and Riccaboni. Finally it wishes to recognise
the key importance of new discourses such as strategy and marketing, without
overprivileging their role in the implementation and operation of organisational change.
I now turn to issues raised in the implementation of this theoretical approach. Case study
research is an appropriate research strategy for questions related to 'why' and 'how'
where the researcher has no control over events (Yin, 1989; Spicer, 1992). The kind of
longitudinal case study undertaken here has been considered in the literature as
appropriate where one is attempting to identify how large change visions are implemented
26 Probabilistically, events do not repeat themselves. Logically, even if they do, that repetition is different to
those in the past, in that it represents a supplement to them.
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operationally on the ground, in what is an increasingly familiar phenomenon in
contemporary real-life contexts (Yin, 1994; Scapens, 1990).
3.4 Research method: case study
'A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to
be drawn) to the initial question of a study' (Yin, 1994:18). It is concerned with defining
the appropriate processes for collecting, analysing, and interpreting data. Its main purpose
is to help avoid a situation in which the evidence does not effectively address the initial
research question. After defining the research questions and sub-questions, the research
design for this study selected to respond to these concerns will be discussed.
3.4.1 Research questions
The key research question that underpins this study is: how and why has management
accounting practice changed in the organisation under study, and what were the
dynamics around the ABC proposal as its implementation proceeded? Sub-questions
include:
• What conditions led to the change in MAS?
• How do MAS and other change initiatives depend on each other?
• Why has the organisation adopted ABC?
• What were the stated objectives when the new system was designed and how did the
actual design and implementation conform to them?
• What were the roles of the consultants?
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• How did the organisation design and implement the new system? What were the
obstacles to change?
• Who were the important participants? How did they participate in the process?
• What were the organisational and behavioural difficulties of the process?
• What were the outcomes? What roles do (and can) MAS play in the organisation?
Adequate answers to these questions require a critical discussion of organisational and
behavioural consequences, and thus will hopefully enable the identification of similarities
and differences with studies, which have focused on the relations between MAS and
organisational change in the financial services sector. Significant studies, as noted in
Chapter Two, include the research of Soin (1996) into the change process in an UK
clearing bank drawing on Laughlin's (1991) theoretical framework. There is also Euske
and Riccaboni's (1999) longitudinal study of change in an Italian bank, using institutional
theory (Fligstein, 1991). One may now add the Morgan and Sturdy (2000) study of
change in the UK financial sector, for the help it offers in the development of the
theoretical framework used in this research.
The research adopts a design that provides an opportunity to gather contextual data at
multiple analytical levels whilst maintaining a focus on the main unit of analysis
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Yin, 1994). The ABC system was implemented across
the whole bank but the main unit of analysis is the implementation team, which
comprised consultants and staff from the organisational and accounting departments. The
research thus focuses on the interaction between these departments and the
implementation team.
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Given the research questions, the primary aim of this study is to understand the sense-
making and interpretative schema of the implementation team, for example, to study how
'they construe, construct and interpret their own behaviour' (Schwandt, 1994:120)
embedded in particular social, temporal, and cultural situations.
3.4.2 The Qualitative Nature of the Inquiry
The study is predominantly qualitative in approach. Qualitative methods permit the
evaluator to study selected issues in depth and detail, thus providing rich information
about the research phenomenon although it often requires a relatively long data collection
period and a robust means of recording, collating and analysing that data.
Jennifer Mason (1996:5-6), in reviewing qualitative research, makes the apposite
observation that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is not clear
and that qualitative research is not therefore necessarily subordinate to a dominant
quantitative paradigm. At the same time, there are important differences. The two strands
'should not be seen as a unified body of philosophy and practice, whose methods can
simply be combined unproblematically'. He then offers six key procedural features that
qualitative research should have. First, it should be 'systematically and rigorously
conducted'. This involves the preparation of a plan to use as a guide in the research
process. Second, it should be 'strategically conducted, yet flexible and contextual'. This
means that it is not only guided by research strategy but is also sensitive to changing
situations. Third, it should 'involve critical self-scrutiny by the researcher, or active
reflexivity'. As discussed above, this is based on the belief that a researcher cannot be
neutral or objective. Fourth, it should 'produce social explanations to intellectual
puzzles'. This involves recognition that selection and interpretation of data cannot be
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neutral. Fifth, it should 'produce social explanations which are generalizable in some
way, or which have a wider resonance'. Finally, qualitative research should be 'conducted
as an ethical practice, and with regard to its political context'.
Looking at qualitative research in a slightly different way, Erickson (1986) claims that the
most distinctive characteristic of qualitative inquiry is its emphasis on interpretation. But
this then needs a careful specification of what interpretations should come through.
Erickson argues that the key interpretations to be pursued are not those of the researcher
but those of the study participants. At the same time, however, the narrative that is
produced inevitably carries the interpretive framing of the researcher. So one must
recognise the importance of the observation, but arguably recognise that the question of
whose interpretations are presented and emphasised is an ambiguity present in case study
research.
More recently, Creswell (1998) has suggested that there are five traditions of qualitative
inquiry: biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study
research. Given this typology, the case study approach seemed the most appropriate here,
given the research questions. For instance, Scapens (1990:264) argues that 'case studies
offer us the possibility of understanding the nature of management accounting in practice;
both in terms of the techniques, procedures, systems, etc. which are used and the way in
which they are used'. Furthermore, case study research emphasises the importance of
getting close to people and situations to understand the reality of daily life (Yin, 1994;
Miles and Huberman, 1994). An important reason is that the case study has the ability to
facilitate the development of theory (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989, 1995). Humphrey and
Scapens (1996:101) not only defend the role of case studies in researching the day-to-day
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functioning of accounting in organisations, but also they assert that they help 'to enhance
understanding of the many paradoxes inherent in the growing resort to accounting'.
Another strength of the case study is that it is a logical and systematic mode of
investigation (Yin, 1994). Accordingly, the case study has been used within several types
of research paradigms, ranging from positivism to interpretivism or critical research. It
can provide rich detail about a social phenomenon and can handle several types of
evidence — interviews, documents, observations and questionnaires. This is important
when exploring the complexity of social life.
If this explains why the case study option has been chosen from within the qualitative
research field, there remains the question of what kind of case study this is. In one of the
major methodological works on this approach, Yin (1994:13) defines the scope of a case
study as follows:
'1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.
2. The case study inquiry
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables
of interest than data points, and as one result
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating
fashion, and as another result
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection
and analysis'.
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Spicer (1992) divides up the case study 'field' in a rather different way, proposing two
major categories of case study research 27 . The first, descriptive and/or exploratory,
includes case studies whose objective is to describe and/or explore reasons for accounting
practices. These practices may be existing or new and innovative practices. This kind of
case study research can have two objectives. The first is to describe how and/or explore
why practice has changed. The second is to develop a taxonomy of successful and
unsuccessful practices and the conditions under which they occur. The main purpose of
this research is to develop theories for practice. The second category of case research,
informing and/or explanatory, includes cases 'which are used indirectly to inform other
forms of non-empirical research or directly to explain the reasons for observed practices'
(p. 24). Case study research can be structured and informed by both theory and prior
empirical research. The study of management accounting practice can then feed back to
theory to inform or enrich it, help to shape future empirical research designs, or
reconfigure practice.
The recent spate of work on case study method is one indication of how much things have
changed over the past two generations. Two decades ago there were major calls for case
study research in management accounting. Hopwood (1983:302) argued that 'there is a
very real need for theoretically informed studies of both the use and design of accounting
systems'. Similarly Kaplan (1984a: 415) called for 'management accounting researchers
to leave their offices and study the practices of innovating organisations ,28 . Not all such
27 Other typologies of case study research methods have been suggested (Smith et al., 1988; Scapens, 1990;
Otley and Berry, 1994; Yin, 1994). For example, Scapens proposes five categories, according to the way in
which cases can be used: descriptive, illustrative, experimental, exploratory and explanatory. However, he
recognises that the distinctions between them can be ambiguous. An exploratory study, for example, may be
concerned with initial ideas forming the basis for explaining management accounting practices.
28 The reasoning beneath Kaplan's advocacy of case studies was discussed and an attempt to explain was
made by Smith et al. (1988).
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calls, obviously, were for purely empirical research. Indeed calls for case studies of
accounting in practice have come from a range of accounting researchers who want to
develop better theoretical explanations of accounting practices (e.g. Burchell et al., 1980;
Hopwood, 1983; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Hopwood, 1987; Smith et al., 1988; Scapens,
1990; Otley and Berry, 1994).
This particular study involves longitudinal case study work of the kind that Yin (1994)
has recommended. It hopefully meets the objective set by Scapens (1990:264) that 'case
studies offer us the possibility of understanding the nature of management accounting in
practice; both in terms of techniques, procedures, systems, etc. which are used and the
way in which they are used'. It hopefully also meets the processual concern expressed by
Pettigrew (1987: 655) that studies of change should be longitudinal in nature as
processual models of change must be historical, studying change through time. Pettigrew
observed that 'There are remarkably few studies that actually allow the change process to
reveal itself in any kind of substantially temporal or contextual manner'. Instead, to that
time, he claimed that 'research on change continues to this day to focus on change
episodes, and more likely a change episode, rather than the processual dynamics of
changing' (Pettigrew, 1985:10, original emphasis).
Studies such as that of Soin show that this is no longer the case, even in the banking
sector. In that emergent tradition, this study consists of a single longitudinal case study
that investigates the antecedents for changes in a Portuguese bank and how those changes
emerge, develop and terminate over time. In particular, it focuses on the implementation
of an ABC system. Although the case study is singular, it has several levels of analysis
and is a complex entity operating within a number of contexts. It can be classified as an
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intrinsic case study (Stake, 1994:236), undertaken to get a better understanding of this
particular case or 'to optimize understanding of the case rather than generalization
beyond'. Dyer and Wilkins (1991:614) also stress the usefulness of a single case study,
maintaining that the essence of case-study research is 'the careful study of a single case
that leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships and question old ones'. They
claim that building theory from multiple cases can harm the visibility of the interrelations
with the context of a particular setting. A single case study can give more attention to
distinctive and typical characteristics of a particular context, and reveal the deep structure
of social behaviour.
It is clear that there is still a debate over the single case study, and that some within the
field feel that there is a 'danger' in not looking to generalise. In this tradition, one may
note the work of Eisenhardt (1989, 1991, 1995), who has agonised over the single versus
multiple issue. Eisenhardt ultimately argues in favour of using several case studies, but
recognises that this is not an easy decision. In the last analysis, however, given the tension
between the richness of a single case and the insights produced from several cases, she
advises the researcher to decide in favour of the contribution of the incremental
improvement of the theory by adding more cases. At the same time she points out
(1991:622) that 'the appropriate number of cases depends upon how much is known and
how much new information is likely to be learned from incremental cases'. She also notes
that case studies may focus on a single setting but they can rely 'on the comparative
multiple-case logic of replication and extension for their theoretical insights'.
If one is looking to justify the choice made here in the terms that Eisenstardt adopts
(which are after all widely accepted as reasonable), one could argue that a single case
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study was favoured here for two main reasons. First there is the complexity involved in
understanding all the differences posed by the context in which the changes occur29.
Second there is the issue of just how much additional theoretical contribution additional
cases would make, in the context of developing the new kind of theoretical approach
articulated here. Not only would such research be time-consuming, it would arguably at
this point not be time well spent. But in the last analysis, perhaps all these attempts to
justify what is being done in a single longitudinal case study simply manifest a residual
attachment to the old style of scientistic approach that believes that research seeks for
generalisations. Or as Mintzberg (1979:583) observes, then, 'What, for example, is wrong
with samples of one? Why should researchers have to apologise for them?'
3.5 Research procedures
Although the culture of banking in Portugal has changed significantly over the last 25
years, some traditions remain in force. An important contribution of this research, then, is
its examination of how an imported MAS like ABC is developed and disseminated within
a Portuguese banking context.
29 Here one might note the kind of complexity that Pettigrew notes as being embedded in any large business
entity where change is taking place. 'The analytical cornerstone ... is the view that theoretically sound and
practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, content, and process of change together
with their interconnections through time. The focus is on changing, catching reality in flight; and in
studying long-term process in their contexts, a return to embeddedness as a principal of method. Context
refers to the social, political, and sectoral environment in which the firm is located. Inner context refers to
features of the structural, cultural, and political environment through which ideas for change proceed. The
overall research challenge ... is to link the content, context, and processes of change over time to explain
the differential achievement of change objectives'.
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3.5.1 Choice of case study site
Choosing the appropriate case study and establishing a relationship with its participants is
important in case study research. Pettigrew (1995:102-105) suggests four key decision
rules to be considered when choosing a research site. First, he suggests that researchers
'go for extreme situations, critical incidents and social dramas' (see also McWilliams and
Siegel, 1997). He defends a choice of 'cases where the progress is transparently
observable' (original emphasis). The second suggested rule is to 'go to polar types'. He
claims that in order to study the link between the capability of firms to manage change
and their performance, 'one needs to select sites which illustrate high and low
performance'. His third suggestion is for the investigator 'go for high experience levels of
the phenomena under study'. Creswell (1998) proposes the selection of a case study if it
provides different perspectives on the problem, process, or event that need to be
portrayed. Pettigrew's final and the most pragmatic suggestion is to 'go for more
informed choice of sites and increase the probabilities of negotiating access'. This is
important in longitudinal research, as one needs intensive access to key data sources.
The decision to conduct the research in Banco Lusitano relates to Pettigrew's suggestions
and can be summarised in three main reasons. First, the financial services sector and the
culture of banking in Portugal have changed significantly over the last 25 years. Few
academic studies of the Portuguese financial services sector exist, and none concern
management accounting. Second, this particular bank 3° has achieved high-performance
and rejuvenated itself in terms of profitability, capability and customer satisfaction since
its re-privatisation. Several change initiatives have occurred in the bank and it was the
30 Banco Lusitano is an 'old' family-owned bank, nationalised after 1974 and transformed into a state-
owned company, and then re-privatised at the beginning of the 1990s.
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first Portuguese bank to implement ABC. Third, the bank was selected because of facility
of access. It was possible to obtain the bank's permission to carry out a detailed research
investigation. The main aim was to maximise what can be learnt with respect to the
research questions, given limited time and fieldwork access. Stake (1994:246) claims that
the emphasis is on 'learning the most about both the individual case and the phenomenon,
especially the latter if the special circumstances may yield unusual insight into an issue'.
3.5.2 Data access
In-depth case studies involve certain risks because they require high quality access to
managers, and the preservation of data confidentiality over time. In this research, the risks
involved were indeed high because the bank was not familiar with case study research for
a doctoral degree in Accounting, nor the requirements involved. Interviews with key
people were planned and scheduled with the help of the personnel department. They were
held with managers of several central departments, regional offices and branch offices.
During the implementation of the ABC system, interviews were held with managers and
staff of the departments directly involved in the process. Contact with external
consultants and free access to their reports was also established.
Questions of confidentiality imposed significant constraints on the study. It was agreed
with the personnel and accounting departments that the bank would remain anonymous.
Protecting the confidentiality, and by extension the welfare of the people interviewed,
was a major concern. It was especially important to make this clear from the start of the
research that interviewees would remain anonymous. The researcher assured study
participants that only he would have access to interview tapes and transcripts, and that
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quotations from the interviews would be attributed in a way that would protect their
source.
It is important to stress that data collection did not only rely on consent from 'high-
ranking' people in the bank. It also depended considerably on the willingness of people at
various sites to speak with the researcher. However, the majority seemed genuinely
interested in talking about their work and their view in respect MAS.
3.5.3 Triangulated data collection
The research drew on a variety of sources of evidence. However, the two main data types
were documentary and archive data, and in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Data
triangulation was used for two main reasons. First, it represents an attempt to moderate or
neutralise any potential bias from a single data source, especially in terms of retrospective
analysis; bias may occur because interviewees may deliberately mislead the researcher
(Van Maanen, 1979). They also may be unaware, misled or wrong about certain aspects
of their own activities (ibid.), or make errors of recall about past events (Glick et al.,
1995; Golden, 1992). Another source of bias can relate to the situated nature of the
researcher which affects both the context and the researcher's impressions (Barley, 1995).
Second, the data was triangulated to gain a holistic view of the change initiatives
occurring in the bank. Multiple data sources highlight convergencies or discrepancies
within the findings.
Yin (1994) overviews the strengths and weaknesses of the major sources of evidence (see
Table 3.2). He strongly recommends the use of multiple sources of evidence —
triangulation — as they are highly complementary. Finally, Patton (1990) points out that
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one important way to strengthen a study is by triangulation — or by combining of different
methodologies to study one phenomenon. He distinguishes between triangulation of data
(the use of a variety of data sources), theory triangulation (the use of multiple
perspectives), investigator triangulation (the use of different researchers) and
methodological triangulation (the use of several methods). Since no observations or
interpretations are perfectly repeatable, triangulation also helps to clarify meaning by
identifying the different ways in which the phenomenon is being considered (Flick,
1992). Flick (1998:230) claims that triangulation 'is less a strategy for validating results
and procedures than an alternative to validation ... which increases scope, depth and
consistency in methodological proceedings'. Perhaps one may say that case study
research has itself become a subject of triangulation, given the rich variety of viewpoints
on it outlined earlier. Nonetheless, it is an established means of helping us to understand
the complexity and unpredictability of life, even within well-ordered organisational
contexts, by examining and recording and then reflecting on what people do in practice.
3.5.3.1 Documentary and archive data
The main documentary sources were annual reports and financial statements, consultant
and internal reports. Data was also gathered by examining minutes of meetings,
advertising material, internet WebPages, company magazines, state regulations
concerning the sector, operating statements relating to accounting and control systems,
newspapers, social balances, and other administrative documents. Documents were
carefully used to provide specific detail, assist preparation for interviews, and corroborate
evidence from other sources. Particular attention was paid to understanding the purpose
and audience of the documents. The documents were useful in four ways:
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(1) they established familiarity with not only the changes that occurred in the bank
after re-privatisation but also the structure of the organisation and review
practices;
(2) they provided a provisional list of key people to interview;
(3) they enabled the construction of a preliminary chronology of changes that
occurred in the bank and raised issues to talk about during the interviews; and
(4) they provided corroboratory evidence about the phenomena being studied
which confirmed and replicated data collected from the interviews.
The research questions of this research could not be adequately investigated without
analysis of documentary data. However, they were used with caution. As Atkinson and
Coffey (1997:47) observe,
'Mil paying due attention to such materials, however, one must be quite clear about what they
can and cannot be used for. They are 'social facts', in that they are produced, shared and used
in socially organized ways. They are not, however, transparent representations of
organizational routines, decision-making processes or professional diagnoses. They construct
particular kinds of representations with their own conventions. We should not use
documentary sources as surrogates for other kinds of data'.
The implications of this are that it is important to treat documentary sources adequately:
'We have to approach them for what they are and what they are used to accomplish. We
should examine their place in organizational settings, the cultural values attached to them,
their distinctive types and forms'.
3.5.3.2 Semi-structured interviews
In-depth, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with key people in the bank formed an
important source of information. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their position
in key areas of the organisation or their involvement in the change initiatives that have
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occurred since re-privatisation, specifically, the ABC project. Interview material was seen
as a way of accessing various stories that people tell to describe their world. The
interviews were tape-recorded (except in one case) and then transcribed. Interviews were
helpful in three key ways: (1) gaining insights into the change initiatives reported and
interpreted by interviewees; (2) acquiring insights into the history, context, content, and
culture of the bank; and (3) hearing about certain organisational issues — the unwritten
knowledge of the bank. However, it was recognised that interviews present problems of
bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1994). Emphasis was thus
given to corroborating interview data with information from other sources.
One issue about recording interviews concerns the use of a tape recorder. Tapes provide a
more accurate version of interviews than any other method. Silverman (2000:149) argues
that tapes and transcripts
'are a public record, available to the scientific community ..., can be replayed and
transcriptions can be improved and analyses taken off on a different tack unlimited by the
original transcript ..., if you want to, you can inspect sequences of utterances without being
limited to the extracts chosen by the first researcher'.
However, the presence of a tape recorder can prejudice or adversely influence discussion.
In this study, some interviewees were not completely comfortable in its presence (e.g.,
they gave extra information once the tape-recorder was switched off) and issues of social
desirability were raised — interviewees gave what they believed to be the 'correct' answer.
Gillham (2000b:94) claims that 'Nile relationship between beliefs, opinions, knowledge
and actual behaviour is not a straightforward one. What people say in a interview is not
the whole picture; adequate research and, in particular, adequate theorizing, needs to take
account of that'. Interview material was supplemented with data collected from
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documents, reports, and so forth, in order to check what the accuracy of what the
researcher was being told and also to replicate it.
3.5.4 Data gathering process — the stages of the research
The fieldwork was conducted over three years. It involved preparatory fieldwork and two
main empirical research stages. The first studied the bank context; identified and analysed
change initiatives since re-privatisation, understood what kind of accounting information
was produced as well as about its role and usage; and identified information needs for
different levels of the organisation. The second stage focused on the design and
implementation of the ABC system. This focus was on technical issues (e.g. design
complexity, activities and the definition of cost drivers, volume of output), and more
importantly, on behavioural issues both at individual and organisational level.
3.5.4.1 Preparation and research protocol
Before conducting the main research, it was necessary to become acquainted with the
history of the banking sector and the bank itself. Several external sources of information
on the Portuguese financial services sector evolution were used. Several visits were also
made to the bank's accounting department to conduct archival and historical research
before interviewing took place, in order to gain familiarity with historical events and
developments. During these initial contacts, a case study protocol written in non-
academic language was presented to the bank. A formal protocol can provide reliability
and forces the researcher to anticipate several problems that may arise. In this way it
avoids disastrous outcomes in the long run (Yin, 1994). The protocol developed for this
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study contained an overview of the research project and guaranteed confidentiality. It
listed the main objectives, field procedures and sources of information.
3.5.4.2 The first stage — research in Banco Lusitano
The first stage of the main research was conducted during July and August 1999. The
research involved 22 open-ended interviews with members of the bank's central
departments, and of regional and branch offices. Since the study aimed to obtain multiple
views from various people, interviews were scheduled by the personnel department
according to the selection of interviewees following the preparation stage in order to gain
a wide range of different perspectives.
The format of each interview was basically the same. Appendix I includes the guidelines
used to shape interviews, with open questions. These questions were supplemented with
others developed during the course of the interviews, reflecting respondents' differences
and unanticipated developments. Interviews were divided into three main parts. In the
first part, the project and the researcher were introduced, confidentiality was promised,
and the conditions of the interview were explained. Questions about the career and work
experience of the interviewee were used to open the interviews for three reasons. First,
this prevented the researcher from assuming that the job title was an accurate portrayal of
what the interviewee did. The second reason was to understand what range of questions
the interviewee was able to give an answer. The final reason was to help the interviewee
disengage from what he or she was doing immediately before the interview, relax, and
focus on the interview. In the second part of the interviews, following questions about the
department and incentive systems, interviewees were asked to talk about the information
provided by the accounting department and changes in the management information
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system. Interviewees' descriptions and reflections on these major issues were noted and
followed up with supplementary questions where possible. In the third part, the interviews
concluded with questions about change projects that had occurred in the bank since re-
privatisation.
In addition to their recollections, perspectives, and opinions, the participants provided an
avenue to gathering accounting reports, system of objectives and incentives reports, and
descriptive documents. These helped the researcher to understand the change initiatives
that had occurred in the bank since the re-privatisation. Several interviewees were key
informants. They not only provided relevant feedback to specific questions, but also
facilitated progress to different research directions or provided insightful comments on
other evidence.
3.5.4.3 The second stage — focusing on the ABC system
The second stage of the fieldwork was conducted between July 2000 and April 2001. The
main data sources for studying the implementation of the ABC system were 19 open-
ended interviews (13 in July and August 2000, 4 in January 2001 and 2 in April 2001)
with people involved in the development of ABC. These were contacts from the
organisation department, accounting department, and externally, the Consultant Company
and the Information Technology Company. Although the interview format varied from
participant to participant, guidelines were used (see Appendix I). Three broad areas were
covered by the questions. These related to changes in the management information
system, changes in the Information Technology Company and its role in the change
initiatives, and the implementation of ABC. Another important data source was
consultant reports. These reports, prepared for regular meetings between consultants and
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managers of the departments involved in the implementation team, provide data from the
consultants' perspective. However, since the reports were an important component of the
communication process between consultants and the bank, the analysis was relatively
cautious. The structure of the reports includes a review of the situation, problems solved,
new problems identified, and next steps.
Interviews were held in managers' offices. On several occasions, a separate meeting-
room in the bank was used. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese and most of the
questions were asked in an open-ended fashion to enable interviewees to respond in their
own words. Interviews lasted on average 75 minutes and were tape-recorded. In one case,
the interviewee did not give permission for the interview to be taped so notes were taken.
However, even in tape-recorded interviews, some note-taking was undertaken to help
formulate new questions as the interview progressed and create a database of the main
issues raised in the interviews. Rules about how to create a case study database and
maintain notes were followed (see Yin, 1994, 1998; Gillham, 2000a, 2000b). All data
were included, regardless of their apparent importance. Interview notes and impressions
were completed within a day of each interview.
Whenever possible, an effort was made to talk to managers informally about the bank, its
control systems, and change initiatives in order 'to better capture feelings, attitudes and
beliefs' (Hogue and Hopper, 1994:8). Secondary sources were also examined (e.g.
internal documents, industry reports, Banco de Portugal reports, newspapers articles).
128
3.5.5 Data analysis
The process of qualitative data analysis has been described by several authors (e.g., Miles
and Huberman, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Silverman, 2001). Data analysis is an
interactive process that occurs before, during, and after data collection. In this study, the
main data analysis process was conducted in three stages (cf. Miles and Huberrnan,
1994). In the first stage, a narrative that described changes in the bank was written. In the
second stage, according to the framework developed in the literature review, the
initiatives, and in particular issues regarding the implementation of ABC, were analysed.
Data was organised and displayed in charts, graphs and other compact formats to help
further analysis. In the third stage, conclusions were drawn and verified.
3.6 Reliability and validity
For judging the quality of a research design, Denzin and Lincoln (1994:100) propose four
criteria for all empirical social science research, including case study methods:
'internal validity, the degree to which findings correctly map the phenomenon in question;
external validity, the degree to which findings can be generalized to other settings similar to
the one in which the study occurred; reliability, the extent to which findings can be
replicated, or reproduced, by another inquirer; and objectivity, the extent to which findings
are free from bias'.
Yin (1994:33) cites similar criteria in a more 'pragmatic' way:
`• Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied
• Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown
to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships
• External validity: establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be generalised
• Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study — such as the data collection
procedures can be repeated, with the same results'.
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One does not necessarily have to accept this whole package (e.g., the belief that 'causal
relationships' can be established in human relations is itself deeply embedded in a
particular world-view that not all would share). At the same time, these lists are
methodologically helpful, preventing us from falling into avoidable research traps. For
instance, Yin's first criterion reminds us that it is important to develop an operational set
of measures to avoid 'subjective' judgements in the collection of data. The second
addresses the problem of making inferences. The third criterion, analytic generalisation31,
is a process for testing existing theory against case study findings, and generating new
theory, for instance, where discrepancies are shown. Alternatively, Alasuutari (1995:157)
suggests that generalisation is the wrong word to describe what qualitative research
attempts to achieve. He argues that 'extrapolation better captures the typical procedure in
qualitative research'. The last criterion reminds us that it is important to ensure the
possibility of at least partially replicating a case study and checking or testing findings.
To establish construct validity and the reliability of the case study, three principles of data
collection proposed by Yin (1994, 1998) were followed. First, multiple sources of
evidence were used. Second, a case study database was created. Finally, a 'chain of
evidence' was maintained. Stake's (1995) suggestions were also followed: information
was triangulated and bank's members checked rough drafts of writing. Furthermore,
during data collection the researcher sought feedback from the same and new participants.
Beyond this, Bruns and Kaplan (1987) and Yin (1989) provide guidance on what forms
an exemplary case study. Although Bruns and Kaplan focus on case studies in accounting
and Yin focuses on case studies in general, their views overlap to a certain extent (see
31 The role of theory for this research is characterised as 'analytic generalisation' in contrast to another way
of generalising results, 'statistical generalisation' (Ryan et al., 1992).
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Table 3.3). The present research may not be an exemplary case study; however it does
have many of the features highlighted by Bruns and Kaplan (1987) and Yin (1989). First,
the case topic is clearly important to managers and involves issues significant in terms of
empirical and conceptual development (e.g., understanding the changes in the Portuguese
financial services and the role of accounting in that process of change. At a more
theoretical level, it seeks to understand the roles of accounting in modern management).
Second, the site selection although justifiable (see Section 3.5) was also chosen
opportunistically since the aim was to gain good access, and to maximise what can be
learned regarding innovative practices in the Portuguese context. Third, the case is
described in detail and careful attention is given to the bank context. Fourth, the case
analysis considers alternative perspectives and provides links to established literature and
previous research. Finally, efforts to write in an engaging manner and provide useful
findings are made. The reader will ultimately decide if that was achieved.
3.7 Limitations of case study
It would be improper to conclude without referring to the limitations that case study
research, like all methods, have. Scapens (1990) identifies three particular problems.
First, there are difficulties relating to drawing boundaries around the subject matter of the
case. Second, there is no such thing as an 'objective' case study. Social systems are not
natural phenomena, they 'must be interpreted by the researcher and, thus, case studies
represent interpretations of the social reality' (p. 277). The last problem relates to
confidentiality. Access or subjects' views can often only be gained if confidentiality is
assured. This situation may prevent the researcher from presenting a full picture of what
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Table 3.3 — Views on characteristics of an exemplary case study
Yin (1989) Bruns and Kaplan (1987)
1. Case topic is significant 1. Subject matter is important
>	 Of unusual or wide interest >	 Significant to managers
>	 Underlying issues are important in
theoretical or practical terms
>	 Potential for making advances in
conceptual development of a
managerially relevant phenomena
2. Case is complete
>	 Distinction between phenomena
studied is given explicit attention
2. Site and research method appropriate to
the topic
>	 Careful site selection
>	 Demonstration of an exhaustive
attempt to collect relevant data
>	 Appropriate sequence given inquiry
>	 Good interview questions
3. Case analysis considers alternative
perspectives
>	 Descriptive or exploratory cases
consider alternative perspectives
3. Good data presentation and interpretation
>	 Researcher understood topic and was
careful with interpretation
>	 Linked to established literature
>	 Informing or explanatory cases
consider rival hypotheses or
propositions
4. Case displays sufficient evidence 4. Findings are useful
>	 Critical pieces of evidence are in the
case study report
>	 Implications for practice are clear
>	 Appropriate qualifications are made
>	 Implications for future study are
stated
5. Case is composed in an engaging manner
Source: Spicer (1992:13)
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has been found, as well as sometimes make it difficult to check the validity of evidence
(e.g., when access to relevant material held in confidence is denied).
Nonetheless, case study research 'provides a vehicle by which theories can be generated
and modified in the light of data' (Otley and Berry, 1994:47). However, 'it is important to
give considerable care and attention to the collection and evaluation of evidence which is
used in developing and generalising theory' (Scapens, 1990:276). Case studies are
'fundamental to the development of explanatory theories of management accounting
practice' (p. 279), when they are 'informed by social theory' (p. 267).
3.8 Ethical issues
Social researchers face a tension between giving full information to interviewees
'contaminating' their research by informing them about the research questions under
investigation. When asking questions, not only the values of the researcher, but his or her
responsibilities to those studied have to be considered (Silverman, 2000).
Regarding the interviews undertaken for this study, ethical concerns related to the consent
given by interviewees after they were carefully and truthfully informed about the research
(i.e. informed consent, renegotiated throughout the development of the research),
protecting the identity of the interviewees (i.e. confidentiality), and their protection from
negative consequences (Fontana and Frey, 1994; Kvale, 1996).
These concerns also relate to J. Mason's (1996) two main sets of ethical issues in social
research. First, qualitative methods for gathering data involve the development of a
relationship characterised by trust and confidence. The researcher has to decide what to
do with the data. Although there is a friendly relationship with informants he or she is
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also a professional who intends to use information for a formal purpose. However,
privacy and confidentiality are not only about disclosing private data but also involve the
interests of the interviewees and other affected parties. Political questions about whose
interests are served or damaged by the analysis also need to be addressed. Second, during
the research process, new and unexpected ethical dilemmas may develop. Initial consent
may not be adequate in the light of such, and often is proper to obtain additional consent
as to how data may be used.
In the methodological research literature, the relationship between researcher and the
researched has received extensive interest (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and
Powell, 1985; Chua, 1988; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990; Scapens, 1990; Llewellyn,
1992; Kvale, 1996). The case study approach taken here bore in mind that the researcher
was a 'guest' in a private organisation. His code of ethics was thus very strict. Since
personal views and circumstances were particularly important for the study, issues
regarding exposure of participants and reportage were discussed with them in advance of
the interviews.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to explain how the research dialogue between theory and
practice was undertaken in the process of developing this investigation into accounting
and change in Banco Lusitano. It has attempted to indicate why and how research was
conducted in a certain way. The main methodological contribution of the study is the
construction of a longitudinal case study approach, based on a critical-interpretive model,
for investigating the factors that influence accounting change in a bank that was not
familiar with this kind of research and where confidentiality was an important issue.
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In summary, the research forms a qualitative inquiry using the case study method to
critically report on how the imported MAS of ABC was developed and disseminated
within a Portuguese banking context. The research method is divisible into two phases.
The aim of the first phase is to understand the bank context and its recent evolution via a
range of change initiatives. In the second phase, the development and implementation of
an ABC system has been followed across time. To understand organisational or
accounting change, a longitudinal qualitative approach is appropriate. It is based on an
empirical case study in the interpretive tradition since it is concerned with actors'
perceptions, interpretations and beliefs. At the same time, the research draws on a
Foucault-inspired critical framework of the kind developed in the work of Hoskin and
Macve, and in the research into the financial sector undertaken by Morgan and Sturdy
(2000). The particular model developed here is designed to enable the exploration of the
effect of accounting practices on change from three perspectives — changing structures,
changing discourses and the effect of both of these processes on power relations. It also
draws on Fligstein's (1991) institutional framework to understand change in terms of the
interplay across three relevant institutional contexts — the organisational field, the state,
and the existing strategy and structure of the bank.
The Portuguese economy, especially since 1974, has focused on striking a balance
between the state and the market; this process has had significant consequences on the
banking sector. Therefore, the next chapter describes the Portuguese economy and
provides the bank context and its recent evolution. Institutions in the organisational field
and the role of the state, being both 'arbiter and interested party', are outlined throughout.
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4 The Portuguese Economy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the context of the organisation under investigation in which change
initiatives have occurred. This contextual examination includes an analysis of the
Portuguese economy and banking sector, thereby developing a conceptualisation of this
particular organisational field. This setting is explored historically in terms of the role
institutions and the state played within a dynamic sector which pioneered the process of
liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation that transformed a state-dominated economy
into a modern European economy.
The so-called Carnation Revolution (25 April 1974) fundamentally altered the Portuguese
society. During the authoritarian regime of Salazar (1932-68) and his successor, Marcello
Caetano (1968-74), Portugal stood "proudly alone" with its vast African empire (Angola,
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome e Principe), "turning its back
on Europe". The regime fell victim to growing pressure for change, spearheaded by the
Armed Forces Movement (MFA — Movimento das Forcas Armadas) that was unhappy
with the government's African policy, and backed by massive popular support. Some of
the new political and economic objectives included a move towards democracy and
decolonisation that was accompanied by major investment in economic development.
Political instability led to economic crisis, exacerbated by successive oil shocks32.
Measures to resolve problems were often hesitant and contradictory. Consequently,
32 Increases in the price of oil and other imported goods led to deterioration in the balance of payments and
an increase in inflation.
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governments twice sought assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
European integration and political stability proved essential to the introducing of change
to the economy and employment laws to increase competitiveness and foreign
investment. European funds were used to improve economic infrastructures and train the
workforce. Portugal is now a modern democracy, no longer separate from the rest of
Europe. Nonetheless, Portugal still falls below the European average and faces the major
challenge of balancing economic efficiency with social cohesion within an European
framework. However, the country is stable, equipped with a modern infrastructure and
more qualified workforce, and strongly committed to involvement in Europe. In this
context, the Portuguese financial sector has changed from a state-owned and market
regulated sector with countless direct controls to a well-capitalised and relatively efficient
one, where most of the institutions are privately owned.
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 4.2 discusses the institutional and
economic legacy of the 'New State'. Section 4.3 explains how the country went from
political to economic crisis. In Section 4.4, membership of the European Community and
political stability are cited as used to justify the modernisation and convergence of the
Portuguese economy. Section 4.5 portrays the banking sector and highlights growing
competitive pressure within it. Finally, Section 4.6 summarises the main features that
characterise the Portuguese economy and more particularly, the banking sector over the
past 25 years.
4.2 The 'New State' (pre-1974)
A key feature of Portuguese government policy before 1974 was Portugal's retention of
colonies. However, maintaining control of the colonies became an increasing burden in
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the 1960s, with wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Colonial policy became
increasingly unpopular in Portugal, and it antagonised the international community.
However, during the 1960s, the Portuguese economy grew at a fairly rapid pace though it
was perceived to primarily benefit a small group of powerful industrialists and
landholders who had close ties to the regime. The growth can be largely explained as a
consequence of Western Europe development which provided an expanding market for
Portuguese goods, a steady stream of tourists to Portugal, and most important,
employment for nearly one million Portuguese emigrant workers by 1973. A key
motivation for retaining the colonies was the link economic groups had with them as
markets and sources of raw materials (World Bank, 1977).
4.2.1 Economic and political basis — the institutional legacy of the 1930s
The 'New State' (Estado Novo) established an economic and political framework for its
longevity through a set of economic policies that operated within a corporatist structure
(Nataf and Sammis, 1990; Corkin, 1993; Neves, 1996). Portugal's political Constitution,
voted in 1933, and many fundamental laws date from the 1930s. First, the wheat
campaign aimed to revitalise the stagnating agricultural sector and relieve pressure on the
balance-of-payments. It limited the importation of wheat, guaranteed wheat prices, and
provided subsidies for machinery and fertilisers. Second, the Colonial Act (1930) brought
the colonies under tighter control from Lisbon. The aim was for colonies to provide raw
materials in exchange for manufactured goods. Corkin (1993:5-6) claims that li]nstead
of providing expanded markets for metropolitan products and stimulating domestic
industry, the colonies increased rather than reduced external dominance and
subordination to foreign and, especially British, economic interests'. Third, protectionism
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and industrial regulation controlled the pace, direction and impact of economic
development through a system of protective tariffs. The 1931 Industrial Regulation Law
(Lei do Condicionamento Industrial) required government approval before an enterprise
could be formed, the introduction of new technology and the transfer of ownership. 'The
aim of this institutionalised intervention by the state was to establish an 'equilibrium of
production' in the domestic market and to limit competition among small, medium and
large enterprises' (ibid.: 7). Fourth, planning actively involved the state in the provision
of infrastructure. The 1935 Economic Reconstruction Law (Lei de Reconstituiglio
EconOmica) provided assistance to the private sector, generating employment and
encouraging propaganda about the regime's accomplishments. The government used
'Plans' (Pianos de Fomento) to define investments in every sector, with special emphasis
on infrastructures (e.g. transport and communications). Fifth, the state consolidated the
position of the dominant classes through the control, discipline and exploitation of the
workforce. Labour organisations were tightly restricted by the state, workers had no right
to constitute independent trade unions, and strikes were outlawed.
Corkin (1999:53) quotes an OECD report to claim that the pre-1974 regime was built
'on hierarchical principles in which 'operational units existed to serve the state rather than the
citizens' (OECD, 1996, p.119), and were oriented primarily towards internal control. Staff
was expected to carry out orders and instructions delivered from the top and consequently
'their image was closely associated with the image of the state' (Ibid.). The inertia-bound
system was elitist and shunned meritocratic employment and promotion systems'.
The regime adopted the doctrine of 'corporatism'. Social and professional groups were
incorporated into official organisations that were supposed to represent their interests
(Neves, 1994). These organisations of workers and employers were supposed to lobby the
government, thereby avoiding 'class struggle'. In this way, they were controlled and used
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as instruments of state policy. Collective negotiations under the corporatist institutions
served as a mechanism for holding down wages. The most important role of these
institutions was under the Industrial Regulation Law. They were consulted when a
company needed government authorisation to enter a market or change installed capacity.
The impact of this system was low levels of innovation and economic flexibility. It
helped to concentrate the economy by creating a few large economic groups. At the same
time, it contributed to financial stability through wage control.
4.2.2 The 'Golden Age'
According to Lopes (1996), in 1960, Portugal was about to enter a phase of
unprecedented economic growth but from an underdeveloped base. For instance, per
capita income was approximately a third of that in developed European countries.
Agricultural work was undertaken by approximately 45 per cent of the workforce.
Industry included a significant percentage of factories with underdeveloped technologies.
Their activity centred on low-value-added transformation of raw materials or primary
products. Unemployment and under-employment were high (the latter particularly so in
the agricultural sector). Average life expectancy was low, infant mortality rates were
high, and a relatively small percentage of the population had access to facilities such as
electricity, health services, formal education.
The main characteristics of a developing Portugal from 1960 to 1973 were an acceleration
in economic development, with an increase in foreign trade, and the avoidance of major
macro-economic imbalances. Corkill (1993:18) points out that
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'Wile industrial sector performed very strongly, averaging yearly growth rates around nine
per cent, followed closely by the service sector buoyed by the tourist boom. Only agriculture,
the perennial economic millstone, registered a disappointingly low 1.5 per cent increase in
average annual output'.
Institutional structures were kept more or less the same during this period. Although
'industrialists' and 'free-traders' dominated, the presence of 'ruralist', protectionist and
colonial lobbies was clearly evident (Neves, 1996). The economic plans applied from
1959 to 1973 privileged industry and the (regulated) private sector, and promoted foreign
capital and co-operation with foreign companies. Agriculture was seen mainly as a means
of support to industry (ibid.).
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 6.9 per cent from 1960
to 1973 (Lopes, 1996), reflecting a number of new factors: an intensification in the
industrial investment with a considerable degree of modernisation of plants and
processes, the integration of Portugal into the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
the colonial war, and the first wave of growth in tourism and immigration from the then
Portuguese colonies.
4.2.2.1 Intensification of the industrialisation process
Lopes (1996) notes that, over the period 1960-73, agriculture shed about 600,000 workers
and its share in GDP shrank from 24 per cent to 15 per cent. This change corresponded
with what has been seen elsewhere as the normal pattern of modern economic
development, with a shift away from the land (although there was a small shift towards
intensive agri-business farming in the agricultural sector). However, the secondary sectors
(i.e. industry and services) started to play a more significant role in the economy. Industry
grew from 30 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 36 per cent in 1973. It became more diversified,
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with higher productivity, thereby contributing to a growth in exports. Modern high-
added-value factories expanded while older traditional industries (i.e. food and textiles)
stagnated. The service sector, which has always been a major part of the Portuguese
economy, grew only slightly in relative terms from approximately 45 per cent of GDP in
1960 to 49 per cent in 1973. However, this masked a considerable change in the make-up
of services, with a retreat from traditional activities towards those with significant
potential for growth (e.g. financial services, transport, tourism and communications) in
line with economic modernisation.
Foreign investment began to flow into these sectors, as there was a range of favourable
conditions for such. Oliveira et al. (1998) point out that wages were low, unions were
weak or non-existent, and the Salazar regime was politically stable. These conditions
provided good opportunities to investors to offer competitive local salaries to attract
skilled professionals and others in demand whilst repatriating a healthy stream of profits.
At the same time, despite the speed and depth of the economic transformation, there were
no significant problems in respect of economic imbalances. Unemployment fe1133,
agricultural under-employment was practically eliminated, inflation fell while budgets
were generally balanced or in surplus, and the balance-of-payments remained healthy. As
a consequence, gold reserves rose to a level where they were, among the highest in the
world, by 1973 (Lopes, 1996). However, international competitiveness was based on low-
cost labour, which disregarded the negative effects of low productivity, an unskilled
workforce, low levels of technology and an "indulged" private sector (Robinson, 1979).
One dark cloud on the horizon was the beginning of colonial wars (or wars of
independence) in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique from 1961. However,
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although they proved a significant drain on the public purse, the balance of public finance
remained healthy.
4.2.2.2 The colonial wars
The wars in African colonies, particularly Angola and Mozambique, had a major effect
on Portugal's disposable resources. Thousands of extra soldiers had to be recruited, and
the prosecution of campaigns for over a decade entailed the application of substantial
resources for non-productive ends. As a result, many social and economic development
programmes were cancelled or cut back (e.g. in housing, health, education). To ensure
that growth was sustained, Portugal tried to attract foreign investment to compensate for
the drain of funds due to the considerable defence budget. Notwithstanding this, the
gearing-up of a war economy had some positive effects. For example, it stimulated war-
related industrial production and boosted consumption by increasing the wages paid to the
armed forces and workers in boom industries.
4.2.2.3 The integration of Portugal into EFTA
Despite the economic growth of the 'New State', the Salazar regime continued to hold out
against the kind of political-economic changes such as decolonisation and
democratisation that were taking place outside the Iberian Peninsula. Nonetheless, the
effect of economic change was considerable over the longer term. From 1948, Portugal
participated in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) 34, and in
1960, it joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The creation of
33 This was illusory since it was a consequence of massive emigration.
34 Canada and the United States joined with the European countries in 1961 to transform the OEEC into the
OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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EFTA in 1960 encouraged the reduction of obstacles to the importation of non-
agricultural products. Portugal's membership meant that it gained considerably from the
lowering of trade barriers. However, under Annexe G of the Stockholm Convention,
Portugal benefited from a special statute that allowed the protection of some sectors in
terms of preserving some of their old "vices". EFTA membership also led the state to
prioritise trade within Europe rather than overseas in the national economic plan. In 1961,
the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) helped to
reduce trade barriers with countries outside EFTA.
4.2.2.4 Immigration and tourism
A number of positive effects also flowed from a growth in immigration (used as a policy
instrument for the maintenance of political and social stability) and the first wave of
growth in tourism. Emigration impacted positively on employment, balance-of-payments,
saving rates, and private consumption. Tourism benefited the balance-of-payments and,
over time, led to a rise in the average family income. At the same time, however, inflation
began to increase and the first adverse effects of the shift to technologically-advanced,
labour-efficient industrialisation began to be felt. These effects came through more
strongly in recent decades. At first, Portugal had enjoyed a competitive advantage from
its relatively low labour costs, but the ability of companies to relocate production to
countries with lower labour costs and an adequate skill base saw the erosion of this form
of competitive advantage. Growing realisation of this led to a shift in Portuguese
development strategy towards a more service-oriented and diversified economic pattern.
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4.2.3 New Industrial Policy
In 1968, due to health problems, Salazar stepped down and was replaced by Marcelo
Caetano. Although it had initially embarked on a policy of limited political liberalisation,
there were no signs of change in the regime's attitude towards Africa. A new
development model, based on the co-operation between the state and economic groups,
failed to gain support for its 'renovation in continuity'. However, some results of the
modernisation programme were achieved (Corlcill, 1993). First, the 1972 Industrial
Development Law (Lei de Fomento Industrial) made funds available for modernisation
proposals. Second, the promotion of growth was stimulated through development
planning (e.g. the Sines industrial project). Third, there was a reduction in the economic
importance attached to the empire. 'Taxes on exports to the colonies encouraged colonial
industrialisation and forced metropolitan firms to relocate overseas or to seek alternative
export markets' (ibid.:33).
Caetano's regime missed the opportunity to end the wars and obtain the trust of a small
group of opposition liberal deputies. Social problems — relating to education, health,
social security and the general protection of the lower classes — were significant, and the
economic situation was rapidly deteriorating. The army was discontent with the colonial
policy and its peaceful revolution led to the downfall of the 48-year-old regime.
In sum, the combination of an internal shock (the revolution) and external shocks from
rising oil prices and imported inflation impacted negatively on an ill-prepared economy.
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4.3 The period 1974-1985
In April 1974, the revolution replaced the 'New State' with a democratic regime, leading
to an overhaul of major features of the political and economic system. The revolution had
three broad objectives: first, to establish a democratic society and restore civil liberties;
second, to cease the colonial wars and give independence to the colonies, and third, to
pull economic power away from the economic groups created during the dictatorship and
improve the standard of living for workers and small farmers (World Bank, 1977). A new
constitution was formulated in 1976. It embodied many collectivist principles and strong
communist influences. A period of considerable confusion followed as a result. Serious
problems built up in the economy and in Portuguese society over these years despite
economic growth. There were serious structural constraints, and a relative lack of
investment in sectors such as health, education, social security and transport. The post-
revolutionary economy required structural reform and a more efficient use of resources.
4.3.1 Economic legacy
The fairly impressive economic growth rates achieved in the 1960s masked, but did not
remove a series of structural weaknesses (World Bank, 1977; Corkill, 1993; Lopes,
1996). First, in a dualistic industrial structure, a modern sector comprising a few private
economic groups co-existed with a traditional sector made up of a large number of small
firms. These economic groups, under the control of families, were involved in a range of
areas including manufacturing, banking, agriculture and the media. Second, agriculture
was characterised by low productivity and a dualistic landholding structure that was
urgently in need of reform. 'Large agricultural estates in the south of the country were
often farmed by absentee landlords, and land was fragmented in the north' (World Bank,
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1977:7). The state never had political will to tack the problems, preferring to regulate the
sector through institutions 'set up to administer costly subsidies to privileged wheat, dairy
and olive farmers' (Corkill, 1993:25). Third, the economy was highly sensitive to changes
in the international context. The situation was 'exacerbated by the high level of defence
expenditure and a burgeoning commercial deficit caused by industrial development (oil
imports, capital equipment) and agricultural shortfalls (wheat and other foodstuffs). In
this context, tourism receipts and emigrants' remittances, both highly sensitive to
recession, became doubly important' (ibid.: 27). Fourth, an inept bureaucratic and
centralised machine, created to administer and regulate in detail the corporatist structures,
remained in place. Fifth, much protected and uncompetitive industry was still dependent
on the African market and unprepared to face international competition. The colonies
were used 'as a safety valve to provide an outlet for the excess population and minimise
social disruption at home, and as a source of cheap raw materials and a captive market for
metropolitan industrial production' (ibid.: 19). Sixth, Portugal adopted an ambiguous
attitude towards Europe, which reflected a political dilemma involving a choice of
isolationism or stronger links with Europe. EFTA membership was an important step, but
as long as the political regime remained a dictatorship, Portugal could never accomplish
full membership of the European Community (EC).
4.3.2 Economic and political change
Political instability characterised the early years of Portuguese democracy. Agents of the
revolution met little resistance and won support due to a popular desire for economic and
political change. Political transition up to 1976 involved three phases: first, a moderate-
conservative phase (May 1974 — March 1975), second, a middle-leftist phase (March —
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late November 1975), and third, a final moderate reaction (late November 1975 — June
1976). This contributed to six changes in government within two years, attempted coups,
and frequent strikes and demonstrations. However, the country witnessed the formation of
political parties and trade unions, and freedom of the press (World Bank, 1977).
Although, the attempt to create a socialist economy failed, the consequences of the
structure inherited from the 1960s were quite damaging (Neves, 1996).
Political instability had economic consequences as the rates of growth in GDP decreased,
while inflation and unemployment increased rapidly, and public debt increased as greater
social provision occurred35 . Given the coincidence of this with the global effects of the
first oil crisis, in 1973, the government had recourse to the IMF, and had to accept
stringent terms for stabilising the economy. This led, as in other countries, to the state
having to impose highly contentious measures to cut government expenditure and
eliminate budgetary deficits. The stabilisation plan included strong monetary and budget
control and devaluation of the currency to face expenditures (Neves, 1994; Oliveira et al.,
1998). Although successful, the reduction occurred mainly in the private sector as public
deficit remained around 10 per cent of GDP (Neves, 1994). The political decision to
expand the economy after the second oil shock had fatal effects for the fragile external
equilibrium. An external payments crisis forced another agreement with the IMF in 1982,
35 More specific external factors also played their part, in particular, certain unanticipated effects of the
independence of the colonies. First, there was the loss of favourable trading relationships, with a consequent
major drop in exports to former colonial markets like Angola and Mozambique. In 1973 such exports
formed about 15 per cent of total Portuguese exports, but this percentage fell by half over the next few years
(Lopes, 1996). Second, there was an influx of about 800,000 Portuguese who had settled in the colonies
before the revolution, with predictable effects on the state budget (World Bank, 1977). The labour market
suffered not only from the retornados (returning migrants from the former colonies), but also from
demobilised soldiers, and thousands of regressados (returning migrants displaced from their jobs in Europe
facing a recession). Unemployment was a new phenomenon which required intervention to moderate its
impact. For instance, agriculture functioned as an absorber of labour and, according to the World Bank
(1978), during the period 1973-78, employment in public administration grew at an average annual rate of
almost 16 per cent.
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leading to the imposition of a stabilisation programme from 1983 to 1985. Nataf and
Sammis (1990:114) stress that externally-imposed shock treatment had short-term effects:
Wile governments were singularly ineffectual in reversing the deficiencies in Portugal's
productive capacities, but they were quite successful in convincing austerity-oriented
international lenders, budget-minded tourists, and high interest-seeking, stability-minded
emigrants that the Portuguese economy was being corrected of its "excesses".
4.3.3 The nationalisation of the main economic groups
The economic problems outlined in the preceding section were exacerbated when moves
were made to establish a more socialist, centralised economy in Portugal. Direct measures
were adopted to increase wages and protect the rights of the workers, while prices were
controlled. The World Bank (1977) claims that the new rulers promised a widespread
nationalisation of key economic sectors, job creation, the raising of the minimum wage,
the imposition of price controls, and the implementation of agrarian reform with a shift to
communal farming.
Large, often uncultivated track of lands were transformed into cooperatives. 'The landless
workers of the south did not parcel out the land and thereby transform themselves into
smallholders. They acted collectively and organized collective worker-controlled farms'
(Bermeo, 1986:100). The World Bank (1977) maintains that this change in ownership did
not improve efficiency since the workforce lacked management skills and administrative
experience. Bermeo asserts that worker-controlled farms were at least as productive as the
units they replaced. She suggests another explanation of why agrarian reform faced
severe problems, while the occupation and nationalisation of industries did not — 'worker-
controlled factories and service firms were not perceived as bastions of the communist
party' (p. 214). Collective farms did not manage to be economically successful; even
149
those with a positive experience were submerged by the process operating against
agrarian reform (Lopes, 1996). According to Bermeo (1986), some 569,000 hectares
reverted to private ownership and over 100 cooperatives were dissolved by January 1981.
However, the policy of returning lands that had been taken over by agricultural workers
to 'old' owners also failed and did little to improve agricultural productivity (Nataf and
Sammis, 1990).
A large portion of the productive sector was nationalised, in a process that involved
several stages. Initially, banks and insurance companies were nationalised in September
197436. Since banks had share-holdings in many private companies, the effect was
indirect ownership of hundreds of small — and medium — sized companies. Subsequently,
other industries came under state control: petroleum, steel, cement, tobacco, brewing,
water, paper paste and transport. Corkin (1993) cites several consequences of this
process. First, Portugal had one of the largest public sectors in Western Europe.
Furthermore, it comprised what were among the most modern and technologically
advanced industries to come under state control. Second, human capital changes
weakened the already precarious economy. On the one hand, "purges" [in the form of
political oustings] included in the anti-fascist campaign aggravated the shortage of trained
and experienced staff. On the other hand, there was strong political pressure to increase
staffing levels to absorb surplus labour, especially refugees from the former colonies.
Third, the foundation of state monopolies relegated market forces to an accessory role.
36 On 13 September 1974, the issuing banks were nationalised: Banco de Portugal (issue bank in Portugal,
Decree-law no. 452/74), Banco de Angola (issue bank in the ex-colony of Angola, Decree-law no. 450/74)
and Banco Nacional Ultramarino (issue bank in the other ex-colonies, Decree-law no. 451/74). Decree-law
no. 132-A/75, of 14 March 1975, nationalised all credit institutions with head offices in mainland Portugal
and the autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores, with the exception of the Saving Banks, Agricultural
Mutual Credit Co-operatives, the Credit Franco-Portugais and the Portuguese branches of the Bank of
London & South America and the Banco do Brasil.
150
For example, the nationalised banks, although in competition between each other,
encountered significant state interference. They were closely supervised by the Bank of
Portugal, suffered from political interference and excessive bureaucracy, and supplied the
majority of the available credit:
'As a consequence, the banking system, already weakened by capital outflows during 1974-5,
lost any semblance of independence and financial discipline. Government interference
ensured that interest rates bore little relation to inflation, preferential credit was extended to
insolvent public enterprises well beyond the boundaries of financial prudence and the
government itself became a major borrower' (ibid.: 39).
Many state-owned companies had also a social function. They were compelled to accept
excess labour, as did the banks that hired many retornados who had held banking
positions in the former colonies (Natal and Sammis, 1990). Fourth, the dramatically
increased public expenditure generated by revolution commitments and current account
deficits had to be financed from external resources: borrowing from international capital
markets and emigrant remittances. The fast rates of growth in long-term indebtedness
meant that a large proportion of government revenue (approximately 11 per cent) went to
servicing debt.
4.4 1985 on: renewal of economic growth and subsequent reform
The fact that the large public sector in Portugal was often not managed according to
economic criteria was synonymous with resource misallocation and bureaucracy. Corkill
(1999:53) points out that even today '[t]he public bureaucracy remains 'a highly
centralized and hierarchical apparatus based on an ethos of order, deference and legalism'
(Graham, 1992:2) and until the late 1980s efforts at administrative reform were half-
hearted'.
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From around the end of 1985, the Portuguese economy entered a new phase. The balance-
of-payments problem finally receded, and Portugal joined the EC in January 1986. At the
same time, a centre-right government was elected with a significant majority of seats in
the Assembly of the Republic, and the exchange rate strengthened, following a fall in oil
prices and the exchange rate of the dollar. This promoted savings on the cost of many
imports, and a reduction in the inflation rate. Meanwhile, membership of the EC
accelerated the growth of both exports and imports, and the level of foreign capital
investment; there were also considerable transfers from the EC's structural funds to
support investment, employment policies, infrastructural development and so on. The
new political stability allowed expansionist policies to be pursued in a sustained way.
Initially, priority was given to stimulating economic growth, and after 1990, to reducing
inflation over the long term. Inflation fell from 13.7 per cent in 1990 to around 5.5 per
cent by 1994. However, GDP growth reduced from 5.5 per cent in 1989 to around one per
cent in 1994. Unemployment, which was 4.1 per cent in 1991, grew to 7 per cent in 1994.
Under exceptionally favourable circumstances — low oil prices and declining interest
rates, combined with funds from EC — the government's main objectives were: high and
sustainable rates of GDP growth, a lower unemployment rate, controlled inflation, the
correction of the disequilibrium in the balance-of-payments, stimulation of investment,
and a reduced public-sector deficit (Corkill, 1993). To obtain these objectives, several
structural reforms were necessary: liberalisation of the financial sector, modernisation of
the tax system, legislation to promote flexible labour markets, and a privatisation
programme.
152
As a result, there was considerable expansion in private sector activity, with a sustained
boom in tourism and infrastructural development as well as continuing neo-liberal reform
in labour relations and industrial activity. Overall economic indicators were generally
favourable as this process unfolded, both in terms of GDP growth and the balance-of-
payments. 'The eighties were a period of consolidation of the institutional changes of the
democratic regime and of stabilization of the society' (Neves, 1994:90). Consequently,
Portugal has been able to achieve the criteria for participating in the third phase of
European Monetary Union (EMU) — the creation of a single currency. Table 4.1 shows
the main economic indicators of the Portuguese economy.
4.4.1 Liberalisation of the financial sector
The state-owned banking system had had a very important function: 'to fund the
government's huge deficit by providing low (non-market) interest rates and loans to
public enterprises' (Corkin, 1993:135). Significant resources had been made available to
public companies that buried large subsidies and continued to make large operating
losses. These companies were characterised by high labour costs, overstaffing, outdated
technology and poor customer services (ibid.).
The first stage of liberalisation involved the restructuring of the banking system. This was
followed by development of the capital markets. Gradually, the financial sector was
opened to more competition via new domestic and foreign private-sector banks (permitted
since 1984) and privatisation (since 1989). According to the Bank of Portugal (1997), the
liberalisation involved three main aspects:
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Table 4.1 - Portuguese main economic indicators
Units	 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Expenditure, income and saving
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	 r.g.r., %
Private consumption	 r.g.r., %
Public consumption	 r.g.r., %
Gross fixed capital formation 	 r.g.r., %
Exports of goods and services 	 r.g.r., %
Imports of goods and services 	 r.g.r., %
Domestic demand	 r.g.r., %
Households disposable income (DI) 	 r.g.r., %
Households domestic saving rate 	 % of DI
Employment
Total employment
	 % change
Employment rate	 %
Unemployment rate	 %
Prices, wages and unit labour costs
Harmonised index of consumer prices 	 % change
Consumer prices index 	 % change
GDP deflator	 % change
Private consumption deflator	 % change
Goods export deflator 	 % change
Goods import deflator 	 % change
Nominal wages	 % change
Unit labour costs 	 % change
Current and capital account
Current account + Capital account 	 % of GDP
Current account	 % of GDP
Capital account 	 % of GDP
Public finances
General Government overall balance 	 % of GDP
Public debt	 % of GDP
Current receipts	 % of GDP
Current expenditure	 % of GDP
Primary current expenditure 	 % of GDP
Credit aggregates, interest rates and
capital markets
Credit to non-financial corporations	 % change
Credit to households	 % change
3-month Lisbor	 %, Dec.
10-year fixed rate Treasury bond yields 	 %, Dec.
Stock price index (BVL 30)	 % change
3.7 3.8 4.0 3.1 3.3
3.1 3.1 5.7 4.6 3.0
3.4 2.2 3.2 3.4 2.8
6.3 14.4 9.8 6.3 5.0
7.1 7.2 8.7 3.9 7.9
4.9 10.0	 " 13.8 8.5 6.9
3.2 5.0 6.2 4.9 3.4
2.0 1.6 3.8 3.8 3.5
11.3 10.0 8.3 7.5 7.9
0.6 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.7
66.1 67.9 70.2 71.2 72.2
7.3 6.7 5.0 4.4 4.0
2.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.8
3.1 2.2 2.8 2.3 2.9
3.0 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.3
3.6 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.9
-3.1 2.2 -0.4
-1.7 5.2
1.2 2.3 -2.1 -1.1 8.2
6.4 5.0 4.8 4.1 5.8
3.8 2.3 1.4 1.7 3.4
-2.1 -3.2 -4.7
-6.2 -8.5
-4.2 -5.7 -6.9
-8.3
-9.9
2.1 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.4
-3.9 -2.7 -2.2 -2.0
-1.4
62.7 59.1 55.3 55.0 53.8
39.6 39.4 40.2 40.5 41.7
39.7 38.4 38.4 38.3 39.4
34.4 34.2 34.9 35.1 36.3
6.4 20.7 22.8 24.1 25.8
25.0 26.0 31.4 27.9 20.4
6.3 5.0 3.3 3.4 4.9
6.8 5.6 4.1 5.6 5.2
34.7 74.6 26.7 10.1 -11.0
r.g.r. - real growth rate
Source: Ministry of Finance (2001:ix)
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1. The structure of banking business — Restrictions to the composition of assets and to
banks' activity were lifted. The compulsive investment in public debt securities was
suppressed. The legally enforced segmentation of credit institutions' activities was
gradually removed.
1. Competitive conditions — Competition in the banking sector ceased being controlled
directly by the state through limits to credit granting, administrative regulation of
interest rates, and restrictions to new banks or expansion of branch networks.
2. Banks' international activity — Free establishment and supply of financial services in
the EU was accomplished alongside the harmonisation of supervision instruments.
Although they initially had a small share of total lending, the new private banks impacted
on the nationalised sector through their competition for customers and stricter accounting
procedures. At the end of 1996, the presence of the state in the financial sector was
confined to the group Caixa Geral de DepOsitos. New instruments and the gradual
removal of capital controls accompanied deregulation of the financial sector (European
Commission, 1997). Capital markets were modernised, and trade in new money market
instruments was sanctioned. Corlcill (1993:136) claims that the liberalisation and the
privatisation programme provided improvements that involved 'a new stock-market law
(1991), continuous computerised trading, an independent securities exchange commission
and a new daily index in accordance with EC rules'.
4.4.2 Tax system reform and legislation to promote flexible labour markets
The Portuguese tax system encouraged tax evasion and produced only limited revenue.
From 1986, with the introduction of VAT, efforts were made to widen the tax base and
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improve equity and efficiency. In 1988, the whole tax system was simplified via the
introduction of two taxes for income and property, one personal (IRS) and the other
corporate (WC).
Labour laws, seen as an obstacle to modernisation, become more flexible. Corkin
(1993:138) notes that 'employees, who in the past could only be dismissed for
disciplinary reasons, could now be made redundant if the economic and commercial
situation warranted it'. Although these changes faced strong opposition from left wing
parties and trade unions, for some, the new laws did not go far enough. For example,
'Mlle Portuguese Industrial Association objected on the grounds that they remained
inflexible and would encourage short-term fixed employment contracts, which grant
workers fewer rights than permanent contracts, to be the norm rather than the exception'
(ibid.: 138).
4.4.3 The privatisation programme
The maintenance of a large and largely unreformed public sector preserved some of the
social achievements of the revolution. However, this proved prejudicial to modernisation
and economic growth. It also meant that the public sector was seen as one of the reasons
why overall productivity was low, outside the country as well as inside. 'Many of these
companies were operating at large losses and high indebtedness was pervasive; efficiency
was often mediocre and many companies were sheltered from competition' (European
Commission, 1997:75). Fundamental structural reforms became urgent to respond
positively to the challenges presented by European integration.
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Nevertheless, the process suffered several delays. Corkin (1994:218) explains those
delays 'by the constitutional constraints, by the lack of experienced administrators to steer
the sales through, the negative impact of the 1987 stock market crash and the uncertainty
as to future growth prospects generated by the Gulf War'. Political stability and EC
competition policy directives to limit state aid to industry facilitated the government's
initiation of the process. After a constitutional change and the Privatisation Framework
Law (Lei-Quadro das Reprivatizagdes) that allowed selling more than the previous 49 per
cent maximum, the legal framework was established.
Corkin (1994:219) points out that the Prime Minister, when announcing the programme,
clarified three categories within the state sector:
'The first group, public services such as the railways, the national airline, and the postal
services would remain in the public domain. The second group, problem companies such as
EDAP, Quimigal and Siderugia would require restructuring before any sale. The third,
corporations in healthy condition, would be early candidates for the return to the private
sector'.
Corlcill (1993, 1994) claims that there were three main objectives regarding privatisation.
First, obtain best value for public assets to reduce the level of public debt and to
restructure state industries to prepare them to the private sector. Second, improve
efficiency and competitiveness through an efficient private-sector management. The
involvement of foreign capital would help improving productivity and transference of
technology. Third, spread shares ownership and provide the basis for the development of
capital market.
One controversial issue was possible foreign control of key economic sectors. Foreign
ownership was generally restricted while the first phase of privatisation was in process.
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According to the IMF (1998), direct foreign ownership of share capital was limited to 10
per cent and this could be raised to 25 per cent only with specific regulatory approval.
The rationale for these restrictions was that 'emerging domestic entrepreneurial groups
had to be encouraged and former (pre-1975) owners had to be assisted in regaining
control of the enterprises via reduced competition during the bidding process' (European
Commission, 1997:77).
However, in 1995, the Portuguese government decided to abandon its foreign capital
policy. The financial sector was the most attractive sector for both foreign and national
economic groups. Most of the companies that were sold were in the banking and
insurance, telecommunications, electricity, oil, and cement sectors (see Table 4.2). The
privatisation programme 'enhanced the diffusion of share ownership, contributed to the
increase of the stock market capitalization and liquidity, the diversification of saving
options and the improvement of companies financing' (Ministry of Finance, 2001:34).
From 1989, the public sector share of the economy continuously decreased:
In 1988, the Portuguese public sector accounted for 19.7 per cent of GDP and for 5.5 per cent
of total employment. State owned enterprises were dominant in sectors such as finance,
transport, energy, communications, steel, cement, brewing, shipbuilding, wood pulp and
tobacco. At the end of 1999, the share of value added by public owned enterprises amounted
to 7.5 per cent of GDP and their employment amounted to 2.6 per cent of total Portuguese
employment' (ibid.: 34).
4.5 The banking sector
In this general context of development, the Portuguese banking sector was both a major
beneficiary, and driver, of economic growth. At the beginning of this period, it still
played a very traditional and inward-looking role, when compared to the expansionist role
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Table 4.2 - Major privatisations 1989 -2000
Company Sector Proceeds(billion PTE)
Privatised
share Year(s)
Banks
Banco Portugues do Atlantico 223.3 100.0 1990-95
Banco de Fomento e Exterior 161.0 88.0 1994-97
Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa 149.9 100.0 1991-92
Banco Totta & Acores 71.5 93.3 1989-96
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay 45.1 100.0 1991-92
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor 44.1 100.0 1994-95
Credit() Perdial Portugues 40.8 100.0 1992
Unido de Bancos Portugueses 39.4 100.0 1993-96
Insurance companies
Tranquilidade 44.7 100.0 1989-90
Mundial Confianca 33.4 100.0 1992
Bonanca 29.7 100.0 1991-94
Imperio 25.5 100.0 1992
Alianca Seguradora 13.9 100.0 1989-91
Other
EDP Electrical utility 1,228.1 68.2 1997-2000
Portugal Telecom Telecommunications 1,033.6 97.2 1995-2000
Brisa Motorways 348.3 84.9 1997-2000
Cimpor Cement 286.3 89.5 1994-1998
Petrogal Oil 80.8 45.0 1992-95
Cimentos de Maceira e Pataias Cement 39.6 100.0 1994-95
Portucel Industrial Pulp and paper 39.5 44.3 1995
SECIL Cement 35.9 58.9 1994-95
Centralcer Brewery 34.6 100.0 1990
Unicer Brewery 22.7 100.0 1989-90
Source: Ministry of Finance (2001:A35-A36)
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it has adopted under the liberal economic regime. In the last 25 years, the sector has
undergone substantial changes, including the introduction of a new legal framework,
liberalisation, the privatisation programme, and the EMU membership. It has evolved
from a strongly regulated, state-owned system to a modern and competitive market.
According to the OECD (1996:63), the changes have been successful and may be used as
a point of reference to other countries since Portugal 'was able to enjoy the fruits of
liberalisation — such as increased efficiency of financial intermediation — without
experiencing some of the post-liberalisation problems that occurred in several other
countries, including the failure of financial institutions'.
4.5.1 The changeover
Before the 1960s, Portugal's banking sector was, like the economy in general, relatively
under-developed. Under the Salazar regime, there was some expansion in banking
activity but it was largely the large private groups that dominated the economy who
benefited. The banking sector, like most of the economy, was closed to foreign markets.
Almost all of the banks were private, with only Caixa Geral de DepOsitos owned by the
state.
After the revolution in 1974, all domestic banking institutions were nationalised.
However, unlike other nationalised sectors where private firms were typically
consolidated into state monopolies, the commercial banking system and the insurance
industry were both left with a degree of competition. A few foreign banks held a very
small share of the market. The banking sector was highly regulated, with interest rates for
both deposit and lending operations set administratively, credit ceilings, legal entry
barriers, and strict international capital movement. Furthermore, banks were required by
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law to extend preferential credit to nationalised non-financial companies, as well as to
finance the public debt at below market rates. Political interference affected bank
solvency, leading to an increase in non-performing loans and an insufficient capitalisation
of banks. In such a setting, banks also accumulated involuntary excess liquidity which
was then invested with the Central Bank at below market rates (Ministry of Finance,
1998). Affected by heavy regulation, a lack of competition and limited exposure to
innovative foreign influence, the banking system remained under-developed and
inefficient (OECD, 1999).
Portugal's accession to the EU made the liberalisation of its financial sector imperative.
An OECD (1999:65) economic survey claims that this liberalisation has many
dimensions:
'Beyond ensuring that savings were efficiently directed to investments, an efficient financial
system was also expected to have in-built incentives for innovation and least-cost provision
of services, while offering a large choice of financial instruments and hence allowing a better
match of preferences for risk, return, liquidity and cash flow. In addition, reforms were
expected to improve macroeconomic management by enhancing the conduct of monetary
policy'.
From 1983, new private financial institutions were allowed to operate. However, they
were subject to administrative discretion until the adoption of the EU Second Banking
directive at the end of 1992. Barriers to entry protected the highly under-capitalised state-
owned bank sector (Table 4.3). Nevertheless, new banks market share, although small,
steadily increased (see Table 4.4). The pace of reform accelerated in the early 1990s. The
banking sector was opened fully to competition, external capital flows were liberalised,
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Table 4.3 - Profitability of the banking sector
1984 1987 1989
Profitability (Gross income* / Assets) (%)
Banking sector 0.97 2.02 2.69
State-owned banks 0.92 1.96 2.62
Private Domestic Banks 2.43 2.97
Foreign banks 4.84 2.77 3.32
Capital / Credit (%)
Banking sector 3.7 6.4 8.9
State-owned banks 3.6 5.8 7.9
Private Domestic Banks 11.5 13.1
Foreign banks 12.5 12.8 17.6
* Profits before depreciation, provisions and income taxes.
Source: Ministry of Finance (1999:52)
Table 4.4 - Market shares in banking markets
1984 1987 1989
Credit
State-owned banks 95.9 89.8 83.9
Private Domestic Banks 3.1 6.2 11.1
Foreign banks 1.0 4.0 4.7
Deposits
State-owned banks 96.2 93.6 88.7
Private Domestic Banks 2.5 4.3 8.6
Foreign banks 1.3 2.1 2.7
Source: Ministry of Finance (1999:52)
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remaining interest controls were abolished, monetary policy instruments were
modernised, and most of the public financial institutions were privatised (OECD, 1999)37.
The privatisation process led to the decline of state-owned banks' market share. In 1984,
the market share of these banks was more than 95 per cent. The privatisation process
started in 1989, gradually transferring directly state-owned banks to private
administration. Their market share felt to about 45 per cent in 1993 and remained below
30 per cent by the end of 1997 (see Figure 4.1). The financial sector again became a
major source of investment and interest for leading private groups, many of them
continuations of old groupings. In the initial phase of liberalisation, the activity and
profitability of the financial sector increased significantly. In the early 1990s, the banking
sector was contributing 8.5 per cent to the GDP, a comparatively high percentage in
international terms. However, profit margins fell back, even though activity remains high,
as the market has been filled with participants who compete in both domestic and foreign
markets, chasing lower costs and higher market share.
4.5.2 The current state of affairs
In recent years, the Portuguese banking system has increasingly concentrated on
expanding in other markets, notably insurance. This has enabled it to explore synergies
and develop new sources of income to compensate the fall of financial margins. The
Portuguese Banking Association (Associacdo Portuguesa de Bancos, 2001) overviews the
banking sector in 2000 (see Table 4.5). In 2000, the banking sector's assets grew by nine
per cent representing an increase on that of the previous year (the growth rate was 13.5
37 A more detailed description of the financial sector reform process is given in Annex 1 of the OECD
(1999) Economic Survey of Portugal; see also Pinto (1996).
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per cent in 1999). Behind this trend was high growth (22.7 per cent in 2000 and 25.9 per
cent in 1999) in credit to customers, accounting for 53.5 per cent of total assets. The
growth rate of credit to households declined to 20 per cent, having reached a peak in
previous years (Table 4.6).
Three factors explain the dynamism of mortgage credit. First, declining interest rates
promoted demand for housing and mortgage credit. Second, tax incentives encouraged
the purchase of a first home among the young. Third, after the restrictions on the granting
of mortgages, an adjustment was to be expected (Ministry of Finance, 1999). Recently,
more rigorous eligibility requirements may explain the reduction in the growth rate. As a
consequence of the restructuring of banks following mergers and acquisitions, there was a
significant reduction in employee numbers (-3,594) during 2000.
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Table 4.5 -The Portuguese banking sector
Dec.
2000
Dec.
1999 Absolute
Change
1.	 Financial data (EUR millions)
Net total assets 276,833 253,882 22,951 9.0
Credit to customers 148,070 120,721 27,349 22.7
Deposits and other clients' resources 151,170 135,829 15,341 11.3
Cash flow 5,492 4,473 1,019 22.8
Net income for the year 2,398 1,552 846 54.5
Number of branches 5,550 5,487 63 1.1
Number of employees 59,056 62,668 -3,612 -5.8
2.	 Ratios (%)
Solvency ratio 10.67 9.66 1.01
Administrative costs / Financial Assets 1.67 1.73 -0.06
Net return on equity (ROE) 14.68 11.20 3.48
Source: Associacdo Portuguesa de Bancos (2001:9)
Table 4.6 - Customer loan portfolio
Customer loan portfolio 2000 1999 ChangeAbsolute
Loans to individuals 68,550 56,935 11,615 20.4
Mortgage 50,562 42,128 8,434 20.0
Consumer credit 8,310 6,793 1,517 22.3
Other 9,678 8,014 1,664 20.8
Loans to companies 61,763 49,444 12,319 24.9
TOTAL 130,313 106,379 23,934 22.5
EUR millions
Source: Associacdo Portuguesa de Bancos (2001:11)
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4.5.2.1 Market structure and concentration
Deregulation, together with privatisation, increased competition and triggered a drop in
financial margins, thereby stimulating an accelerated concentration process. The rationale
for the level of concentration, beginning after privatisation and intensified since 1994,
was to reduce costs and increase efficiency through the reorganisation of services and the
distribution system, the sharing of operating structures and managerial capabilities, and
taking advantage of potential economies-of-scale. In addition, banks had to search for
new sources of income, intensify housing and consumer lending, and expand into
investment banking and cross-sell financial products (such as insurance policies) through
their branch networks (IMF, 1998; European Central Bank, 2000).
The number of banking institutions in December 2000 was 62, of which 33 were non-
domestic banks. Following a wave of mergers and acquisitions, the market share of the
major five banking groups converged to EU standards (see Table 4.7). In 2000, the sale of
the Champalimaud group explains the significant rise in business concentration. The top-
ranking Portuguese banks include two groups, Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) and
Caixa Geral de DepOsitos (CGD). Between them, they accounted for almost 60 per cent
of the market, leaving Banco Espirito Santo (BES), Banco Portugues do Investimento
(BPI), and Spain's Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) as strong second-tier
players.
Despite the rise in the number of foreign banks in the Portuguese market, the direct
participation of foreign capital remains small. Both restrictions on foreign ownership,
during the privatisation process, and competitive forces explain this situation.
Nevertheless, one fifth of BCP and BES holdings and nearly one third of the BPI group
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Table 4.7 - Market share of the five major banking groups
1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000
Credit to customers 79.6 77.3 76.9 75.0 83.3
Resources from customers 84.9 82.8 81.7 80.3 85.1
Assets 83.0 78.1 77.1 75.1 83.4
Branches 78.3 76.0 76.5 75.9 81.8
Note: Banks having their head office in Madeira's offshore are taken into account in the
calculation.
Source: Bank of Portugal (2000:214)
Table 4.8 - Market share of non-domestic banks
1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000
Credit to customers (gross) 7.6 8.3 8.8 11.2 17.9
Resources from customers 4.9 6.2 6.2 6.8 16.6
Assets 7.6 11.7 11.6 12.8 20.6
Branches 7.2 7.2 7.1 6.7 15.8
Note: Banks having their head office in Madeira's offshore are taken into account in the
calculation.
Source: Bank of Portugal (2000:215)
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are foreign-owned (Ministry of Finance, 1999). Foreign investors have preferred to
establish strategic alliances through mergers and acquisitions rather than seek direct entry.
However, the economic importance of foreign banks increased significantly in 2000 (see
Table 4.8), as their market share increased significantly, due not least to the acquisition of
part of the Champalimaud empire by Spain's BSCH38.
The most recent round of consolidation has involved two groups. First, BCP acquired
Banco Mello, BPSM and the insurance company Imperio. Their integration into the BCP
group was then launched:
'The aim was to exploit the potential synergies, both through the rationalisation and
optimisation of structures and operating procedures and through maximising the economies
of scale and experience. Within the scope of the three-year synergy programme, it proved
possible to implement the target of downsizing the staff, leading to a reduction of 2,965
employees during the year. This process also involved, in parallel, the various operational
support areas, leading to the reorganisation of the Group's banking and insurance distribution
platforms' (Banco Comercial Portugues, 2000:2).
Second, BSCH acquired BTA and CPP, enabling to increase its market share from two
per cent to 10 per cent. After acquiring these companies, the focus was on:
'restructuring of the banks, ending the year with a new and clearer structure in which Totta
heads the Group and under which are Predial, Santander Portugal and Banco Santander de
NegOcios Portugal; a profound change in image (campaigns in the media and a new external
look for branches during the fourth quarter); and integration of central services, with common
first and second levels in the organization chart. The process of merging systems was also
started, which will create within a year a common platform of applications for the three retail
banks (Banco Santander Central Hispano, 2000:96).
38 The BSCH had negotiated to acquire Champalimaud group banks, Banco Pinto e Sottomayor (BPSM),
Banco Totta e Acores (BTA) and Credit° Perdial Portugues (CPP) against strong opposition from the
Portuguese government. The conflict was resolved by an agreement under which BSCH acquired BTA and
CPP. BPSM, previously the Champalimaud group's main bank, has gone to CGD which, as expected, later
sold it to BCP.
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4.5.2.2 The behaviour and performance of banks
The elimination of credit ceilings and the liberalisation of interest rates predictably
contributed to an increase in competition, with the price of banking operations assuming
strategic importance. As a result, the financial margin of banks decreased substantially
from 4.6 per cent of average assets in 1991 to around two per cent by the end of the
decade (Bank of Portugal, 1997, 2000). However, extraordinary gains explain the rise in
return on equity (ROE) from 11.20 per cent in 1999 to 14.68 per cent by 2000. Return on
assets (ROA) also improved from 0.67 per cent to 0.91 per cent. Concern with solvency
and the two return figures are reflected in the trend ratios shown during the 1990s (see
Table 4.9).
The structure of bank profits also changed — with profits derived from traditional
'financial margin' activity decreasing in importance compared with the profit from other
activities. In 1991, traditional intermediation activities predominated in terms of total
banking product (82.8 per cent) while earnings from other current activities (sc.
commissions and earnings from other financial operations) amounted to only 17.2 per
cent. However, the strategic trend was away from a focus on traditional financial margin
activities and towards increasing the importance of activities not directly related to
intermediation (see Figure 4.2).
A rise in non-interest income and a fall in the importance of the financial margin are
symptomatic of product differentiation. At the same time, a focus on commissions and
other earnings means that local bank managers and employees are expected to become
active sellers of services (e.g. the loan insurance that was for a while sold passively with
169
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50% •
40%
30% •
20% •
10% •
0%
1995 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000
Table 4.9 - Bank sector performance in Portugal
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of employees 62,022 61,311 60,911 59,912 60,453 56,859
Number of branches 4,221 4,311 4,645 4,876 5,258 5,328
Employees per branch 15 14 13 12 11 11
Cash-flow (EUR millions) 2,529 2,872 3,605 3,982 4,473 5,492
Ratios (in percentage terms):
Difficult loans / Customer loans 6.8 5.9 4.5 3.6 2.6 2.2
Financial margin 2.67 2.45 2.40 2.19 2.05 2.04
Banking product/Financial assets 3.64 3.67 3.67 3.40 3.36 3.21
Other financial results / Financial assets 0.97 1.22 1.27 1.21 1.30 1.17
Administrative costs / Financial assets 2.06 2.09 1.95 1.76 1.73 1.67
Source: Associacdo Portuguesa de Bancos (2001:12-21)
Figure 4.2 - The banking product
Lo Other revenus D Comissions Ei Financial margin
Source: Associacdo Portuguesa de Bancos (2001:14)
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loans). Therefore, it potentially creates a new need for an accounting for product/service
lines.
4.5.3 The outlook: prospects and challenges
The OECD (1999) Economic Survey includes a special report about financial sector
reform in which several challenges that relate to the EMU are identified39.
First, the introduction of the Euro has implied start-up costs (e.g., for training staff and
adapting information technology). However, since efforts to incorporate new technology
are recent in Portugal, the cost of the introduction of the Euro in terms of IT replacement
and retraining should be relatively lower. The single currency is likely to be a catalyst for
accelerating technological change and increasing the use of securities in the
intermediation of finance. The use of new delivery channels such as electronic means of
payments, phone banking and the Internet is widespread. However, the use of securities is
still incipient (OECD, 1999).
Second, pressure to change the structure of the banking system may grow. As there is no
excess capacity in the Portuguese banking system — both branch density and employment
levels are lower than the EU average — pressure to consolidate may be weaker than
elsewhere in the EU. The large European banks have shown little interest in the
Portuguese market apart from a low level of interest in several financial institutions and
some supporting consultative work. Cultural differences, geographic distance, and the
relatively small dimension of the market may act as inhibitors. Spanish banks, on the
other hand, have a more aggressive strategy to gain a foothold in a small but accessible
and dynamic market, and to support their clients in Spain.
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Third, further internationalisation and geographical diversification can be expected under
EMU. Portuguese and Spanish banks may provide synergies in their respective Latin
American markets of Brazil and Spanish-speaking countries. It is important that Spanish
banks enhance their presence in Brazil and the most logical step would be to move in with
the support of a Portuguese partner. Most likely, restructuring will gradually continue.
Mergers, strategic alliances and co-operation agreements may be undertaken slowly in
order to obtain cost and efficiency improvements (economies-of-scale and scope),
product diversification, new distribution channels and geographical expansion (European
Central Bank, 1999a).
Fourth, pressure on profitability may be expected to grow as increasing competition leads
to a further decline in financial margins. Furthermore, the transition from national
currencies to the single currency is likely to reduce foreign exchange operations, and lead
to a fall in the profits from money market trading and decline in banks' share of financial
intermediation. In previously high-inflation countries like Portugal, where convergence
implied a decline in inflation and interest rates, capital gains and "float" profits may
continue to shrink (OECD, 1999). However, Portuguese banks seem to have a
competitive advantage in terms of operational costs — even if labour productivity is below
the EU average — due mostly to lower staff costs, and operational costs below the EU
average. This may prove valuable in the initial stages of EMU. Nevertheless, productivity
and wage levels are expected to converge. Portugal's exposure to emerging markets is
generally less than for other EU countries, despite recent investment by some banks in
Brazil.
39 See also reports from the IMF (1998) and the European Central Bank (1999a).
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A separate if related issue that concerns the European Central Bank (1999b) is the effect
of technological development in banking systems. IT development contributes to the
reduction of costs associated with the management of information. In addition, it provides
new ways for customers to access to bank services and products, mainly through
automated channels. However, challenges relate to customers' easier access to
information since they will make comparisons, and arguably barriers to entry for new
competitors are lowered as a large branch network is no longer necessary. At the same
time, with the collapse of the headier predictions made at the height of the IT and
telecoms sector bubble, it is apparent that change has not involved a wholesale switch to
an IT-based banking culture. Customers continue to show a considerable inertia,
remaining with their existing banks, and IT access is typically seen by banks as more of a
necessary add-on than a substitute.
To respond to the major challenges just noted, the OECD (1999) Economic Survey lists
recommendations for authorities concerning the financial services (see Table 4.10). These
policy issues mainly concern prudential regulation and supervision issues, and challenges
relating to the restructuring of the banking system. The OECD (2001) Economic Survey
recognises that several measures have been taken to improve co-ordination between
supervisory agencies, and prudential regulation was adopted in respect of the recent rapid
expansion of domestic credit and adequate control of the remaining risks — both on and
off balance sheet. However, the survey claims that little progress was made in terms of
further privatisation and labour market flexibility. The Caixa Geral de DepOsitos group,
which accounts for about 25 per cent of banking assets, remains state-owned.
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Table 4.10 — Recommendations relating to the financial sector
Prudential regulation and supervision issues
Improve co-ordination between financial sector regulatory and supervisory agencies. Formal
links between the three agencies (CMVM*, Bank of Portugal and the Insurance Institute)
should be reinforced.
Adapt regulatory and other legal frameworks to keep pace with technological change in
financial markets. At the international level, disclosure requirements need to be tightened and
contract enforcement mechanisms reinforced, especially those related to Internet transactions.
In addition, national authorities should introduce education and awareness programmes to
prepare consumers for a rapidly changing market.
Introduce a more market-based assessment of risk for prudential purposes. Present prudential
arrangements are under revision, both at the EU and multilateral (Basle Committee) level.
Portuguese authorities should implement revised guidelines once they are adopted.
Create an appropriate legal framework for the development of mortgage-backed securities.
This "securitisation" of mortgages would facilitate banks' liquidity management, while
allowing for the removal of some mortgages from banks' balance sheets. Banks would then
have the option of limiting (or eliminating) their exposure to credit risk in mortgage lending.
The restructuring of the banking industry
Ensure that ownership structure of financial institutions is conducive to competition. Further
privatisation in the banking system should be considered over the longer term.
Make pension rights of banking sector employees portable. Easing transferability rules of the
separate banking sector pension scheme would further enhance labour market flexibility and
facilitate the restructuring of the banking system.
Monitor private arrangements to ensure they do not limit competition. Private arrangements
especially those that prevent hostile take-overs, should be closely monitored to ensure they
do not constitute barriers to entry.
* CMVM — Securities and Exchange Commission for Banks (Comisstio do Mercado de Valores Mobilikrios)
Source: OECD Economic Survey (1999:101)
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4.6 Conclusion
The Portuguese economy has changed dramatically over the last three decades. This
chapter has analysed those changes and discussed the effects of the changing context on
the role and business of banking. It has emphasised the important role that institutions and
the state play in economic development.
During the half-century of corporatist dictatorship, the state played a custodial role and
gradually influenced every aspect of economic, political and social life. It ensured a stable
economic context but considerably reduced flexibility and innovation. The change to a
democratic regime was not accompanied by a transformation in terms of the state
apparatus. The large state sector became associated with the 'conquest of the revolution',
and the 1976 Constitution assumed a highly interventionist role of the state and approved
the 'irreversibility' of the large nationalised sector. Corkill (1999:56-57) maintains that
'[u]nder state control, the public enterprise sector performed poorly, turning in large
operating losses, voraciously devouring public subsidies and ensuring that productivity
increases remained stubbornly low. A large public sector did serve to preserve the infant
democracy's social achievements but, by placing political and social priorities before
commercial considerations, great stains were imposed on the productive structure and on the
public finances'.
Portugal's accession to the EC, favourable external factors (e.g., falling oil and raw
material prices, declining interest rates, and economic aid from Brussels), and the
political stability provided by the first single-party majority government, provided the
opportunity to change the country's public institutions and structures. Privatisation began
to reduce the size of the public sector, starting with the financial sector — 80 per cent of
the financial sector was state-owned in 1989 compared to just 15 per cent in the
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manufacturing sector (Corkin, 1999). However, either directly or indirectly, the state still
controlled the 'strategic' economical sectors. For instance, it kept control of Caixa Geral
de DepOsitos (and indirectly, Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the insurer Fidelidade).
The banking sector changed significantly over this period. From nationalisation and tight
regulation, liberalisation gradually took place, with the allowance of the entry of private
capital. Not burdened with high overheads and accumulated debts, new entrants
established themselves as market leaders and innovators (ibid.). The privatisation process
and entry of foreign capital deregulated the state-owned sector and made it more
competitive. Spanish banks established a foothold in Portugal despite residual customer
loyalty to national banks and problems with the Portuguese government.
The prospects and challenges facing the banking sector relate to EMU participation.
Portuguese banks face the prospect of turning into smaller players in a much larger
financial market. A key challenge for them therefore is to increase revenue from fees and
commissions, while raising productivity and reducing costs (IMF, 1998).
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5 Case Study
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explained the external context, in particular the situation in the
banking sector in Portugal. It highlighted the growing competitive pressure within the
banking industry after Portugal joined the European Community and following a period
of financial deregulation. Economies of scale encouraged concentration, as did the
general belief that larger units would better withstand the impact of growing competition.
Additionally, the chapter characterised the role of the regulator and the current state of
affairs in the banking sector. Competition is likely to accelerate further in the near future
under EMU and as a result of the growth of foreign competitors, in particular Spanish
banks.
This chapter sets the organisational context within which the ABC system was developed
and implemented. The study was undertaken in a Portuguese bank facing strong
competitive conditions and reshaped by new discourses, particularly those concerned with
'strategy', 'marketing' and 'change'. It is a large family-owned Portuguese bank, whose
foundation dates back to the last century. Banco Lusitano 4° was nationalised following
the fall of the Salazar regime in the 1970s, but was re-privatised in the early 1990s, at
which point the original family regained control. This was part of a general privatisation
of financial houses, and this economic shift led, as in other countries, to a greater focus on
profitability, cost control and efficiency, and the effectiveness of customer services. In
40 As mentioned in the introduction, the name of the bank has been anonymised to preserve confidentiality.
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this respect, an old business culture (dating back to before nationalisation, but artificially
prolonged by it) was suddenly confronted with new economic demands.
This empirical part of the thesis traces the change initiatives that occurred in Banco
Lusitano following its re-privatisation, focusing in particular on the design and
implementation of ABC. Initial contact was made with the bank in early January 1998
through the accounting department. The initial purpose was to negotiate access. It was
clear that access would be possible only if confidentiality were assured, especially since
the intention was to explore the complexities involved not just in developing innovations
but also in negotiating their implementation, handling conflict and differences of opinion.
The bank was willing to give generous access, with a full range of materials being made
available (under the usual terms of confidentiality where appropriate) and with interviews
being granted with a wide range of relevant bank employees. The research was carried
out during the period from April 1998 to April 2001, primarily within the accounting and
organisation departments. Interviews were also conducted with senior managers of other
central departments, regional directorates and branches.
The objective of this chapter is to describe how an ABC initiative has developed in a non-
US/UK business environment. The account includes the characterisation of the internal
context, involving such aspects as the firm, its history and structure. Additionally, several
change initiatives that were implemented by the bank, the reasoning behind the decision
to implement ABC, and the organisational efforts to co-ordinate and to develop the
project are described. The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 looks inside the
bank to focus on its history, in particular since privatisation, and provides a profile of
Banco Lusitano. Section 5.3 presents a series of change initiatives undertaken by the bank
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since its privatisation. Section 5.4 introduces the bank's management information tools.
In Section 5.5, the ABC project is presented. The reasoning behind the implementation of
ABC and its subsequent delays are also discussed. Finally, Section 5.6 summarises the
main issues raised during the implementation of ABC.
5.2 Banco Lusitano
Banco Lusitano is a long-established private bank, dating back in one manifestation to the
last century. As such it has a considerable tradition of banking behind it, and many
traditional ways of doing business. These factors are not negligible in attempting to
understand how the bank operates today as it considers new forms of cost-effective,
accounting-based management. At the same time, the bank has become a beneficiary of
the recent financial liberalisation, and it is aware that it needs to gear up to survive in the
new competitive culture of banking in Portugal, and of banking in the wider, increasingly
globalised, world. Hence it realises that the adoption of an ABC or ABM model may
offer it a competitive advantage. In sum, the bank is an institution with, arguably, one
foot in the past and one in the present.
5.2.1 Background
In the life of the bank, it is possible to distinguish four main periods. The first covers the
prehistory of the bank, beginning in the last quarter of the last century, when a family-
owned foreign exchange business was established. It became a bank only in 1920, when it
took the name of 'Banco Lusitano'. It then continued as a separate entity, growing in size
and wealth over the next decade.
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The history of the bank proper begins in 1937, when, with the aim of consolidating
resources and widening the customer and service base, the bank merged with another
bank, apparently highly regarded in business circles of the day. The first period of the
bank's development lasted until the revolution in 1974. Over that period, the bank grew
into a successful enterprise in the old tradition of Portuguese banking, becoming a widely
recognised player in the national banking sector, so that by the 1970s it operated 100
branches across the country and internationally. Then, in 1974, the revolution was
accompanied by the nationalisation of the majority of the productive and service sectors.
The bank was nationalised and transformed into a state-owned company, with effects in
line with those outlined in the previous chapter, as all significant banking activity was
restructured. The banking sector became underdeveloped and inefficient, as it was highly
regulated, protected from competition, and limited in exposure to innovative foreign
influence (OECD, 1999). Furthermore, banks' solvency was affected, as the banks were
required by law to extend preferential credit to nationalised non-financial companies, as
well as financing the public debt at below market rates (Ministry of Finance, 1998).
In the 1990s the bank was re-privatised and the Lusitano group (the financial group of the
family which had controlled the bank prior to its nationalisation in 1975) obtained a 50
per cent voting control of the bank shares and of the bank board of directors (Pohl and
Freitag, 1994). Additionally, the 1990s brought new elements to influence change in the
banking sector, particularly because Portugal's accession to the EU made the
liberalisation of its financial sector an imperative. First, there was deregulation by the
Bank of Portugal, thereby eliminating gradually some administrative constraints and
controls. Secondly, new banking law was introduced according to the EU Second
Banking Directive. Thirdly, market globalisation, with new competitors and the need to
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support customers in their international activities, had a major impact. The redefined
environment involved more private and foreign competitors, and financial margins were
falling.
5.2.2 New market environment and bank structure
The bank's owners were therefore looking for competitive advantage in the new
economic climate for the Portuguese banking sector, and looked to such internationally
adopted innovations as diversification of services and growth through merger and
acquisition — all designed to maintain a healthy balance sheet and profit and loss account.
The pursuit of these goals has continued up to the present, and Banco Lusitano has
secured its position as one of the country's leading banks, with a wide range of overseas
interests. The bank has set up subsidiaries and representative offices in cities where there
is a significant Portuguese community, and has entered the Spanish and Brazilian
markets.
After the bank's return to the private sector, the new board of directors began the
restructuring of the equity holding portfolio. The bank would act as the co-ordination
centre for a global financial group, around which would be assembled operating units
specialised along product lines and devoted to the extension of high-quality financial
services, aimed at their own specific market and business segments. Prominent in the
group are those units more directly dedicated to financial services (e.g. banking,
insurance), but also there has been an expansion of those units arising from the bank's
restructuring process (e.g. outsourcing units), or whose purpose is the extension of
ancillary services in the financial area (ancillary service units and subsidiaries whose
purpose is limited to acting as finance vehicles). The financial group covers a range of
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business areas ranging from banking to property and equipment leasing, insurance,
factoring, investment and pension fund management, credit cards and stock brokerage,
among others.
In these respects, the actions of the bank's top management can be seen to be very similar
to those of the sector as a whole, as described in Chapter Four. Following re-privatisation,
greater attention was directed towards results, i.e. the efficiency and effectiveness of
operations. Furthermore, the traditional focus on products has changed to a stronger
orientation to the customer, with an emphasis on segmentation. The role of segment
manager in each branch for individual customers and for small and medium-sized
companies was conceived. In a subsequent phase, the product delivery function was
adapted to the segmentation process, enriching it with group company products, made
available through a network that was substantially expanded, remodelled and
supplemented by alternative channels:
Tile] Group has evolved from a product-oriented and mass-communication strategy to a
commercial strategy that focuses on the client and permits an approach based on the
Continuous Relationship Marketing concept' (Report and Accounts, 1999).
In terms of cross-selling efforts, the bank has sought to take advantage of synergies
among its operations and the other banking and insurance operations of the group by
selling additional products and services to existing customers through its branch network
(e.g. property and equipment leasing, insurance, credit cards, stock brokerage). This was
accompanied by the expansion of the bank's commercial network, since the bank is aware
of the current importance of branches as a privileged channel. On the other hand, the
group has developed its multi-channel distribution ability in order to meet the clientele's
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preferences in terms of convenience, comfort and fast service, while at the same time
increasing operational efficiency, specifically in low added-value operations:
'The group's mission is thus to extend to its clientele, both retail and corporate, a high degree
of satisfaction appropriate to the market's ever-growing requirements in terms of information
and sophistication' (Report and Accounts, 1997).
By 1999, the structure of the bank (see Figure 5.1) had been developed to a point where it
potentially mirrored this mission statement. The ways in which initiatives undertaken
across the 1990s led up to the establishment of this structure will be considered in more
detail below (see particularly Section 5.3). However, in terms of understanding the
situation when the ABC initiative began to implemented, it is helpful, as a general
orienting device, to have a sense of how the bank was then structured.
As Figure 5.1 shows, in line with the customer focus the bank was now divided, below
the top management 'strategic' level, into three areas: commercial, product and logistics.
The commercial area was the front line for engaging with customers, and it was here that
the key break with the old branch-focussed structure was implemented. So the branches
were now subject to regional directorates, with branch managers no longer semi-
autonomous rulers of their local 'fiefdoms', but instead very clearly defined as line
managers reporting up to the regional directors. The regional directors in turn reported
into the three operations departments at Headquarters in Lisbon, each with a geographical
remit, but with a separate department for Lisbon, reflecting the demographic significance
of the capital city.
Additionally, the commercial area also now included those banking departments which
have traditionally seen themselves as distinct from 'regular' branch banking, and are
arguably also often differentiated in technical accounting terms.
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Figure 5.1 — Banco Lusitano organisation chart (March 1999)
GENERAL MEETING
Audit Committee
Board of Directors
Executive Committee
Secretary
Commercial Area 	 Product Area Logistics Area
Operations Department,
Lisbon
Commercial Marketing
Department
Accounting Department
Operations Department,
Oporto and Northern Portugal
Treasury and Market
Research Department
Strategic Marketing
Department
Operations Department,
Central and Southern
Portueal, Madeira and Azores
Credit Risks Department Organisation Department
Corporate Banking
Department
International Department Personnel Department
Private Banking Department Expatriates and Overseas
Department
Operations Executive
Department
(• • .)
Municipals and Institutional
Department Auditing Department
First and most important there was the corporate banking sector, focussing on serving the
financial interests of major corporate clients (which inevitably, in the new globalising
culture of corporate business, entailed the high-status and high-margin area of merger and
acquisition work, and the specialist accounting expertise therein required). Second there
was another 'exclusive' area, private banking, with its focus on 'high net worth'
individuals, therefore requiring its own distinctive kind of specialist accounting expertise,
devoted to optimising the portfolios of such individuals, in order to retain their loyalty
and potentially act as a conduit for new business through reputational effects spreading
among the network of the moneyed elite. Third there was the distinctive business to be
won in the public sector, run through the municipals and institutional department, where
there was a distinctive need for public sector accounting expertise.
This re-structuring therefore brought together under the umbrella of the 'commercial
area' what had previously been a very disparate set of departments. But this was arguably
essential in terms of the customer-focussed strategy, given the overall solution adopted by
the bank in order to implement the customer-focussed strategy. That solution, as noted
above, entailed the division of other line activities into two management lines: 'product
area' and 'logistics area'.
The 'product area', as Figure 5.1 shows, now covered all the customer-focussed back
office functions. Hence there was a credit risks department to handle at the detailed level
the differentiation of individual customers given the prior segmentation of customer
categories. There was a commercial marketing department to handle the customer-
focussed 'sharp' end of the marketing effort. There was a 'treasury and market research
department' which stood behind these two more front-line customer-focussed
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departments, focussing on customer preference trends via market research and linking
these market research findings to financial analyses of the bank's economic situation, to
generate optimal product mixes and market opportunities. The international department
and expatriates and overseas department respectively serviced two distinct but significant
customer segments for a Portuguese bank: the new customers won via the globalisation
strategy, and those 'old' but still potentially profitable customers inherited from the
colonial past or emigres.
Finally there was the 'logistics area', which in one respect was the 'residual area', having
to include all those back-office functions not directly related to customers or products,
such as the personnel, auditing and operations executive departments, which had to deal
with the essential HR, financial reporting and operations area (including handling the
outsourcing of key operations such as IT). These were those 'general' functions whose
activities are so difficult to assign to particular products or services, but which are
indispensable to the coordination of a large and complex entity such as the Banco
Lusitano.
The 'problem' posed by such essential functions to the ABC project is shown by the
analysis of 'macro-activities' produced by the consultants for the ABC project (see Figure
5.13), which reveals that only 73.7 per cent of total costs could be accounted for in
'causal activity' terms. That is not to say that all the remaining 26.3 per cent of costs were
located in those departments; organisational activity is not so simply divisible. However,
as the analysis of bank activities undertaken by the consultants shows (Figure 5.12), a lot
of what went on in 'macro-activities', whether as R & D or product management, could
not be easily incorporated into the set of costs relevant to sales, or capturable in the
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'activity drivers'. At the same time, the 26.3 per cent of costs not accounted for were
clearly fundamental to the business. What Cooper and Kaplan describe in their ABM
model as 'facilities sustaining' costs may also be seen, in activity terms, as strategically
essential for long-term viability. In this way of seeing, there is a 'strategic' value to
retaining good staff (the HR function), to optimising the transaction costs involved in
outsourcing versus in-house solutions (the operations executive function) and to ensuring
effective external and internal accountability (the auditing function).
There is also a strategic aspect to the other three departments making up the logistics area,
the accounting, strategic marketing and organisation departments, although in these cases
the strategic aspect is arguably more conventional, since these can be seen as key players
at the operational strategy level. Strategic marketing can be seen as having been
differentiated from commercial marketing in order to ensure that the implementation of
the marketing-focussed strategy was assured, while also ensuring that the lower-level
marketing directed at customer interests was implemented. But the most interesting
departments, in terms of the move towards an ABC approach, were the accounting and
organisation departments. The next chapter will consider the interaction between them in
more detail, but it is clear that the accounting department had long had the key role, at the
operational strategy level, in running the budget-focussed approach to managing the bank
system. The organisation department had a complementary role in coordinating
management activities across the organisation within that financial control model.
However, once ABC appeared on the horizon, this distribution of responsibilities and
power was potentially destabilised. For insofar as one stressed the 'activity' dimension of
ABC, it became arguable that the organisation department had the more important role in
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rolling out strategy at the operational level. At the same time insofar as this was still, as
'costing', a form of management accounting, surely the accounting department was still
the key department. The accounting department was potentially facing a real dilemma. On
the one hand, it had the image of being 'the' place in which strategically crucial
accounting data accumulated. On the other, it ran the risk of becoming seen as having the
'wrong' kind of accounting, particularly given the consultancy rhetoric around ABC
summed up in the 'relevance lost' phrase. At the same time, the organisation department
was potentially primed to step in as the new home of relevance, the department most
primed to exploit the new kind of accounting approach embodied in the ABC model.
The tensions that ensued between the accounting and organisation departments will be
pursued in more detail in the next chapter. But it is hoped that this initial summary gives a
sense of how the bank's complex and diverse activities were coordinated into a
management structure, and of some of the potential tensions this posed, as the ABC
project was about to begin.
5.2.3 Profile of Banco Lusitano
Currently, Banco Lusitano is one of the largest banks in Portugal and one of the most
profitable. To show the group's profile, Table 5.1 includes its financial highlights and
business indicators. In 2000, total consolidated assets under management reached Euro
42.7 billion, which corresponds to an overall business increase over the previous year of
14 per cent. With regard to the activity more directly involving clients, customer loans
were up by 28 per cent, and customer funds, including disintermediation, grew by 16 per
cent. The breakdown of consolidated business by the main business areas shows that the
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Table 5.1 — Financial highlights and business indicators
Balance sheet (106 Euros)
Total assets (47 26 768 32 120 37 446 42 658
Total customer funds (") 18 131 21 673 25 949 30 059
Customer loans 9 861 14 051 16 987 21 789
Shareholders and similar funds 1 791 2 094 2 417 3 060
Income statement (10 6 Euros)
Net interest income 437 482 569 640
(+) Customer services 223 274 300 378
(+) Earnings from market operations 143 150 161 211
(.) Operating banking income 803 906 1 030 1 229
Operating expenses 451 499 547 627
Profitability (%)
Financial margin 2.58 2.39 2.35 2.33
Return on financial assets 0.89 0.83 0.85 0.83
Return on assets (ROA) 0.80 0.74 0.77 0.76
Return on equity (ROE) 22.75 20.25 21.14 21.94
Efficiency
Operating costs / Total assets
	
(%) 1.69 1.55 1.46 1.47
Assets per employee
	 (103 Euros) 3 721 4 390 4 859 5 438
Cost to income	 (T) 56.2 55.1 53.1 51.0
Branches (le) 540 574 608 629
(") Includes disintermediation.
Source: Report and Accounts
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group's business is concentrated on commercial banking and supplemented, on the
funding side, by investment trusts, and, on the loan-granting side, by specialised
consumer credit, factoring and leasing units (Report and Accounts, 2000). Despite the
strong pressure on margins, net interest income grew by 12.5 per cent from 1999 to 2000,
which explains part of the growth achieved in consolidated banking revenue (19.3 per
cent). The capacity to raise earnings from investment banking and trading activities (up
by 31.1 per cent) despite the strong turbulence that affected the financial markets 41 , and
the diversification of income sources, with services up by 26 per cent, help to explain the
evolution of banking revenue. The 14.6 per cent increase in operating costs was driven by
depreciation (up by 17.2 per cent) resulting from continuous investment in the
modernisation of information systems and the integration of new technologies. In fact,
administrative costs continue to drop relative to net assets, accompanied by improvements
in the cost to income and in the number of employees per branch ratios (12.5 in 2000),
while assets per employee continued to show considerable growth (up by 12 per cent).
Banco Lusitano preferential shares are quoted on the New York Stock Exchange. In 2000
the bank achieved consolidated results of Euro 228 million. This was a 10.9 per cent
increase on the previous year. The group's profitability has been above the sector norm.
Profitability stabilised at high levels (ROE was 21.94 per cent in 2000), notwithstanding
an environment of declining margins, based on net interest income, commissions and
capital markets growth (see Figure 5.2). The cost to income ratio (excluding trading)
decreased from 62.9 per cent in 1999 to 61.6 per cent in 2000, whilst the same ratio
41 In 2001 the consolidated banking revenue did not vary due to a decrease of earnings from investment
banking and trading activities of 40 per cent, compensated because the net interest income grew by 12.2 per
cent.
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(including trading) declined from 53.1 to 51.0 per cent in the same period following a
pattern that has continued since re-privatisation (see Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.2 - Group Lusitano's Return on Equity evolution
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Figure 5.3 - Group Lusitano's Cost to Income evolution
	75 -	 72.4
	
70 -	 68.4
66.0 Cost to income
61.6
Commercial
(excluding trading)
51.0
Total
191
5,3 Change initiatives
Since the bank was newly committed to profitability and cost control, one major concern
that began to emerge, and remained a high priority across the 1990s, was over the head-
count. Naturally this was not necessarily something that the bank's top management
wanted to broadcast; but from 1992 there were a number of initiatives undertaken, with
the help of leading consultancy firms, where in retrospect it can be seen that a major
objective was a reduction in the head-count and, associated with that, an improvement in
the cost to income ratio (operating expenses/banking earnings)42. With the growing
adoption of internationally used financial performance measurement systems, this ratio
increasingly became a major concern to banks and to financial sector analysts as a proxy
for efficient and profitable operations. According to a bank report, in order to increase
profitability, market share and productivity,
'the Bank has sought to strengthen its position within the Portuguese commercial banking
sector by (i) increasing the penetration of its existing client base through enhanced customer
service, (ii) substantially expanding its commercial banking network to accommodate
increasing demand and ensure adequate marketing capabilities and (iii) consolidating its
existing operations in an effort to control expenses and boost productivity' (Annual Report:
Form 20-F, 1997).
The bank was determined to increase revenue but simultaneously to cut costs, which
would require a leaner structure. Consequently, the bank undertook a series of
'commercial reorganisation' and 'efficiency-focussed' projects (see Figure 5.4). The
largest projects were the rationalisation carried out in the branch network (the Excellence
Project) and in the central departments (the Efficiency Project):
42 Operating expenses includes personnel expenses, depreciation, and external supplies and services.
Banking earnings includes financial earnings (net interest income), commissions and fees from banking
services, and earnings from market operations (trading).
192
1992
	
1994
	
1996
A) Cost projects... (focus on processes)
B) Reorganisation projects...
Regional Directions
C) IT excellence...
•
Small projects>Excellence
• CST — commercial
support tool
New Information System (NISI)
Figure 5.4 — Change initiatives
On the organizational side, we draw attention to the rationalization carried out in the branch
network (the Excellence Project), and in the central departments (the Efficiency Project), as
also within internal services (Complementary Grouping of Companies), while at the same
time we intensified the process of horizontal and vertical communication between the Group
management structures, with particular emphasis on the travelling executive committees and
the Group conferences. At the same time, we took some important steps towards modernizing
the new information system, with some of its modules now in operation' (Report and
Accounts, 1997).
In addition, there were projects reviewing commercial banking, best practice, and the
information technology area. Over the same period, the head-count was reduced from
approximately 6,325 in 1992 to 4,962 in 1998 (see Table 5.2), while the cost to income
ratio improved, from 67.7 per cent in 1995 to 57.5 per cent in 1998. The bank's efficiency
also improved substantially over the period, with total assets per employee increasing
from PTE 465 million in 1995 to 918 million in 1998.
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Table 5.2 — Social audit of Banco Lusitano
Permanent staff 6 325 4 962
By areas
-	 Central departments 2 331 36.9 % 1 177 23.7 %
-	 Commercial network 3 994 63.1 % 3 785 76.3 %
-	 Women 1 453 23.0 % 1 242 25.0%
-	 Men 4 872 77.0% 3 720 75.0%
Average age (years) 41.1 38.8 Women 41.6 37.3 Women
43.0 Men 43.1 Men
Antiquity (years) 14.8 16.0 12.7 Women
17.1 Men
Education
-	 Basic 4 113 65.0 % 2 112 42.6 %
-	 Secondary 1 830 28.9 % 1 527 30.8 %
-	 University 382 6.1% 1 323 *	 26.6 %
Absenteeism	 5.0%
	
3.3%
Employees by branch
	
26
	
12
* 38 % were still studying
-
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5.3.1 'Commercial reorganisation' projects to increase banking revenues
According to a senior manager from the marketing side, following privatisation the bank
'adopted a strategy aimed at achieving strong growth, enabling it to build a large national
retail business, while maintaining high levels of profitability' (Strategy Day 2001:
Marketing Presentation). In his opinion, the adoption of the strategic path of organic
growth was based decisively on the strength of the bank's brand, as well as on Portugal's
low branch density in the early 1990s. In the growth to become a 'leading player' in the
Portuguese banking sector — average market share almost doubled from 9 per cent in 1992
to 16.1 per cent in 2000 — it is possible to identify two phases.
Phase I (1992-1996 — prior to the Excellence Project) was characterised by a strong
expansion in the network, accompanied by a significant reduction in the average number
of employees per branch (see Figure 5.5). A prominent feature of this period was the
definition of a client-centric vision (as opposed to the previous product-oriented
approach), and the development of information systems and platforms supporting this
strategy. This new client-centric vision was attached to structural changes in the
commercial area. In terms of central departments, the changes included the creation of
regional commercial divisions, responsible for managing their branches, and the creation
of two separate marketing departments (strategic and operational), allowing for an
increased specialisation of their activities and close support of the branch network.
Additionally, there was the creation of the regional directorates, located in close
proximity to the branches and customers, and considered as important vehicles to co-
ordinate and give commercial support to branches while allowing a reduction in the cost
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of running the branch network. The expected result was more efficient processing of
transactions, while branches would have more resources to devote to service and sales.
There were two significant features in this period that helped the expansion and
development of the commercial network. First, there was the implementation of a system
of objectives and incentives (SOT) for the entire commercial organisation, including
volume, profitability and more recently also service quality objectives, with a direct
impact on individual bonuses. Secondly, an integrated offer was made available to retail
customers (e.g. including mortgage credit, consumer credit, service accounts, bank
insurance products), similar to that available to corporate customers, where the bank
provided a range of products tailored to meet individual customer needs.
Phase II (since 1996) started with the Excellence Project and was characterised by the
development of a client-segmented approach and multi-channel distribution system. The
goal of the Excellence Project was 'to reorganise the bank, through a group of alterations
to its organic and functional model, as the best form of serving customers, increasing
business and reducing costs' (Consultancy Reports: Excellence Project). Two major
objectives were identified: first, to drive and differentiate the commercial activities
according to the profitability of different customer segments; secondly, to redefine and
rationalise the operational processes in order to reduce costs and increase productivity.
The Project included several programmes to ensure that each customer received a level of
service appropriate to their demands and profitability. The idea was to obtain a more
personalised service and a better relationship with customers — to be customer-directed
rather than product-directed. The central commercial structures for the private segment
and corporate banking were required to offer a wide range of solutions and make high-
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quality services available. Their goals were to specialise in cementing durable
commercial ties of mutual benefit, and to reorganise in a way that raised the level of
efficiency. In terms of retail banking, the purpose was to increase the level of
involvement through appropriate products, using the traditional network or alternative
and less expensive channels such as ATMs or Lusitano Direct43 . Micro enterprises (at a
branch level), and small and medium-sized companies (at a regional directorate level)
were provided with an account manager in their own territory, who was specially
prepared to offer comprehensive proposals to meet the specific needs of those segments
(see Figure 5.6).
To rationalise the operational processes, there were several programmes aimed at
simplifying tasks and administrative procedures in order to decrease production costs.
This involved a remodelling of administrative processes and the central department
structure. The project resulted in 12 per cent of branch staff becoming redundant, with
429 out of 3,649 posts being eliminated. Table 5.3 shows how many positions were cut at
different levels. There was a reduction in about 30 per cent of the number of people in
back-office and multi-functions while at the same time the number of branches increased.
The change of commercial mentality and the introduction of client-segmented approaches
through the restructuring of central departments and regional directorates were seen as the
main advantages of the project. As a manager from one of the marketing departments put
it, segmentation of clients permits 'the right sale, to the good customer, in the right place
43 Lusitano Direct is a telephone service that, besides the options available through ATMs, also provides
'information on products and services, and credit simulations. The service can be used by clients to report
the loss or theft of checks and credit cards, apply for debit and/or credit cards, request foreign currencies,
deposit domestic currency under certain circumstances, and carry out domiciliations, payment orders, and
subscriptions to and withdrawals from investment funds' (Report and Accounts, 1997).
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Figure 5.6 — Segmentation strategy proposed by the Excellence Project
Private Corporate banking
Special individual customers SME' s
Ordinary individual customers Micro entreprise
Table 5.3 — Number of workers in the branches*
Before After
Leaders 790 777
Back-office 953 485
Multifunctions 1,315 1,090
Commercials 591 868
Total 3,649 3,220
* Does not include central departments and the regional departments of Madeira, Azores and Lumiar.
Source: Consultancy Report (Excellence Project)
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and in the right time'. He went on to explain that 'the Excellence Project, with this
segmentation vision, allowed a restructuring of the work in the branches and in all
commercial structures in order to focus commercial action on the segments which provide
more value added' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
However, this change of mentality was not an easy one. There was resistance to change
due to job losses, the transfer of staff to new branches, and new ways of working. As one
manager explained:
'The number of persons that today work in the commercial network has been reduced.
Therefore, they are obliged to do more work and they have to be more productive. In this
respect, there were some adaptation problems. People who were accustomed to a different
regime of work faced cultural problems. They had to have another attitude and dedication to
work. Nevertheless, that is inevitable, the market requires it from us. ... Eventually, there
were also some expectations created around some automatisation and support systems whose
results are not yet significant, namely in terms of IT systems' (Interview: Marketing Dept.
Manager).
Another manager saw major factors producing resistance in the retention of old-fashioned
branch managers for the new style of regional management role, and the persistence of
unionised work patterns:
'The first regional directors, appointed during the regional directorates project, were former
branch managers who had a limited and obsolete vision of the bank. There was a huge effort
to replace them. In the middle of the excellence project none of the regional directors was the
same. Some of the new regional directors revealed themselves during this process. ... The
most significant reactions against the project were from branch staff. The banking sector was
always strongly unionised. Even today, although weakened, unions and commissions of
workers still have their force' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
These comments indicate that there was a major management of change problem in terms
of hiring or promoting managers who would understand the new mentality, and in
winning over existing staff from the old branch-centred way of doing things. Although
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staff from the commercial area did identify with the bank, their primary source of identity
was their local branch (or their region), and there was little identification with head office.
Other significant features of the bank's development in this period were: the introduction
of an extensive multi-channel distribution system (e.g. ATM, phone banking, intemet
banking, assurfinance, mobile banking), and the introduction of a portfolio management
data warehouse (CST — commercial support tool). This tool provides an instantaneous
global picture of the customer (volumes, products, transactions, and remarks), the
management of the daily agenda by commercial staff, the systematisation of commercial
contacts, and their monitoring based upon centrally managed campaigns:
'[CST], a module of the new information system, dedicated to the development of
commercial support and action, will enable us to increase and consolidate our knowledge of
the customers, while affording immediate information on the product that best suits their
individual needs'. (Report and Accounts, 1996)
Due to the success of this tool, the bank has recently developed a web-based
infrastructure to support the active decision management of customer relationships,
allowing direct management control over actions aimed at specific customer groups, thus
leveraging the cross-selling potential.
The recent success of IT tools for supporting commercial staff cannot hide the fact that
the IT is perceived as a strong limitation in the bank. In order to capture efficiencies, in
the mid-1990s the information technology (IT) function was outsourced (although, it is
not clear that this has.
 been a total success). Certainly, within the bank, many employees
see problems, such as bottlenecks and a lack of timely information, due to the outsourcing
of the IT function. There are also claims that commercial staff are facing too many
changes:
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'They should analyse the utility of the IT systems before they install them. What happens is
that they install a new tool and later conclude that it still needs to be improved. This creates
confusion to the employees of the bank and to customers' (Interview: Branch Manager).
Furthermore, there is a recognition that 'IT innovations are not complete and job cuts
have already happened. This adds additional pressure' (Interview: Other Central Dept.
Manager).
The situation has certainly not been helped by a changeover in the software used, which
has sometimes led to 'black holes' in the provision of data to departments. The bank
bought several operational modules from one of its shareholders. Since these new
modules run in IBM, first it was necessary to change the hardware from Unisys to IBM.
After the functional evolution of the new operational modules, there were still several
areas for which there was no module. To deal with this situation, the bank bought new
modules in the market. However, there were some areas where there were no modules
available to meet the bank's needs. In this case, the bank had to undertake a technical
migration of existing modules in the platform Unisys (see Figure 5.7).
It is not clear whether this change has been a total success, in particular when the costs
involved are taken into account. As one manager explained:
'Since the NISI was not linked with the other change initiatives, the modules were adapted to
have a similar performance to those existing in Unisys (except for the marketing and
commercial tools, which did not exist). The outcome is that the NISI has similar potentialities
to the previous one. There are small but not significant improvements' (Interview:
Organisation Dept. Manager).
A number of projects of major importance for the bank's activity were developed in the
IT area. Despite the high costs, the bank saw investments in technology as an important
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solutions
New
modules
'Clients
'Marketing
'Risk management
'Deposits
'Credit
•
Operational modules
component of their overall strategy. It is possible to distinguish between projects carried
out to respond to external factors (the Year 2000) and others to improve operational
efficiency (Efficiency and New Information System — NIS). As the 1999 Report and
Accounts states:
'The works undertaken within the scope of preparing ourselves for the year 2000 took into
account the strategic decision that was taken to replace the entire information systems. This
decision meant that the MS involved not only replacing the entire hardware technological
platform but also the gradual replacement of all the applications software'.
Figure 5.7 — IT changeover
Machine change  (1)
Unisys:	 IBM:
Functional ..
evolution (2)
Technical
migration (3)
44 As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the interviews were grouped to ensure anonymity.
Nevertheless, this does not have a material detrimental impact on the quality of the information convey.
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5.3.2 'Efficiency-focused' projects to reduce operating expenses
The bank has more recently launched a wide-ranging set of restructuring projects, in
pursuit of its belief that 'the growing competitive pressures in the sector and the
opportunities arising from the introduction of new technologies require banks to reinforce
their efficiency levels' (Consultancy Reports: Efficiency Project). These included an
Activity Value Analysis (AVA) Project, the Efficiency Project, and two smaller
efficiency-focussed projects, which are reviewed in the next section.
5.3.2.1 The Activity Value Analysis Project
The AVA project turned the bank's attention to large-scale processes45 that crossed
functional boundaries and forced a re-examination of the fundamental ways in which the
bank operated. The goal of this project was 'to improve the efficiency of the activities
accomplished by the bank' (Consultancy Reports: AVA Project). Two major objectives
were identified: first, to improve the competitive position of the bank, ensuring that
services would be provided at the lowest possible cost; secondly, to guarantee that the
cost reductions would be permanent by analysing the need for products and services of
different units and eliminating the ones that were unnecessary.
The methodology involved three steps. First, an analysis of activities and procedures used
in the bank was conducted, while determining the cost and value of the products and
services provided by the different organisational units of the central and outlying services.
Secondly, the aim was to promote ideas to improve the cost-benefit relationship of those
products and activities. The third step was to transform the approved ideas in action
45 Process is a series of time-based activities that are linked to complete a specific output. Within the AVA
project the main processes of the bank were studied and measured in terms of equivalent labour hours.
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programmes to facilitate their implementation and to achieve reductions of 40 per cent in
costs. It was proposed to implement a 'bottom-up' focus to take advantage of potential
ideas from within the bank. External consultants were retained to work alongside the bank
staff and consolidate and implement the opportunities for improvement.
The organisational department was responsible for the implementation of the AVA
project, but hierarchical line management was directly involved in the implementation of
the approved ideas. The stated objective, according to one manager, was to avoid
'deterioration in the work atmosphere or over-forcing the work rhythm' (Interview: Other
Central Dept. Manager), and thus to ensure that cost reduction did not proceed in an
arbitrary, traumatic or unplanned way. However, in practice the project proved to have
what was seen in retrospect as a 'painful' impact, perhaps because it was the first project
of this kind in the bank, but also because it ended up creating significant job redundancies
in central departments. A manager summarised these difficulties:
'The analysis was too objective, somehow ignoring the human question. It was a painful
process. It was painful for those who made the analysis and for managers that have to make
the choice about people. Of course, that is part of the leadership role — they have to take both
the pleasant and unpleasant measures. It was also painful, because for a long time people
were not confronted with this situation. ... The group chose early retirement, but even that
was complicated. It was easy if any employee could choose, but it was those whom the
managers wanted to go, not those who themselves would like to go. Therefore I believe it was
a dreadful process' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
In July 1993, during a weekend meeting for staff, a senior manager of the accounting
department did a slide presentation where he claimed that the project to increase labour
productivity had three strengths. First, it was a project implemented by an outside
consultant company that demanded the full involvement of those responsible for each
area. It was accepted because it was an order from the top management and executed by
205
an external entity. Secondly, it allowed the emergence of already existing ideas, whose
implementation had suffered because of difficulties. Finally, it provided the bank with an
opportunity to speak about its own problems. However, the senior manager also identified
several weaknesses. He claimed that it was a 'static and limited' project, since it did not
take into consideration the dynamic aspects of the operational improvements and the
quality of the service. He also questioned the methodology used, since it did not take into
account the seasonality of the tasks, and the practical difficulties in measuring time and
output volumes that remained unresolved (AVA Project: Internal Weekend Presentation).
Another manager (who was not in the bank at the time) claimed that this project required
a lot of alterations in the level of the information systems. Eventually this was one of the
reasons why the project did not go further:
'I think delays in the IT projects were responsible for some projects (AVA and Excellence)
not having the result they could because our IT system has changed completely. The bank
bought products that were not developed and there was no experience. It is not enough to buy
products ready-made because they have to be tailored for the bank' (Interview: Other Central
Dept. Manager).
Nevertheless, one manager, who believes that the project was on the right lines and so
had benefit when viewed in the longer term, provides a rather different explanation of
why there were `few practical results' of this project:
'We made a basic error. We did not create a commission to follow the project, including
members from the executive committee. I would say that this project provided few practical
results. Nevertheless, it had a positive aspect: it forced us to think in terms of cost reduction.
Therefore, it left a cultural inheritance — to look for process rationalisation' (Interview:
Organisation Dept. Manager).
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Nevertheless, the consequence of the project was that several people were retired early.
Subsequently, in some cases this meant recruiting additional personnel, because there was
no change in the processes and the issue of seasonality was not taken into consideration.
5.3.2.2 The Efficiency Project
The goal of this project was 'to reduce the transformation costs of the bank through the
reorganisation of central services in order to maximise operative efficiency and improve
the service quality to customers and branches' (Consultancy Reports: Efficiency Project).
The quantitative objective of the project was to achieve a cost to income ratio of 55 per
cent. The project included several programmes. The aim of programme 1 — the
rationalisation of the support central units — was to rationalise work methods, final
products and organisational structure. The aim of programme 2 — the management of
external supplies and services — was to control the costs of external supplies and services
and to change the structure of subsidiary companies providing services. Four major
objectives were identified: (1) the rationalisation of the use of certain services — e.g. rents,
cleaning services; (2) the reduction of non-controllable expenses — e.g. phone calls, travel
expenses; (3) to improve purchase management by changing conditions and renegotiating
prices; (4) to change the structure of subsidiary companies providing services. The idea
was to create a new legal structure to avoid charging VAT between companies of the
group (Ancillary Service Company Grouping). In addition to the organisational
advantages, this would afford important economies of scale, as well as certain tax
advantages. Outsourcing units should work more for external companies, reducing the
bank's 'external services'. The management of external supplies and services was
expected to save up to 15 to 20 per cent of costs. Programme 3 — operational management
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— had two major objectives: first, to rationalise the back-office from central services and
branches, maintaining or improving the quality level; and, secondly, to guarantee that
operational priorities were compatible with the development of the new information
system (NISI) and the redesign of processes. Finally, the aim of programme 4 — the
management system of central departments — was to develop and implement a
management system to define and control the objectives of the other programmes. This
was necessary to define management targets and a 'tableau de bord'.
Operational efficiency and rationalisation, both in central departments and in the
commercial network, could be achieved through the automation and elimination of tasks,
the centralisation of administrative processes, and the migration of low value-added
transactions" towards alternative and more efficient channels (e.g. ATMs, internet bank,
phone bank). Externalisation would permit the branch network to focus on advice and
selling. The reduction of administrative work could release workers to commercial
activities.
Overall, the project was expected to reduce the workforce by 1,000 by the end of the year
200047
 by improving services. The project created 'process owners', whose aim would be
to optimise and simplify their processes, taking into account the fact that the departments
and branches still spent much of their time on activities that did not add value. However,
to reduce costs and increase banking earnings it was necessary to 'rethink organisational
structures and some concepts that are given as acquired'. The new customer focus is
clearly articulated in the following:
46 Including withdrawals, deposits, transfers, services payments and cheque requests.
47 A balance made in January 1999 updated the anticipated reduction to 755 workers.
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'The branch should be a sales centre and staff there should occupy the majority of the time in
selling and advising customers. They cannot, as they do today, occupy most of their time with
non-value activities. Certain operative and administrative activities should be automated.
There is a bureaucratic activity load that should be externalised from the branches'
(Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
The fact that this also needed more efficiency at the centre is recognised in the following
observation, from a central department manager:
'We can not have a financial institution where two-thirds of its resources are allocated to
administrative support activities. The project seeks to improve the efficiency of central
departments, reduce the number of staff and to automatise all tasks that can be automatised'
(Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
Nevertheless, it was recognised that job redundancies do not automatically reduce costs in
the short term, because 'even if the person is retired there are future incumbencies with
the retirement' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
5.3.2.3 Other projects
By 2000, the bank was involved with two more efficiency projects which took still further
the new focus on bringing value-adding activities closer to the customer while capturing
optimal cost and efficiency solutions at the back office level. The back-office zero project
sought to eliminate administrative tasks currently conducted at branch level, while the
integration project aimed to concentrate under a single operational basis the entire
logistics and information systems support functions shared by the commercial banking
activities. It was envisaged that unified operational units within the group and the zero
back-office at branch level should permit a reduction of 670 employees currently working
at the branch back-offices and the reallocation of 300 employees to the commercial front.
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5.3.3 Changes in the organisational discourse
As these change initiatives were taking place, and the implications of the new structure
became increasingly clear to bank employees, one consequence was a 'discursive shift'
first in official documents and then in the vocabulary adopted by managers (i.e. the range
of things said and those not said began to shift). This can in general be characterised as a
move towards a more internationally recognisable kind of 'financial management'
phrasing and vocabulary. Terminology stressing profitability, unit cost reduction, quality,
rationalisation and radical change became widespread, whereas before this had been rare.
Thus, in the Report and Accounts for 1997 we find such observations as the following:
'The plans for change are clearly coming together, as on the one hand we increase our ability
to generate business and hence earnings, and on the other hand, as we reduce our unit costs of
production'.
The Excellence Project was put into operation with the aim of improving the quality and
competitiveness of the Group's services, 'directed mainly toward the distribution network,
the segmentation of our clientele, and adapting the customer service to that segmentation'.
The Efficiency Project was 'designed to reduce transformation costs through slimming down
the logistical support services, to reduce costs and redesign processes, bearing in mind the
changes introduced by the NISI'. With the Efficiency Project 'we simplified, rationalized and
redesigned the circuits, and automated and centralized processes, while linking Group
companies more closely to the process of monitoring customer satisfaction on a continuing
basis'.
The NISI was 'designed to make radical changes in hardware and software, in order to
respond to the needs of running the organization in an up-to-date way'.
This new discourse was also 'advertised' with the announcement of a share increase (see
also Figure 5.8 that includes supporting data):
'Despite narrower net interest margin, Portuguese banks were able to diversify their income
into no-interest income generating activities as well as to generate significant cost savings
and increase global profitability with [the bank] ahead of peer group on all counts'.
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Figure 5.8 — Ratio evolution, 1996-2000
Evolution of the net interest margin 	 Weight of fees and commissions within
1996-2000 (%)	 the income structure, 1996-2000 (%)
Administrative expenses in percentage of
total Banking income, 1996-2000
Portuguese banking	 Group
sector**
Source: Strategy Day (2001)
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As the process of organisational and discursive change has gathered momentum and been
maintained now for the best part of a decade, bank employees have not been slow to
realise what has been happening. Some of this has followed as a natural consequence of a
change in personnel, with new people entering who buy into the new discourse more
automatically. But additionally those who have stayed on have embraced the new kind of
discourse and the practices that go with it, while they have also had to accept that there is
an increase in job insecurity under the new more 'competitive' regime.
Unsurprisingly, there has been a considerable increase in suspicion of the motives of top
management when initiatives promoting 'improvement' have been set up, particularly
among older employees. At the same time, a new spirit of competitiveness has begun to
be disseminated at the everyday level with the setting of targets, both financial non-
financial, e.g. with the framing of new objectives such as increasing the percentage of
'high-value' customers.
In this process, there has been some considerable reorganisation of the bank's structure.
In the mid-1990s there was a geographically-based reorganisation of the management
structure below top management, with the introduction of regional divisions, and with a
related focus on revamping the work patterns in branches, so that branches became more
of a 'one-stop shop' for a range of services and the first point of call for most services that
the average customer might want or be persuaded to consider. Separate 'corporate
banking' and 'private banking' divisions were also set up for high net worth customers.
Thus, strategy and marketing discourses became the accepted language through which
senior managers articulated their decision-making processes and justified their outcomes.
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The following 'key strategic messages' from a presentation during a 'strategy day'
organised for all managers, are an example of these discourses:
'The creation of shareholder value is increasingly at the heart of [the bank's] business model
and decision-making processes:
• [The bank] aims to be a regional leader (top 5) in terms of efficiency (cost/income ratio);
• Market share growth is "only" an intermediary target to achieve increased levels of
profitability;
• Strategic development — although the emphasis is on organic growth, we have no dogmas
regarding M&A, but will only act on opportunities that will add value to our current
positioning, notably outside Portugal' (Strategy Day 2001: Strategy Presentation).
Other examples can be taken from the Report and Accounts for 1999:
'[The Group] ...has outlined its business strategy according to the specific needs and wishes
of the different consistent segments that make up the overall financial demand in the various
markets where it operates. Based on a diversified and high added-value provision, the Group
has sought not only to secure the loyalty of its present customer base, but also to increase its
market share through a cross-selling approach and by enhancing the high quality and
recognition of products and services associated to the ... brand'.
'Within the scope of relational banking dynamics and in view of its very extensive and
diversified client base, [the Group] has evolved from a product-oriented and mass-
communication strategy to a commercial strategy that focuses on the client and permits an
approach based on the Continuous Relationship Marketing concept'.
The bank's mission is expressed as follows:
'[The] Group aims to be the leading Portuguese multi-specialist financial group in terms of
innovation, customer service and profitability. While maintaining strict risk management, [the
bank's] continuing organic market share growth is fuelled by anticipation of client needs and
alliances with premier partners to leverage its strong brand image' (Strategy Day: Strategy
Presentation)
This discourse reflects the position held at a general meeting in March 1998, where the
shareholders approved the Millennium 3 Programme. This programme sets forth strategic
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commitments towards growth, financial strength, profitability and productivity. Table 5.4
includes the quantifiable strategic objectives for 2000.
In the Report and Accounts for 2000 'the strategic mainstays that guide the Group's
activity' are described as:
'To extend our client base and consequently our market share has at all times been an
intermediate goal for the Group; the development of our presence in markets having affinities
with Portugal was also a strategic vehicle that we have reinforced in order to meet this goal.
Our commercial performance is therefore guided by the underlying objective of delivering
maximum value to our customers, and based on a relational marketing approach and the
continuous effort to improve efficiency levels. The increase in value generated is shared with
the agents involved (employees, customers and shareholders), thus fostering an increasingly
concerned and long-lasting relationship.
At the same time and intimately connected to these guidelines, we note the initiatives taken to
fully use the potential afforded by the new technologies, which provide a faster and more
efficient means both for the communication between the Group and its customers and for
carrying out transactions and business'.
The strategic guidelines may be summed up in four points: (1) leveraging the bank's
franchise and trademark for market share gains; (2) developing an international presence
in markets having affinities with Portugal; (3) improving relationship marketing to deliver
maximum value to customers; (4) developing multi-channel distribution in the financial
sector along with full exploitation of New Economy opportunities.
The 'truth' of the free market is reinforced through the statements, publications and
actions of the Portuguese public institutions (state) and other institutions such as the
World Bank.
214
•".1 Strategic objectives
Table 5.4 — Strategic objectives for year 2000
Market
Productivity
Solvency
Profitability
Staff
Shareholders
market share? 17.5 %
cost to income = 60 %
(excluding trading)
BIS ratio? 12%
return on equity (ROE)? 15 %
growth of profit sharing? 10 %
growth of dividends? 10 %
(more than 400.000 customers)
cost to income =55 %
(with trading)
pay out ratio? 50 %
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5.4 Management control systems: the original MAS
The original MAS, as noted before, was largely budget-driven, supported by a system of
objectives and incentives (SOT). The new ABC system was apparently expected to
supplement this, through rendering visible the activities that were required to make the
new customer-focussed strategy work effectively. However, that assumed that the
existing budget-driven MAS was already effective, and that it could be adapted to fit with
the ABC approach. Both these issues were problematic.
Anthony and Govindarajan (1998) have noted that even today the budget is an important
tool to fine-tune the strategic plan and to help co-ordinate the activities of the several
parts of the bank. It informs managers of the amounts they are permitted to spend and the
performance that is expected of them. Additionally, it is a basis for evaluating a
manager's actual performance, so long as it is linked effectively to an appropriate system
of objectives and incentives (SOI). The SOT therefore needs to include a series of
measures that best represent the bank's strategy and should be a mechanism for
improving the likelihood of the bank successfully implementing a strategy. However, this
is easier said than done. In reality there were, within Banco Lusitano, significant
limitations to these theoretical aspirations.
5.4.1 The budgetary control system
The budgetary control system had been in place for some considerable time, and
additionally was an evolved version of an older incremental budgeting system, which had
been in place before the re-privatisation of the early 1990s. The annual budgeting process
operated as follows.
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The annual congress of the group management starts the budgeting process and is an
important way for the executive committee to communicate the mission and strategic
objectives for the forthcoming periods. The objectives for the next year are then handed
down from the executive committee to the senior managers in the key central
administrative departments involved in the budget-setting process. These include the
accounting, strategic marketing, treasury and market research departments. The
departments prepare a document containing the main factors in the macro-economic
environment (historical/evolution/trends), scenarios for the banking sector, and
commercial objectives and by business unit. Then the executive committee prepares a
document that establishes the corporate objectives of the bank as a whole and its
outsourcing companies. The objectives are broken down by business areas and for the
different parts of the organisation. The document also communicates details of budgetary
policy and guidelines to those involved in the preparation of budgets. Budget forms are
sent to all responsibility centres (see Figure 5.9), including central departments (cost
centres), the branch network (profit centres), and outsourcing companies (investment
centres). Costs that are not allocated to responsibility centres are budgeted to the
managers who are responsible for them as an attempt to control them (e.g. depreciation,
phone calls). The principle is that all costs should be controllable in one way or another.
The accounting department co-ordinates this stage of the process. The department
receives the forms and ensures that the budgets are in harmony with each other and with
the guidelines. The department also promotes meetings with the commercial marketing
department with the aim of establishing objectives for the different parts of the bank, e.g.
relating to product range or marketing segmentation. There are also meetings with the
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'process owners' (responsible for the preparation of the budget for their processes) and
responsible departments.
Finally the accounting department elaborates the plan and budget under the supervision
and collaboration of the 'budget supremo', who reports to the executive committee. The
budget includes a 'tableau de bord' (see Table 5.5), where special attention is paid to
certain key targets, especially return on equity and the cost to income ratio. This
document still requires the revision and approval of the executive committee.
Actual numbers are compared with budgetary figures on a monthly basis, and a
management by exception principle is implemented on the basis of the fixed budgetary
numbers. This enables the 'process owners' (process costs) and accounting department
(direct costs) to identify the items that are meeting plan objectives and to investigate the
reasons for differences. Corrective action can be taken to avoid similar inefficiencies
occurring in the future. Although the budget is not flexed, seasonal variations may justify
variances. Differences may occur because the budget was unrealistic to begin with or
because the actual conditions during the budget year were different from those
anticipated. Even in this situation the budget is not revised. The budget is not changeable.
Seasonal variations or other unexpected events tend to result in additional expenditures
being authorised where potential cost overruns are identified.
A comparison of actual numbers with the budget provides a means of informing
managers of how well they are performing in meeting the targets that they have been
previously set. The existence of a 'budget supremo' is part of an effort to motivate
managers to strive to achieve the budget goals. The 'supremo' explains his own role as
follows:
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Table 5.5 — Tableau de Bord — Group Lusitano
Symbol	 Yearn-3 Year n-2 Year n- ,T3- Year n
•44,	 (budget)
Strategic objectives
Return on equity	 ROE
Cost to income
Total	 0E1BE
Commercial (excluding trading) 	 0E/CBE
Rates of growth
Operating expenses	 OE
Personnel expenses
External supplies and services
Depreciation
Commercial banking earnings	 CBE
Total banking earnings	 BE
Efficiency of the organisation	 0E/TA
Quality of the network implementation	 TA/NB
Employees per branch	 NE/NB
Assets per employee	 TA/NE
Personnel expenses per employee 	 PE/NE
Business earnings 	 BE/TA
Financial earnings	 FE/FA
Return on commissions 	 C/TA
Return on market operations 	 ME/TA
Level of overdue credit
Other factors
Tax efficiency
Net assets to capital employed
Level of provisions
NB — Number of branches 	 TA — Total assets	 FE — Financial earnings
NE — Number of employees	 FA — Financial assets 	 BE — Business earnings
ME — Market operations earnings
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'A department relates itself to other departments on the basis of equality. It can ask for
responsibilities but things do not necessarily happen as they should. If there is someone
responsible for cost [reporting directly to the executive committee], he can ask whatever he
needs to know and he can impose certain behaviour because he has a different role [and
position]. The budget supremo together with the accounting department can fortify control of
costs' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
However, one consequence is that managers complain about too many people controlling
their own budgets:
'Everyday we receive maps from somewhere to control our budget. At this moment there is
excess in terms of cost control and the problem is that information in excess provokes
disinterest... We have more important things to do' (Interview: Other Central Dept.
Manager).
'There are several persons that send us the same cost control information. I do not agree with
that, it should only be one entity. The same information has to be answered to all those
persons' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
The intended change of mentality was not achieved completely:
'[The budget] does not influence this department. Although we had taken some measures and
people collaborate with those measures, this department is too important to be subject to the
budget' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
The problems involved in motivating managers in appropriate and optimal ways had led
to the development of a system of objectives and incentives (SOI). While this was
undoubtedly seen as an extension of the budgetary system, a logical step to set targets at
all levels in the bank, to communicate these strategies to managers and motivate them to
achieve those goals, it too had limitations in the way it developed.
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5.4.2 The system of objectives and incentives
The SOI was introduced initially only for the commercial area — the branch and regional
directorate network, and the central commercial structures for the private, corporate and
institutional segments. It was perceived as a key means of inducing more effort to achieve
goals (in order to receive associated rewards) and to guide this effort into directions that
are valuable for the bank. It provided a monetary bonus for achieving short-term targets
giving positive direction and motivation. The objective was to develop a greater
competitiveness and commercial awareness at the 'sharp end' of the business, in the
branches. The targets set (along with the potential incentives for success) are increasingly
driving the activities of managers and employees in the branches. There is (as in the
banking sectors in other countries) an increased focus on sales and short-term profit.
Targets are related to commercial effectiveness (measured by the degree that commercial
objectives are reached) and profitability (measured by business volume with standard
margins defined by product). Profitability is assessed in terms of the evolution of cost to
income, i.e. the cost to income ratio is compared with the ratio for the same period in the
previous year.
The big problem that quickly emerged with the SOT (and one that had not been solved
before the advent of the ABC initiative) was that the bank did not have the tools to
calculate actual product margins. Consequently, while commercial staff needed to be
encouraged to direct their efforts appropriately, they were equally likely to be motivated
simply to work harder, since the SOT could not differentiate focussed activity from
activity in general. In other words, the system worked to encourage the generation of as
much business as possible, which could involve selling less commercially attractive
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products. Here the SOT failed to differentiate selling strategies, in the absence of profit
margin information. As a commercial manager explained:
'Perhaps it should not include some products that, although strategic for the bank, are almost
in extinction commercially. In terms of borrowing, the weight of the current and saving
accounts is too high. I understand that those products are strategic and important for the bank
but commercially they are products that we cannot make an effort to sell' (Interview:
Regional Director).
Since commercial staff can squeeze margins in order to do more business, and the system
does not translate that through actual margins, the results reported can create a perceived
unfairness in the attribution of performance rewards. As a manager from the commercial
area put it:
'Profitability is just a volume effectiveness because a standard margin is used, which is
totally mismatched; it should be the actual margin. Imagine that I am someone who does
good credit management and practice interest rates above the bank's average. In terms of
profitability I am in the same situation as someone who squeezes interest rates, so there is not
a profitability measure. We should have combined the volume growth with actual interest
rates (Interview: Regional Director).
An additional problem is the difficulty in identifying profitability in terms of the branch
network and central departments that work with special segments, namely corporate and
private banking. By using average margins, the branch network is adversely measured in
terms of profitability since corporate and private banking departments have lower
margins. A manager from a central department from the commercial area explained that:
'Our customers also affect the SOT of the branches. We do not follow directly the customer so
we need to have the branches interested by reflecting their numbers with what they and we
obtain. However, some of our customers could affect the branches negatively since our
relationship with them is affected by the strategic position decided by the administration. We
decided that five of our customers are too dangerous for branches and they have been
removed from their SOI. These customers are only in our SOT. We are not very worried about
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our SOT but about the profitability we get from our customers... and the SOT is still imperfect
in this measure (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
In 1999, a SOT was also created for central departments. Although benefiting from the
experience in the commercial area, this system was difficult to set due to the different
activities in the central departments, ranging from operative to logistics and support.
Therefore the overhead allocation problem was posed particularly acutely. The
provisional solution was to set four types of targets, each of which related to costs that
were measurable, rather than costs that were relevant. First, efficiency targets were set
measured in terms of workforce reduction and redesign of processes by the 'owners'.
Secondly, cost targets were set measured in terms of budget execution (including direct
costs and process costs for the `owners'). Thirdly, quality targets were set, measured
through a questionnaire to internal clients regarding the quality of service. Finally,
commercial targets and the global effectiveness of branches were set, but only for the two
marketing departments (strategic and operational). Along with this set of targets, the
system required an evaluation of each individual's performance conducted by the senior
manager of the department, which also affected the individual reward. In addition to the
problems with the 'objective' reward system, this added a perception of potential
subjectivity and unfairness in the attribution of rewards, while imposing significant
burden of time and stress on those managers.
In practice, the application of the SOT for central departments during 1999 encountered
several additional problems due to significant variances from previous years that could
not be easily accepted by staff. Furthermore, it turned out that if the bank had applied
directly the rules initially set, the bonuses would have been far higher than the budget had
allowed for. Corrections were therefore made hurriedly, on the grounds of avoiding
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unfairness and inequities in the reward system. In practice this seems to have worked, at
least at the time. As one manager commented:
'Employees from the central departments did not realise the problems because they received
the results that had been corrected. Employees were satisfied since it does not have the
negative aspect of comparing themselves with commercial staff: 'it seems that there are first-
and second-rate employees'. Adjustments for next year would naturally exist but undoubtedly
this was well received by employees' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
It was recognised however that the system needed some significant adjustments if
perverse or unexpected outcomes were to be avoided. If the system had too much of a
cost control focus, this was not going to motivate the development of more business.
Indeed a cost focus might be counter-productive. For instance, in the treasury and market
research departments more costs are the result of more market business. So long as the
SOT considered only the costs, their activity would be counter-productively penalised.
There was also a sense of unfairness because some departments that had well-established
budgets felt penalised when compared to other departments that were new or had never
had a very strict budget.
When examining the two systems of objectives and incentives introduced up to 1999 one
can conclude that performance was too multi-dimensional and complex to be captured by
the set of defined quantitative indicators. These were failing to capture some important
performance dimensions (i.e. they were incomplete) and they were also too easily
affected by exogenous events that cannot be influenced by the staff being measured (i.e.
they are partly uncontrollable)48.
42' Dutta and Manzoni (1999) define the properties a good performance indicator. It should be complete as it
captures 'the whole truth' about the subunit's (e.g. the individual's or the team's) performance, and
controllable as it is only influenced by elements under the unit's control.
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Nevertheless, the SOT has had a huge impact on staff. That was to be expected, since it
'touches people's pockets' and performance affects rankings. As one manager put it:
'One works as a function of the objectives system. Monthly the system measures us. They
make ranking by branches, regional directorates and departments. At the manager level, the
rankings are made on the basis of effectiveness. Each time we are evaluated more in this way;
naturally this system is very relevant for us' (Interview: Regional Director).
Even though inside the bank there is a claim that there is a good fit between this system
and the budgetary system, one may hypothesise that there are still some serious points of
conflict. Furthermore, such conflicts are likely to be resolved in favour of acting in the
terms the new system requires, particularly where incurring extra cost can be justified in
the name of pursuing objectives, and where such costs are authorised without major
objections under the non-flexed budgetary system. Nevertheless, the SOT is responsible
for the major change in the budget that has occurred over the last years. As one manager
explained:
'When the SOI was created, there was a major change in the budget: the division by segment
of customers. Until then the budget was made for business units, i.e. the branches. Currently,
business goals are set for banking customers not business units' (Interview: Accounting Dept.
Manager).
The claim that there is a higher tendency to meet the budget raises the question of
whether this tendency is caused by actual better performance or by manipulation of the
budget estimates, or possibly the actual results reported. As one manager stated, 'if I do a
credit operation and send it to deposits, I will increase two variables without any real
movement' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager). There were claims that in fact
manipulations did happen before:
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'The analysis was always done with monthly balances that allowed manipulations. Last year
there were regional directorates that made 50 per cent of their commercial effectiveness
(equivalent to six months) in one month — December. It was easy to manipulate numbers
because it considered the monthly average. This year the annual average is considered. We
are working with months of the last year; falls one month enter another month. Therefore, at
the end of the year, we will have the annual average, which is more fair. Although
manipulations could always happen, when they are divided by 12 the effect is not so high'
(Interview: Regional Director).
During 1999, the bank changed the SOT. Previously, data were collected by home branch
but this was changed to the banking customer. As a reaction to this change, commercial
staff 'adapted' themselves:
'In branches, employees go to see where the client is in terms of structure, and before they do
business they try to modify it in order to benefit in terms of SOI. Consequently, the customer
may not materialise business immediately' (Interview: Regional Director).
The system is now in continuous improvement. In the Report and Accounts for 2000 it is
stated that will be an 'innovative scheme in the Portuguese financial system', the stock-
based incentive system:
'From the start, the universal nature of this system together with its medium-term perspective
regarding the employees' involvement with the institution's activity proved an efficient
method of keeping hold of the most talented'.
There are grounds therefore for concluding that on balance, SOI's positive effects
outweighed its negative ones. On the positive side, it appears to have widespread support
among staff in comparison to the older system. It can also be seen as having been useful
in adapting the corporate culture to the new environment in which the bank operates. It
has also helped staff to focus on key short-term issues, particularly when it has been
possible to devise incentives that promote desired activities. On the negative side,
dysfunctional consequences have occurred because that has not always been possible,
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particularly in the central bank areas where activities are not easily linkable to particular
products or services. In addition, performance targets have sometimes been unilaterally
imposed or have been manipulated so that they are relatively easy to achieve.
Furthermore, targets have sometimes required revision during the year, but general
principles for doing so have not been developed. There is also the - danger of paying for
something that people might have done anyway. Once the bank starts to pay employees,
they tend only to perform because they are paid to do so. However, even if some of these
problems are endemic, that remains a problem for incentive schemes generally. In
addition, some of these negative factors may be relatively easy to overcome as the
scheme evolves. For example, the SOI for the commercial network recently started to
include service quality objectives.
There are further outstanding issues, not least ensuring that the system adequately
rewards long-term aspects of performance as a basis for promotion. There are two types
of promotion. The first, automatic promotion, happens after the employee has been at a
certain level for n years. The second, promotion by merit, is based on an evaluation
conducted by the senior manager of the department or branch. It seems necessary to have
a clear link between promotion and the SOI in relation to long-term aspects of
performance. However, that process has only recently been addressed, and so there is still
a long way before it is clear how far this can be achieved. To date it has proved easier to
implement at the branch network level, where relatively simple quantitative targets have
been established to evaluate long-term performance.
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5.5 The Activity-Based Costing project
Thus, the 1990s were a decade of major transformation, with many new opportunities and
the associated problems that such transformation brings. It was in this context that an
ABC initiative was suggested, influenced by the consultancy firm involved previously in
innovations. The basic idea was that it should be piloted initially in one operational sector
of the bank. Beyond the initial trial, which was due to begin in 1998, the intention was
that, if it was successful, it should be rolled out across the bank as a means of further
enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. It was not completely clear to many bank
employees why they wanted to implement ABC. However, it appears that some managers
were already voicing concerns about the lack of product cost information, and at the same
time there was a strong price pressure from the increasing competition between banks
driving a perceived need to cut margins. There were also widespread concerns about the
lack of 'information' for management (especially about profitability), the lack of
comparability between information from different sources, and the lack of timeliness of
the information that was available.
5.5.1 Pre-implementation
The implementation of ABC was due to start in 1998. However the project was
successively deferred during 1998 and 1999. There were various reasons advanced for
this delay, including such factors as the currency switch to the Euro and the Y2K
'millennium bug' problem. In the context of the introduction of the new currency, the
bank had to adapt its operations, especially in the information systems area. Although the
new currency only entered into circulation in January 2002, January 1999 was identified
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as the benchmark for the Euro programme. Regarding the millennium problem, the
Report and Accounts (1997) stated that:
'[Its] impact on the Bank will be softened because the main modules of the New Information
System have already taken it into account, either wholly or in part. However, this does not
mean that substantial efforts will not still be needed in the information system as a whole'.
However, there were other more deep-seated reasons. Given the structure outlined in
Figure 5.1, it is obvious how there were power relations issues between departments, e.g.
in the commercial area between those departments dealing with 'standard' customers and
those with more of a prestige client focus. But of particular interest here was the potential
'turf' struggle between the accounting and the organisation departments. By early 1999 it
was clear that the latter department was in line to mount and co-ordinate the
implementation of ABC, were it to go ahead, and this clearly precipitated a boundary
dispute not only over who owned 'accounting' within the firm but also who owned the
'significant' accounting. A manager from another department summed up the dynamics
of the situation:
'There are two forces and two different interliretations of control, definitions of costs and
information systems... that also has to do with the history of the bank. Till a few years ago
the accounting department was responsible for planning, so they intervened almost in
everything. Today, the bank is facing great change, which is not as clear as is desirable. It
also has to do with an historical issue, let things run...' (Interview: Other Central Dept.
Manager).
However, in the early stages, it was not clear whether or how far this potential conflict
would materialise, since as the series of delays perhaps suggested, there was a noticeable
lack of commitment to the proposal from top management, as a manager involved in
proposing the ABC project observed:
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'They [the executive committee] know much about banking, they are bankers in the real
sense of the word, but they are not too sensitive to efficiency. They have a feeling that control
of efficiency is important, but as they do not know the basic concepts they are not too
demanding in that subject'.
'The administration wants to reduce costs and become a more efficient bank, but to do that it
is necessary to change structures and processes. Although they want that, they are afraid of
going too far in terms of change inside the bank. That is a constraint' (Interview:
Organisation Dept. Manager).
It is interesting to note some difficulties forecast in 1999 regarding the implementation of
ABC. Managers outside the accounting and organisational departments anticipated certain
technical difficulties:
'The apprehension of the concept, the amount of resources that it is going to consume. It is
going to change the way people act and think. There will be difficulties in feeding an ABC
system. The IT (or accounting, if you prefer) still does not generate enough data continuously
to feed the system. We could do the conceptual part and implement it, but the problem is the
maintenance of the system since an ABC system is not simple to feed. ... It is going to deal
with departments that have never suffered reorganisation processes in terms of the renewal of
staff. We should do a pilot so that the executive commission and the other departments 'buy'
the idea. Consultants will be necessary since there is not internal knowledge to implement it'
(Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
Also, behavioural problems were anticipated:
'My opinion is that teams are pressured due to job redundancies and new methods of work
that are not fully working. People resist change because they are overloaded; nevertheless,
because of that, they are also susceptible to change.
There are two types of resistance. First, from those that are in a life phase where capacity to
change is limited. Second, from those to whom change creates instability, and they tend to
defend themselves. It is very important to fully inform the latter group of people so they can
collaborate. We are not dealing with objects but with people. We need to follow people's
reaction to avoid resistance and to immediately change their behaviour.
If you randomly interview some people, you will conclude that there is more work, less
people, and working tools are not efficient. When this idea is generalised it is harder to get
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staff collaboration. The insecurity caused by this situation leads to rumours, which is terrible
because it destabilises and distresses people' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
5.5.2 Implementation
In January 2000 the bank decided to start the implementation of ABC. The formal reason
was that ABC could be a relevant data provider for the Management Information System
(MIS). The tender for service presented by the consultancy company eventually selected
stated that Banco Lusitano had contacted them to help implement ABC as part of the
MIS. The aim was to provide 'more accurate costs, in order to manage profitability of
products, customer segments and distribution channels. Additionally, it also permits the
identification of potential improvements in terms of efficiency' (Consultancy Reports:
ABC Project). The consultants perceived that for the bank, the reduction of financial
margins (spread) made it necessary to find new sources of profitability and gains of
productivity. This meant searching for more profitable customer segments, developing
new products, and using less expensive distribution channels (e.g. the Internet).
Another important aim (the most important for the organisation department) was ABM in
order to reengineer business processes, particularly those that did not add value to
customers. Control of cost had become a key issue in the bank and ABC was seen as a
potential device to induce behavioural incentives to be more cost conscientious. ABC was
perceived to be a 'cost saving identification' device. Complementary to these objectives,
it also was expected to provide better information to help the budgeting process.
Potential conflict was initially deflected by appointing the two departments as formal co-
sponsors for the project, with the accounting department in charge of developing the new
MIS, and the organisation department in charge of reengineering processes. Nevertheless
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it was apparent that in certain key respects the latter was in a stronger position, not only in
terms of being more in tune with the project but also in terms of the roles of people
involved and levels of direct responsibility over the project.
At the same time, there was an extraneous reason why, after the earlier delays, top
management arguably saw the project as timely. This was because they were considering
a potential merger with a rival bank. This suddenly gave a new kind of reason why there
was a felt need for a better understanding of the costs involved, in order to ensure the
merger would be a commercial success. One organisation department manager explained
how he perceived the decision to go ahead:
'As you know, the bank was going to merge at the beginning of the year, and when these
things arose they were the result of a decision planned a few months before. Initially, the
project was supposed to finish in September, but it was put back to July due to the merger.
Therefore, eventually there was an urgency to know our product costs before the merger. I am
certain of one thing: the bank always had this need. Last year would have been impossible
with all the changes, the anticipated Year 2000 bug and the Euro. We were still adapting to
the IT systems transition. Last year was too complicated and perhaps if we had started the
project it would have been a failure' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
Once this circumstance had raised top management interest, it appears that a more general
interest developed in ABC as a promising methodology for assigning the bank's operating
expenses to its varied products, customer segments, and distribution channels 49. One
perceived attraction of ABC was the way its language centred on cost awareness and unit
costs, and was increasingly seen to fit with the marketing-focussed strategy.
Consequently the decision was finally made to bring in a consultancy company to
implement the model in conjunction with internal staff. The bank had proposals from
49 In 1998, 52.3 per cent of the operating costs were not allocated to responsibility centres. The costs to
allocate include depreciation, and costs with ancillary services and outsourcing units such as IT.
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three consultancy companies. The winning company was perceived as having one or
more advantages. First, as one manager explained:
'[The winning company] had the luck to have been the last. They took the know-how from
the other proposals and the problems we identified in the other proposals and managed to
present a better proposal' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Employee).
Second, the head of this company in Portugal already had a positive track record with top
management through involvement in earlier consultancy projects, when he was employed
elsewhere. This should not be taken to imply that the winning bid was not superior and
did not necessarily mean that before he moved personal contacts within the bank. On the
contrary, as an Organisation Department manager observed:
'We considered several issues: costs, type of approach, and the know-how of each company
compared to what we want to do. We also compared their experience at the international and
national levels and the type of references we had. ... [From the winning company] we knew
the president in Portugal. He had worked with us as a consultant from another firm. This
personal knowledge may have helped' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
At the same time, the track record almost certainly did not hurt his company's prospects
at the relevant management level. As another employee observed:
'His first work, the AVA project, may have been a painful and traumatic process to those
involved, but for top management the result was excellent. This situation may have created a
strong influence near the executive committee' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
Once the consultants had been appointed, the ABC system was developed in two phases.
The first phase focussed on working in the branch network because it was technically
easier to study their activities and they represented 43.3 per cent of the operating costs
(see Table 5.6). Furthermore, it was easier to make progress with this research, because
the organisation department had already undertaken an activity analysis in branches
during previous reorganisation change initiatives. The second phase then involved the
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Table 5.6 — Operating costs by departmental areas
(1999)
Commercial area
Branch network 32 009 43.3
Regional and central directions 4 752 6.4
Central departments 3 438 4.6
40 199 54.3
Product area 5 141 7.0
Logistics area
• Ancillary services 1 277 1.7
• IT costs 5 985 8.1
• Projects 10 125 13.7
• Other costs 11 275 15.2
28 662 38.7
TOTAL 74 002 100.0
Source: Consultancy Reports (ABC Project)
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extension of the model to analyse activity in the central departments. A more detailed
analysis of these two phases shows the following.
5.5.2.1 First phase — the branch network
This phase was divided into three stages. The first stage was to prepare the
implementation of the project, particularly the pilot. Five high priority steps were
identified. The first priority was to establish the ABC research team. In line with the
commitment to collaboration, this comprised individuals from the consultancy company,
plus members of the organisation and accounting departments, and it also, for necessary
reasons, included employees of the company who handled the bank's IT. The detailed
make-up of the project team changed over the two phases but some of the original
members remained in place throughout. The second priority was to explain and
communicate the nature of the project to the ABC team and the executive committee, and
then to the managers of the main business units. An initial series of educational sessions
were therefore held to familiarise the executive committee and the ABC team with the
basics of ABC, and then a programme of meetings was arranged at intervals of
approximately two weeks. At each meeting the latest progress of the project team was to
be presented and critical issues were to be identified and discussed. The third priority was
the selection of the branches to be involved in the pilot. It was decided that a sample of
twelve branches would be appropriate and that these should be selected on the following
criteria: size, productivity and type of business. It was also important to try to cover all
demographic groupings served by the bank, which was done by dividing branches into
urban/not urban, and large/medium/small categories. The fourth priority was the
preparation of interview schedules to be carried out in the branches, in order to establish
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how valid the preliminary categorisation of key activities was, as defined in the list of
activities prepared by the organisation department. The fifth priority was the selection of
potential ABC software suppliers to tender for the new system that would be required,
and the definition of the criteria for that system.
The second stage was the pilot involving 12 branches. The obvious straightforward
strategy, of going directly to staff members, to obtain information on how they spent their
work time, was considered both too sensitive and too time-consuming. Within Banco
Lusitano the history of staff reductions ensured that this was going to be a particularly
sensitive issue, and the likelihood of getting relevant information was consequently
skewed. The ABC team therefore took time to explain their work and objectives to local
management teams and emphasise that the purpose was to guide a more efficient use of
resources rather than simply to reduce staff. Data were gathered by interviews carried out
by the ABC team. The aim of the interviews was to review the preliminary activities
defined by the organisation department, calculate the percentage of time spent on each
activity, and collect information regarding cost drivers and complexity factors50. Heavy
reliance was placed on interviewees' knowledge of operational details and on their recall
about the percentage of time they spent the year before (1999) performing each activity:
'We noticed that people had difficulties remembering what they had done last year, so as a
reference we told them: 'Try to remember how you spent your time last month. It should be
the same" (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
This direct information was then supplemented and cross-checked by indirect data
provided by central departments. So the accounting department provided data on
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resources consumed and their cost per branch, the personnel department data on
permanent and temporary staff by branch, and the commercial marketing department data
on publicity material used per branch. From outsourcing companies, the team also
obtained confirmatory information, with the IT company having data on the volume of IT
output consumed on each activity by branch, and the firms involved in supplying
consumables, communications, and in property management providing data on resources
consumed by branch, including rents, depreciation and insurance. Sets of key activities
were thus defined in the way summarised in Figure 5.10. It began to appear that there
were certain fairly generic activities across branches, relating to the major forms of
business typically carried on, such as new accounts, loans, leases and insurance provision.
Provisional activity drivers could be postulated, with some provision for the differences
between branches being captured via the complexity factors noted above (see note 50).
Additionally, the ABC team, with the involvement of the IT company, came to a decision
about the choice of software based on presentations by two suppliers. The proposals were
seen as similar in terms of the potential scope and power of the systems, so the team
chose the cheaper one, which happened to be the system sold by the market leader in
ABCM software, and which offered stronger guarantees in case of assistance with
problems. However, later there was considerable disappointment with the performance of
the chosen software, once people had experience of the system in use. The following
quotes come from people in the organisation and accounting departments and from a
member of the ABC consultancy team:
50 Complexity factors were defined in two ways, in terms of complexity of customer demands or of product
types. This enabled the team to take into account the higher or lower consumption of resources for each
activity, according to the products, customer segments or distribution channels to which the activity was
performed (see Figure 5.10).
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'My expectations were that it was simpler to work with the software than it has been in
reality. It is a very complex program and not as versatile as we were hoping. It requires too
many people for its maintenance' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
'This model is too detailed and complex to allow a good ABM. However, since the beginning
we have been simplifying, because the software does not do it. In this sense it has been a
limitation; the ABC system is not the one we would have liked initially' (Interview:
Accounting Dept. Employee).
'We have a tool that allows us a tri-dimensional vision. The problem is its capacity; we have
already bought memory boards because it was too slow' (Interview: Consultant Company).
These problems only surfaced over time. In the meanwhile, the third stage in this phase
was the roll-out of the ABC model to the branch network. Using the data collected during
the pilot on branch characteristics, the ABC team identified four probable 'branch
clusters' and decided on this basis to extend the study to 16 more branches: four from
rural areas, four from urban areas, four from major urban areas (Lisbon and Oporto), and
four from the suburban areas round these major cities. After tests and the matching and
validation of results, the team worked with the software to get the branch model for
defining and tracking activity costs up and running.
The first phase was due to be concluded by June 2000, when the results for the branch
network were supposed to be presented to the bank. However it was delayed several times
due to lack of a key factor for successful roll-out of the ABC system: output volumes.
The essential nature of this information can be seen by comparing Figures 5.10 and 5.12.
The former shows the outline scheme through which the set of activities for a branch in
any particular 'branch cluster' were to be identified. But then to have a sense of what the
costs should be for a particular branch and to track actual performance, it was essential to
have detailed information on outputs of the kind set out to demonstrate the costs
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associated with a particular 'contract', defined in terms of activity involved pre-sale and
post-sale, and in terms of related infrastructural and transactional activities and costs.
Extracting such information depended heavily on input from the IT company. However,
in April a report from the consultants, presented in the fortnightly meetings with the bank,
stated:
Tor the IT company this project is not considered a priority. This logic should change or we
need to review the calendar of the project according to the date when data will be made
available' (Consultancy Reports: ABC Project).
This was perhaps understandable from the TT companies viewpoint, since providing such
information could be seen as extraneous to their main work, and having significant
opportunity costs in terms of their own profit levels. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in July the
situation was still unresolved:
'We have concluded the development of the model. However, costs by cost object still do not
exist due to lack of data regarding volume output' (Consultancy Reports: ABC Project).
Eventually, useable data began to come on line. At this point, with activities selected and
defined, resource costs traced to activities, and cost objects defined, it was possible to
proceed to the next stage of analysis, and to trace the activity expenses down to the
different bank products, customer segments, and channels. The tracing involved defining
activity cost drivers for each activity, then collecting data about the quantities of each
activity cost driver that occurred during the period. Activity cost driver rates, calculated
by dividing the cost of each activity by the quantity of the associated activity cost driver,
could then be used to trace activity costs to individual products, customer segments, and
channels.
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Again, in practice, defining appropriate cost drivers proved to be far from an easy task,
and again the main problem proved to be data collection for the quantities of each driver,
because for a significant number of drivers data were still not available. A member of the
ABC team revealed the extent of the problem, and what they saw as the worrying nature
of the solution adopted:
'The consultants are worried about obtaining the most practical driver not the best, because
they want to present results. I had an access file in my computer, with criteria to allocate
indirect costs to departments and they used it without any change. They should produce
something better, but they say the IT company does not have drivers volume information.
They are using practical drivers in the model, but not the best ones' (Interview: Accounting
Dept. Employee).
The solution arrived at finally was that for data that were not already being collected, new
data capture systems had to be designed and installed.
5.5.2.2 Second phase — the central departments
The second phase was initially supposed to start after the conclusion of the first stage.
However, because of the delays just noted in the first stage, the ABC team started the new
phase due to pressures from the bank's top management, who wanted the system up and
running as close to the original timescale as possible. Also, since a potential merger was
still alive, the bank were willing to reinforce the consultancy team in order to tackle the
central departments simultaneously.
This phase was also divided into three stages based on prioritising departments in terms
particularly of their degree of direct involvement in branch commercial activity. At the
first stage the team also got their analysis moving quickly by defining as priority
departments those for which activities had already been identified by the organisation
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department. These included the central and regional structures of the commercial
network, the international department, the operations executive department, and the
market research department51 . The second stage then in practice involved the other central
departments seen as having significant involvement in branch commercial activity but for
which no activities had been identified. These included the IT costs and other projects, the
strategic marketing department, along with the stand-alone commercial departments
concerned with private and corporate banking. The third stage included the remaining
departments.
As the team now struggled to roll out the ABC system on two fronts, and continued to
have problems over the quality and quantity of information coming from the IT company,
a third problem began to surface. As noted in Chapter Two, one problem frequently found
in ABC initiatives is that the number of activities defined as 'key' in a department can
easily increase. In addition in a complex entity where a range of different activities are
undertaken in a variety of different departments, the number of activities that are 'key'
across the different activities and departments is also likely to increase. All these factors
taken together lead to the design of a system that is at a global level too complex to
comprehend and manage. The implementation team began to feel that this was precisely
what was happening as they struggled to fulfil the different objectives. In addition the
degree of complexity and opacity in the system was seen as increasing significantly when
trying to analyse activities in the central departments due to the higher incidence of costs
that could not be directly allocated to front-line activities, and the heterogeneity of the
indirect activities undertaken. One particular example of the kind of implementation
51 It is worth noting that this analysis led later to a new level of conceptualisation in the way activities were
seen as connected, as the central and regional structures of the commercial network were later considered
together with the branches to form a more comprehensive model: the commercial network model.
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problems encountered was how to treat TT costs and costs from other development
projects which typically only produced benefits across several years. This was a
particularly acute and pressing example of the general problem since such costs already
represented 21.8 per cent of operating costs, and the trend of the previous few years was
for these costs to increase in proportion, as the bank was becoming more technological.
In this case, the ABC team decided to create a specific model to deal with these costs,
which divided them into two cost types: depreciation costs, and relevant maintenance
expenses. Since these costs had to be allocated to activities and then to cost objects, the
team conducted interviews with the departments involved in the projects to identify the
activities supported by each project, and the cost objects that benefited from them.
Experience pointed to the conclusion that this was an area where it was particularly
difficult to identify cost drivers, and that the only viable way to do so was itself costly,
since it had to be done individually by project. Furthermore, it was apparent that dealing
with these costs would entail significant year-on-year work by the team responsible for
the maintenance of the ABC system, as the typical number of new projects annually was
more than 20. Yet it was work that would have to be done, since it was essential, given
the percentage of operating costs involved, to capture the activities involved in new
projects and the cost objects associated with them, if the system as a whole were to be a
credible cost control model.
5.5.3 The activity-based costing output system
The ABC system was developed as a stand-alone system that would interface with other
systems to obtain the data it required (including the 'data warehouse'). Some of the data
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that were to be produced by the ABC system (e.g. standard unit costs by product,
customer segment, or distribution channel) were to be fed into the data warehouse in
order to obtain the expected MIS profitability models. The final structure for
understanding costs articulated out of the ABC project is summarised in Figure 5.11. It
can be seen that what the team had come up with was cost models for four separate areas
of activity, which together produced an 'Aggregated Model'. There was one for the
'Commercial Network' which now included the old core commercial activity undertaken
in the branches (though these were now reorganised via regional head offices), plus the
other commercial activities involved in corporate and private banking and the municipal
and institutional sector (see Figure 5.1). There was one for the 'Central Departments'
covering those costs that could be traced to commercial activities or defined as indirectly
contributing to value adding activities. There was a separate model, as just discussed, for
the costs of 'Projects'. Finally there was a model for dealing with those residual costs
defined by Cooper and Kaplan as 'facilities sustaining', where there was no possible
'causal' relation to particular products or services, and where there had to be, as Figure
5.11 puts it, 'negotiated drivers', i.e. what traditional overhead analysis understands as the
'arbitrary' apportionment or allocation of costs on a judgement basis.
The other three models could however operate as 'causal' systems with three modules of
analysis, concerned respectively with resources, activities and cost objects. Within each
model, in standard ABC fashion, the expenses of each business unit were now collected
into activities, and then, through the appropriate cost drivers, the expenses accumulated in
activities could be assigned to products, customer segments, and distribution channels
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(see Figures 5.10 and 5.12)52 . The system arrived at what could therefore, in addition to
providing a form of the three-dimensional vision of costs by cost object, provide data
about costs by responsibility centre (including a breakdown into direct and indirect costs).
It could also enable a cost analysis in terms of 'activities' and 'processes'.
In terms of the first of these categorisations, there were three 'activity' levels identified:
macro-activities, activities and tasks. The perceived pay-off from this form of
categorisation was that, on this basis, a Porter-style 'value chain' could be constructed for
the bank. The final version of this included seven macro-activities, as represented in
Figure 5.13. These macro-activities could then be broken down at the level of a particular
department into specific 'activities', as per Figure 5.10, thus encapsulating the core of the
ABC philosophy. At the same time, the limits of the approach were perhaps indicated by
the perceived need to have a further division based on tasks (or third-level activities) for
central departments, where so much was being done that was not traceable to value-
adding activities. Here it was accepted, as the result of pressure from the organisation
department, that analysis at the 'activity' level alone would be insufficient to capture the
information necessary to run an effective ABM system. The introduction of the 'task'
level of analysis may therefore be seen either as a realistic solution to the residual
overhead problem, or a kind of tacit acknowledgement that the ABC approach could not
in the last analysis capture all the relevant costs into 'causal networks' in an organisation
of this level of complexity.
52 The analysis of the different types of cost drivers revealed that some form of labour hour equivalent was
the most frequently used driver to allocate cost to activities. This is not unusual within a service industry
with staff costs a high proportion of total overhead costs. Even when allocating activity costs to cost objects
the preferred cost drivers were often replaced with equivalent labour hours due to measurement difficulties.
This is an interesting fact considering the claims of the ABC proponents regarding conventional cost
systems.
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In a sense, that way of seeing came about as what was seen by at least one member of the
consultancy team as a by-product of the ABC form of cost analysis. What came about
was a way of re-thinking or re-categorising what was going on in some six hundred
'processes' in which the bank had formerly seen itself as being engaged'. As this
consultant explained it, this new way of seeing came about as follows:
'The bank provided us with files of their main processes. We could not use those processes
because they were defined in terms of products. In the ABC we have a different perspective:
activities can cross several products, and this is what matters to us. To central departments,
especially to those that have a more operational focus, we redefined in detail all the
'processes' in terms of third-level activities. We gave this information to the bank, as a by-
product of the project' (Interview: Consultant Company).
The perceived outcome of this whole process was that managers could now identify
which processes were adding value to the customer and which were not, and how the
efficiency of different processes could be improved. In addition to the focus on process
improvements, the ABC team was able to produce detailed cost information reports on a
range of other bases. So they identified approximately 40 products or groups of closely
related products, eight customer segments according to the marketing strategy of the
bank, and four business channels (branches, telephone banking, ATMs, and interne
banking).
Finally, given the way they solved the cost allocation problem in terms of the four models
that made up the 'Aggregated Model' (see Figure 5.11), all expenses could be shown to
have been assigned to the cost objects, since the residual indirect costs had been captured
in the 'Costs to Allocate' module. The costs involved included accounting, human
53 The bank had previously seen their main 'processes' as having been defined initially by the AVA project,
and then updated in the Efficiency Project. In those projects, the focus had been on identifying and
measuring the sequence of activities involved in marketing and servicing the main products of the bank, in
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resource management, and other costs not directly related to any cost object, but which
supported the bank as a whole, costs which in total accounted for 26.3 per cent of the
bank's 1999 operating expenses. [The 'negotiated drivers', as noted, remained an
example of arbitrary or judgmental decision-making.] Apart from those intractable costs,
however, an examination of the cost structure suggests that costs related to staff and
external supplies and services were readily traceable to activities. But there remain
questions about the traceability of many costs relating to property and other facilities,
which were classified as business-sustaining or related to macro-activity facilities
management54.
If this presents an overall ex post summary of what can be seen as having gone on in the
ABC project, it is perhaps helpful to compare this with the perceived concerns of a
member of the consultancy team. This consultant summarised the main three concerns
they had in the last few months of the project as follows:
'The first concern was to collect reliable data in terms of activity volumes, which needed data
that should come from the IT company about volumes for the drivers used to allocate costs
from activities to cost objects. ... Another concern was the transference of knowledge from
the consultants to the people of the bank. Although some such people were part of the ABC
team, much information is still with the consultants. Unfortunately due to the existence of
other projects, the people of the bank did not always have available time. ... The final
concern was the validation of the data already included in the model. We came across a lack
of homogenisation between activities from the different departments. Regarding all
departments, we produced reports and had meetings with each person responsible for the
model to see if after all activities were identified they represent the profile of the department'
(Interview: Consultant Company).
terms of equivalent labour hours. The objective had been to simplify the 'processes' and thereby reduce
staff costs.
54 Facilities management macro-activity represented 18.1 per cent of the 1999 operating expenses and
included a range of costs that inevitably were particularly difficult to allocate to cost objects, since they
were going to be incurred regardless of specific activities undertaken, unless there was a step change in
costs, e.g. through reaching an activity level which either required closing an existing facility or opening a
new one.
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These were three very different kinds of concern. The first was a technical-level problem,
or at first sight a technical problem. In other words, if only the IT company had had more
of an incentive to come up with the data, then the data would have 'been there'. However
there is always a question over whether or how far 'data' previously collected for one
purpose, in one MAS, could have answered questions that only became relevant once an
ABC approach was being attempted.
The second appears more of a knowledge or learning type of problem: sc. how to get the
expertise in the consultancy firm embedded in the client. The interviewee sees this as a
problem of lack of time. But it could also be a more complex problem involving some
level of 'unlearning' old practices by those tasked with running the new MAS, and an
ever greater level of unlearning for those who would be the object of the new regime of
visibility and control.
The third problem presents itself as a 'goodness of fit' problem. 'Validation' of the data
just needs more information, and the engineering of greater 'homogenisation' across
departments in terms of activity and its control. On the other hand, the continuing 'lack of
homogenisation' might be a signal of how far there were still vast levels of latent conflict
unresolved, due variously to the legacy of the downsizing, the move from the old branch-
based style of banking, the attempt to render everyone 'closer to the customer' and
committed to a marketing-led strategy.
This set of comments were made during the last set of interviews for this project,
conducted in April 2001, when the bank was planning to conclude this already-delayed
stage of the implementation. It was by then apparent, and not only from this particular
interview, that some significant problems were still unresolved, of a kind that raised
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continuing questions about the accuracy of the cost information generated by the new
MAS. The identification of 'activities' and the attachment of costs to those activities was
in large part not seen as problematic. At the same time, when the staff involved in the
implementation of the project took a wider view on what was 'really' going on, they often
made comments to the effect that reported costs by cost objects 'do not reflect reality' as
they seem 'unrealistically high'. One particular 'cause' fastened on to explain the
'distrusted numbers' was concern about accuracy in terms of output volumes. That is not
to say that this was the real problem. The analysis above indicates that while this was
undoubtedly an issue, there were a number of other significant problems and tensions in
play. In addition, it is apparent that the IT company, as the outsider providing resources
on an outsourced basis, was often a convenient scapegoat when things went wrong.
Nonetheless, the overall conclusion has to be that, while a lot of work had gone in to the
ABC project, and a lot of progress had been made, there were a lot of existing problems
that had not been resolved, and perhaps some that had been exacerbated.
One of the last reports by the consultants presented a model of ABC implementation
where a project went through 'natural evolution' stages: embryonic, consolidated and
mature. According to this classification of theirs, it might be reasonable at this stage to
suggest that the output they had provided to the bank so far was still in its embryonic
stage. There might also be a question about whether it would ever reach the consolidated,
let alone the mature stage. At the same time, the model itself might be questionable. All
such questions remain unresolved given the stage of progress reached at this point.
One may simply observe that the implementation model was characterised by an analysis
of activity structure that was far short of ideal (both in terms of the number of activities
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identified and the understanding of the relative weight or significance of the various
activities). It had developed cost 'drivers' to allocate costs to cost objects that for various
reasons were approximate, and gaining less than total confidence, when the means for
recording volumes of activities were not automated.
It retained a perceived potential to understand outputs in terms of costs by activities and
so to enable a new quality of activity management (as ABM), generating a series of
benchmarks enabling the optimisation of commercial structures and processes. It was also
possible to read off from the final report submitted that the consultants envisaged the
bank as being able to 'upgrade' the model over time. The vision remains that it would be
possible to develop an activity analysis that would reflect how things did run (and should
run), to identify the drivers enabling an 'exact' allocation of costs to cost objects, and to
automate data capture systems that would accurately track the volumes of key activities.
In that case it would be possible to have relevant unit-level costs by product, customer
segments, and distribution channels, which coincidentally were the outcomes that the
bank was initially looking for from the project.
The report recognises that achieving these goals would not be straightforward. It stresses
that maintaining and upgrading the model would be 'complex and time consuming'.
Maintaining the system and keeping it up-to-date on an on-going basis would require a
significant amount of work due to the dynamic, changing nature of the organisation and a
continuing need for collaboration and cooperation, even while there was a climate of
potential conflict with turf battles ahead. There were two distinct but linked issues, which
are captured in the following observation by one member of the consultancy team:
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'At this moment, our concern from the organisation department's point of view is to update
the structure, activities and times of the model. That allows taking advantage of the
involvement in the ABC model of the remaining departments of the bank' (Interview:
Consultant Company).
In other words there was an information quality issue, since the department was largely
using data from 1999, and by mid-2001 the structure of the bank, its activities and the
times used to perform them had already changed, along with other data used in the model.
But even if that issue was resolved, there was still the ongoing problem of the relations
between the organisation and accounting departments.
However, even beyond the unresolved technical problems over the accuracy of numbers
in terms of cost objects to feed the data warehouse and the turf-war battles, it was not
clear what would happen to the project, since this depended on the importance that top
management attached to it55 . At the time of writing up this research, these issues still
remained unresolved. For instance, the bank was facing separate problems with the data
warehouse project, and dealing with these meant drawing away some of the resources
committed to the ABC initiative, and causing significant changes in the implementation
team. At the same time, the organisation department was also undertaking other
potentially linked projects, for instance in the reengineering area, which made
independent calls on their resources, even if the outcome would be to use ABC outputs.
5.6 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter has been to describe change processes and related issues in
this particular financial services organisation, and to help understand the role of
55 In a real sense, the overall process of implementation and the full effects of ABC could not be tracked or
assessed in the timescale of the research. Nevertheless, the research within this time frame has provided a
very rich insight into the change and implementation of an accounting system in its organisational context.
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accounting practices in those processes. Particular emphasis was given to locating the
most recent change initiative, the ABC system, in the longer-term context of change
initiatives and of attempts to refocus the bank on customers and services away from its
traditional banking culture. Secondly, a general review of the implementation of the new
ABC system was provided, along with a sense of the main problems and difficulties that
were faced. The findings can be summarised as follows.
After the re-privatisation, it became clear to the managers of Banco Lusitano that the
traditional focus on products needed to change to a stronger customer orientation
particularly due to pressures and challenges that the Portuguese banking sector was
facing. As structures and managerial discourse changed, contributing to the creation of a
new managerial culture, the old style of traditional MAS were no longer perceived as
appropriate to the internal information needs. This brought a successive series of changes:
first a new more detailed kind of emphasis on cost-aware budget setting and budgetary
control; second the implementation of a new system of objectives and incentives first for
the commercial area and then also for central departments; and finally the implementation
of ABC, amongst other changes.
The ABC project was developed and implemented with a clear dependence on technical
and consultancy expertise, but in a way that turned out in practice often to be very ad hoc.
There were problems in terms of estimating the level of top management support and
enthusiasm. There were technical problems with the quality of information available.
There were also lurking organisational problems such as the fear that this was just a new
way of reducing headcount, and the potential turf war between the accounting and
organisation departments. Consequently, the implementation process did not proceed
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smoothly. Many workers did not have a very clear sense of what was involved in working
under an ABC regime, and the initiative did not always have the necessary support of key
managers. Eventual resistance from the head of a department could induce managers from
that department to be lukewarm or even obstructive towards ABC.
These are all clearly significant factors in making the ABC implementation process so
difficult to manage and subject to delays. But one might also suggest that overall, when
one looks at the complex nature of change in an organisation such as Banco Lusitano, the
evolutionary four-stage model presented by Kaplan and Cooper (1998) was arguably too
schematic and insufficiently contextually aware — too much a technical model that was
not prepared to cope with the complexities of organisational dynamics.
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6 Case Study Findings
6.1 Introduction
The overview analysis made in the previous chapter shows two things. On the one hand,
it demonstrates how potentially valuable the adoption of an ABC approach could be in an
entity such as Banco Lusitano, particularly insofar as the approach was implemented
according to the principles articulated in the technical and consultancy literature reviewed
in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the local problems that had ensued from adopting the SOI
system to motivate and incentivise desired activities, while retaining the old budget-
focussed financial control system (in central bank departments), indicate that an effective
ABC system could have particular benefits, by identifying which activities really had to
be the focus, to get desired results. At the same time, the criticisms made about ABC
remind us that implementation can face many pitfalls, many of them unanticipated. This
in-depth case study attempted to be open to both possibilities, which explains the
approach used to the fieldwork phase.
In this study the process of data collection and analysis was guided by the principle of
'triangulation', where a variety of data sources are used for data collection, so as to
minimise the risk of having errors and ambiguities. In more detail, the field research
involved access to documentary materials such as annual account reports, consultant
project files and several internal documents. In-depth semi-structured interviews were
conducted with several central department managers and commercial managers. There
were also a number of more informal or unstructured interviews with other employees
within the bank. The objective throughout has been to contribute to the understanding of
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the complexity and unpredictability of life, even within well-ordered organisational
contexts, by examining and recording and then reflecting on what people do in their
everyday practice, but with a particular focus on how accounting practice and discourse
contribute to what gets done and said. In that way, what follows is hopefully an insightful
understanding of how change has been taking place of a kind that a more conventional
study of organisational change would not necessarily be, given that the roles of
accounting would just be one of many factors considered.
The chapter is divided into five further sections, following this Introduction. Section 6.2
focuses on how, using Fligstein's terminology, the organisational 'field' of Portuguese
banking changed in ways that contributed to making accounting of more significance as
companies competed to develop successful customer-focussed strategies, and how
accounting discourse can therefore be seen to be becoming more significant within the
sector. Section 6.3 then considers how the new significance of accounting discourse
became visible within Banco Lusitano, in particular in relation to the more obviously
significant discourses of strategy and marketing. Section 6.4 then considers how, within
this discursive context, the bank's commitment to implementing ABC led to particular
kinds of conflict, resolution and reformulation, as the old budget-focussed accounting
practice 'owned' by the accounting department came up against the ABC style of
accounting practice, whose ownership was contested. It considers how such conflicts and
resolutions developed both within the accounting and organisation departments as they
contended to own the ABC initiative, and then more widely, as other departments
encountered and appropriated the new accounting. Section 6.5 discusses how, as one
unintended consequence of the initiative, accounting can be seen as operating more
'intensively' and 'extensively' in a range of ways, almost regardless of the specific
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success of ABC as a technical solution, both in the key departments studied and at the
organisation wide level. Finally, Section 6.6 gives a brief summary of the ways in which
accounting may now be seen to have been implicated in developments within the bank
since its re-privatisation culminating in this initiative.
6.2 Accounting discourse and practice within the changing
'organisational field' of Portuguese banking
As just stated, the analysis in this section begins from Fligstein's idea of 'organisational
field'. The value of using that approach here is that it ensures that there is not an over-
narrow focus on how accounting discourse and practices operate purely in this site. There
is an important macro-level way in which accounting comes to be more central to
everyday activity, in the context of Portuguese financial services, which can be helpfully
analysed through the 'organisational field' concept, and the ensuing analysis of the
interaction between the elements of the field (Fligstein, 1990, 1991).
For almost two decades, Portuguese banks operated under a highly regulated oligopoly,
where all but three institutions of the financial sector were nationalised (more than 90 per
cent of the market), interest rates for deposits and loans were set by the state and entry
was simply banned (Pinho, 2001). The state played a dominant role while the
organisational field was in this situation, and the Bank of Portugal acted as the crucial
mediator between the state and the financial institutions. As a result, it is fair to say that
there was a strong discourse of regulation and hierarchy, rather than markets and
competition.
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For instance, during the period of nationalisation, banking activity was dominated by
setting strict rules (e.g. banks had to finance public deficits at a low rate), and even after
the re-privatisation, the discourse remained similar with an emphasis on granting rights
and privileges to financial institutions in return for their co-operation in managing the
state's finances. That has dramatically changed now, however, and it is more and more
difficult for the Bank of Portugal to control and limit their activities (e.g. the sale of the
Champalimaud group against the Portuguese Government's will).
Arguably, the move away from this old regime began well over a decade ago. In 1985 the
state started a progressive deregulation process that changed some of the rules of the
sector, and therefore the organisational field was characterised by new entrants, plus a
gradual but long-term move towards merger and acquisition activity, and the expansion
by all major participants into a wider range of investment banking, insurance, leasing and
other lines of business. By the 1990s the relatively protected and regulated Portuguese
banking sector had begun to change more rapidly, with the result that the previously
highly protected banks are now competing with new institutions and have become part of
the progressively integrated European market for financial services56.
These general changes have triggered a range of specific organisational responses, one of
which has been an increasing adoption by all banks of a more accounting and
management infused discourse. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Banco Lusitano, like other
financial institutions, became increasingly driven by profit and 'profitability' and a
commitment to `globalisation', extending their operations both nationally and
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internationally (in particular in Portuguese-speaking countries or where there is a
significant Portuguese emigrant community). At the same time, the bank became more
open to management solutions, with the result that the various consultancy-based
initiatives reviewed in Chapter Five for the reorganisation and downsizing of the bank
were adopted.
There is an interesting interplay of discourse and practices here. There was increasing talk
of internal forms of financial control, asserting managerial control over costs and
efficiency to promote profitability. This talk was then manifested in practical terms
through change initiatives such as the AVA and Efficiency projects, which aimed to
reduce costs through the reduction of the workforce (while also renewing it). Meanwhile
externally focused activity took on a similar tone, with mergers being seen as a potential
source of cost savings through the usually-cited two benefits of merger, economies of
scale and productive efficiency57.
Under such initiatives the bank attempted to simplify, rationalise and redesign the internal
circuits of activity, with a greater use of automated and centralised processes, while
accurate and relevant financial and management accounting became a higher priority, as
concern with banking earnings prompted a greater market/customer orientation. Indeed as
we have seen, change initiatives such as the Excellence Project in themselves provided a
greater focus on customers and marketing issues, leading to customer differentiation
56 Protectionism may explain the low productivity and lack of a marketing approach by older banks.
Although there is not much research about it, based on anecdotal evidence Portuguese banks have been
considered to be cost-inefficient. In one of the few existing studies, Pinho (2001) claims that public
ownership of banks is one of the main factors that negatively influence efficiency. He also concludes that
privatisation may be important to reduce inefficiency within the financial services sector.
57 High regulation and lack of competitiveness may have reduced incentives for competition based on cost —
reduction and technological changes. An important contribution to that inefficiency (surplus staff) was that
in the 1970s banks were forced to hire staff returning from former colonies in Africa.
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(segmentation), financial innovation and diversification in the supply of financial
services.
But as just noted, this did not occur in a vacuum, but in a sectoral context where
competition was becoming more intense (along with its uncertainties), because all players
were adopting similar practices and discourses. Hence, from this perspective, one can see
that during the 1990s, the Portuguese financial services sector underwent fundamental
transformations. The banks were no longer the same, the role the state played was
different and not coincidentally the consumers were changing. For with this move
towards competition and markets, people began to be defined and targeted more as
customers, both generally and in the advertising of the banks, and so consumerism started
to become embedded in Portuguese society.
6.3 The raised visibility of accounting discourse within Banco Lusitano
and its relation to strategy and marketing discourses
If this, very briefly, encapsulates the change in the organisational field, the next issue for
consideration is how the nature and visibility of accounting discourse changed in the
move towards a more managerial and consulting-knowledge driven culture in the banking
sector. Here, the interesting question is how accounting discourse was located in
comparison to the two more obviously dominant forms of management discourse that
have developed in the past few decades, namely strategy and marketing.
First it is apparent that all three have migrated into the bank over the 10 year period since
its re-privatisation, and that one reason for the growing influence of all three is the
growing influence of consultancy companies. Each can clearly be seen as significant
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when one moves to the level of what gets said by key players in the bank. Let us begin by
considering strategy, as the apparently most significant single discourse.
Strategy discourse can be seen, across the banking sector, as having helped to identify the
need for organisational restructuring from the analysis and claims of marketing
information and perspectives. The discourse of strategy engaged neatly with the neo-
liberal political discourse of market freedom, as entry barriers within the financial
services were dismantled. There was a sense of 'inevitability', as the country was
required to meet increasing competition from other European countries 58 . Within Banco
Lusitano specifically, after its return to the private sector, there was a restructuring of the
equity holdings portfolio. As the 1997 Annual Report states, looking back to that period:
'a global financial group was developed, in which [Banco Lusitano] would act as the control
tower, around which would be assembled or created, operating units specialized along
product lines and devoted to the extension of high-quality financial services, aimed at their
own specific market and business segments.
The Group's mission is thus to its clientele, both retail and corporate, a high degree of
satisfaction appropriate to the market's ever-growing requirements in terms of information
and sophistication' (Report and Accounts, 1997).
In this analysis, a major change was the organisation of the bank as a Group, which
enabled a new focus on strategic positioning, which
'has come increasingly to be the most effective way in which to respond to the ever-
increasing globalization of the markets, the specialization of activities, and the intensification
of competition, both present and future.
In short, our universe of enterprises and the range of services provided by it give the Group
the vertical and horizontal dimensions needed to maintain a presence in all segments of the
58 The political discourse was about the role of the banks as a set of competitive institutions, but also about
their role as key intermediaries in the construction of the conditions for the integration of individuals and
organisations within the new social order brought by the integration in the European Community.
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market, and to make available a comprehensive range of services to satisfy our clients'
financial needs' (Report and Accounts, 1997).
Two years later, the Report and Accounts (1999) are still reporting that this strategy is
providing good results:
'Assuming as the main vehicle of strategic differentiation the provision of a superior quality
service, [the bank] evolved towards the creation of a Universal Financial Group large enough
to be presented in all market segments and, simultaneously, to offer a comprehensive and
specialized range of services globally meeting its clientele's financial requirements.
Possessing a strong culture rooted on a name and on the experience accumulated over its 120
years of existence, [the] Group is now readily recognized for its prestige and relational
ability, with business units communication among them and interacting under a concerted
approach, leading to the creation of synergies at the commercial level as well as in the use of
human and material resources'.
In such a strategy-infused discourse, management consultants are likely to be seen as key
helpers, and thereby act as crucial carriers of the discourse still more deeply into everyday
organisational reality. It is reasonable to say that Banco Lusitano implemented several
change initiatives with the help of management consultants, where strategy has become
'the main language through which actors make sense of, respond to and thereby help
realize changes' (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000:122). But at the same time, the kind of
strategy just outlined, with its emphasis on satisfying its 'clientele both retail and
corporate', and on offering this clientele a range of services both 'comprehensive and
specialised', inevitably meant that marketing discourse became a key aspect of the
emerging strategic discourse.
Again, the 1997 Report and Accounts bear this out, as the bank highlights the
'fundamental aspects' of its commercial strategy as (1) aiming to improve its knowledge
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of customers, (2) pursuing a multi-channel strategy, and (3) promoting awareness of the
brand. Regarding the bases of commercial performance:
'Since reprivatization, we have changed the traditional focus on products to one more
oriented towards the client, with a strong emphasis on segmentation. At a second phase, we
conceived the role of the segment manager in each branch for individual clients and for small
and medium-sized companies. In a subsequent phase, we adapted the product delivery
function to the segmentation process, enriching it with Group company products, made
available through a network that was substantially expanded, remodelled, supplemented by
alternative channels, to which better-qualified and versatile personnel were assigned'.
As competition increases and the environment changes, marketing inevitably becomes an
integral aspect of the emerging strategic discourse and set of practices, even if there is
still a strong influence of a sales orientation 59 . Marketing provides mechanisms for
understanding and segmenting consumer needs, for designing products and offers which
analyse the relative efficacy and efficiency of particular distribution channels, and for
overcome the weakness of a sales orientation through designing products more related to
specific customer needs (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). The bank reflects this, in its claims
that it
'seeks to extend to its clientele a high degree of satisfaction by providing financial services
that meet the market's ever-growing requirements in terms of information and sophistication.
Our commercial performance is therefore guided by the underlying objective of delivering
maximum value to our customers, and based on a relational marketing approach and the
continuous effort to improve efficiency levels. The increase in value generated is shared with
the agents involved (employees, customers and shareholders), thus fostering an increasingly
concerned and long-lasting relationship' (Report and Accounts, 2000).
59 The sales orientation does not disappear, and aspects of it remain valuable. However it does not provide
ways of dealing with competitive problems besides exhorting more and more sales. So there is still a role
for direct selling and for generating new sales via targeted advertising and promotion campaigns. The bank
also, given its adoption of the SOI system, used it in the only real way possible at the time in the
commercial network, to reward salesmen for sales volume and revenue achieved, in order to generate new
business and increase sales. This kind of activity did not stop the bank's move towards being increasingly
more market-driven and customer focused.
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None of this is to say that this kind of marketing discourse is either natural, inevitable or
even necessarily effective. At the same time, it flourishes through a process of
'naturalisation', e.g. through consultancy and routinisation (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000).
At the same time, there are some contradictions in terms of marketing discourse. Besides
difficulties of specifying customer needs, meeting the needs of the customer only works
as long as they can be met profitaby. This requires selecting profitable products and
profitable customers, but in a market where everyone else is pursuing the same targets
with similar marketing-led strategic approaches. So the business theory is easy. Kotler
(1997), for example, claims that segments should be 'substantial' (profitable) as well as
'accessible', 'measurable' and 'actionable', with each market segment justifying
exploitation in terms of return on investment. Gordon (1998) spells out similar
implications in more detai1 60. In practice, however, first-mover advantages get competed
away, and as more and more sectoral players follow the same prescriptions, there are
sector-level effects, e.g. customers in general feeling that the banks are 'all the same', and
that they are just the objects of uncaring marketing manipulation.
In sum, leaving aside general problems in contemporary marketing discourse (e.g. the
rather patronising view of the 'sovereign consumer' as a passive, manipulable, rather
60 Gordon (1998:40-46) suggests that organisations should 'decide the customer mix and the level of
resources to be committed to each customer' (p.41). This requires that organisations know the `cost-to-
serve' of each customer to be able to obtain an integrated view of customer profitability. He claims that it is
'appropriate' to map customers according to their current and future profitability. Organisations should
reward and invest in 'ideal' customers (profitable now and into the future) by assigning them the best staff,
giving them more service time, providing access to new technologies, and rewarding them financially.
Customers that are currently profitable, but potentially unprofitable, need to be managed to ensure the
continuation of profitability. Customers that are currently unprofitable, but potentially profitable, should be
disciplined either by changing the processes used to service them (cost reduction), or by charging them a
fee. Gordon claims that 'some customers are unprofitable today, will be unprofitable tomorrow and do not
merit further attention by the company. Let them become someone else's problem or opportunity. Fire
them' (p.46, emphasis added). Nevertheless, he stresses that 'terminated customers, like terminated
employees, should leave feeling good about the relationship in which both have invested but which, for
whatever reason, no longer create the value now important to you'.
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undersocialised actor), competitive pressures on profitability and consumer inertia will
have a range of sector-wide consequences, as organisations all shift their attention
towards particular products and customer segments. In the segmentation model spelled
out by Gordon (footnote 60 above), where options defined in accounting terms as 'costly'
or 'unprofitable' options are selected out, the poorest groups in society are once again, but
in a new way, marginalised within financial services 61 . Boyce (2000:650-651) neatly
sums up how this is a product of a marketing perspective:
'The implications of the use of customer valuation are immediately obvious from the
marketing perspective, with the potential to selectively target promotional campaigns at "high
value" customers, but the literature has been silent on other social implications including
differential pricing and product and service levels to different customer groups, and
downright exclusion of certain customers'.
But once again the way in which the sector-wide outcome is constructed at the micro-
level of practices within each organisation can be read off: 'valuation', 'high value',
differential 'pricing' and 'product and service levels' are all calculated, in each
organisation, in each specific case, via accounting practices.
Not surprisingly, if one goes behind the upbeat claims made in the annual Reports,
accounting practices can be seen as having this range of effects within Banco Lusitano.
The focussing on segmentation and differentiation is implemented via the financial and
non-financial performance numbers available, to enable the market-led strategy to
operate. The discursive consequences then play out in very much the way just indicated.
61 Hooley and Mann (1988) claim that the selection of 'profitable' customers and the 'selecting out' of
others can partially be attributed to managerial short-termism or the predominance of 'non-marketing'
priorities within organisations. But if the question is then asked as to how that 'short-termism' and 'non-
marketing' orientation is constructed, the answer that confronts us is 'via accounting'.
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So there are managers who recognise that not all customers are profitable and therefore
the bank needs to identify them and take measures when appropriate. A manager from
one of the marketing departments summarises the overall impact of the new marketing-
led strategic discourse well in the following comments:
'The Excellence Project brought the vision that not all customers are equal. There are
segments that are potentially profitable and there are others that have a marginal profitability
almost null or even negative. It is worth using commercial resources, time and support sales
instruments to some customers: corporate, private, and those with potential. While to others it
is not worth to invest on them... we should try to manage them (externalise) in order to
become profitable'
'The branch should be a sales centre and staff there should occupy the majority of the time in
selling and advising customers. They cannot, as they do today, occupy most of their time with
non-value activities. Certain operative and administrative activities should be automated.
There is a bureaucratic activity load that should be externalised from the branches'.
'The bank has a credit project, that reports directly to the executive committee, to re-evaluate
all credit processes, reorganise and simplify them. The project would permit more adequate
pricing decisions according to the customer's profile' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
As one progresses through these successive comments, all from one interview, it is
possible to see how far accounting has become implicated in this manager's discourse, at
the heart of marketing-led strategy. How does the bank determine the 'non-equality' of
customers in terms of profitability? Via some form of accounting metric (and this will be
the case, regardless of whether in academic terms the metric chosen is of greater or lesser
relevance to the task). How are 'non-value activities' to be determined? Via some form of
'activity' costing (and again this will be the case, whether or not a formal ABC system
has been developed, as happened in Banco Lusitano with the SOT). How, once credit
rating is fixed upon as a key feature of customer differentiation, does the bank achieve the
two necessary requirements — the 'simplification' of the credit scoring process, and the
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relevant pricing decision for each product or service? 'Simplification' requires an
adequate means of determining the relevant activities, and pricing requires an appropriate
full product costing system. With those objectives now at the heart of discourse, a system
like the old SOI one is increasingly likely to be perceived as 'inadequate'. The stage is set
for ABC, or a system like it, to be embraced as 'the solution', particularly if there are
consultants to hand to offer it.
In such ways we can see how accounting is in the first instance important in a general
way as the means by which the discourses of strategy and marketing get implemented.
But further, we can see why a form such as ABC could have become so significant in this
sector, given the kind of marketing-led strategy being pursued so widely. However, that
poses a major organisational problem, as the new accounting required is such a long way
from the traditional form of internal accounting systems and practices with which bank
employees had typically been familiar. There is not simply an issue here of introducing a
new form of accounting technology that will meet the demands of the marketing-led
strategy. There is an issue of unlearning an allegiance to old practices, or perhaps learning
how to align the old and the new. This is not a straightforward process.
Confronting this kind of situation, one can appreciate Miller's (1994:1-5) claim that
accounting has to be regarded as a social and institutional practice with three
complementary dimensions. First, accounting as a technology is a device for acting upon
activities, and providing visibility to events and processes. Both the 'old' and 'new'
modes of accounting here operate in this dimension. But secondly, he argues, accounting
includes discourse representations and vocabularies. These rationales
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'come to constitute truths in the name of which organizations are to be remade, processes
reconfigured, and attempts made to redefine the identity of individuals. Once established,
these truths come to be taken as essential for the proper government of economic and social
life' (p.4).
In this respect, there is arguably one kind of 'truth' represented by the old style of budget-
focussed accounting in the bank, which has a stewardship kind of concern which can
primarily ensure that there is an equitable and efficient allocation of available resources,
given the current strategy (whatever that may be). Such a model can year on year track
the use of resources and report back on them, and serve to validate a given strategy,
particularly so long as that strategy remains valid for successive periods.
But such an accounting is very poor at dealing with a world where strategies have to
change, as competitors compete away short-term advantages rapidly. In this context, the
need is for a more proactive and immediate understanding of the costs of internal
activities and of the products and services supported by them, so that informed decisions
about possible changes in strategy can be made swiftly. Here a different kind of
accounting 'truth' begins to obtain, which requires a set of practices that will meet the
above criteria. ABC articulates such a 'truth' as it makes visible internal activity costs,
even if it does so in ways that may be questionable, in the ways noted in Chapter Two.
For it is simply much better at articulating this kind of 'truth' than traditional budget-
focussed accounting. It is similarly superior at providing numbers that 'you can trust' (as
the research and consultancy rhetoric has it) concerning product/service costs. Again,
traditional overhead allocation models are simply very poor at this game. So the logic of
ABC, as Piper and Walley (1991) argued, may remain questionable. But as an accounting
'truth', in a world where the organisational field has altered in such a way that marketing-
led strategy discourse is king, it dominates older accounting truths.
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In this way, accounting discourse can operate significantly in a third dimension, that of
shaping the whole way that the 'economic domain' is conceptualised and articulated.
Miller's thesis here is that accounting provides ways to constitute and reconstitute the
economic domain by the changing calculative practices that provide the basis for knowing
'economic reality'.
'By transforming the physical flows of organizations into financial flows, accounting creates
a particular realm of economic calculation of which judgements can be made, actions taken or
justified, policies devised, and disputes generated and adjudicated' (p.4).
The particular point here is that, if accounting in general has these effects, the particular
kind of accounting encapsulated in ABC creates a distinctive version of the 'realm of
economic calculation', and thereby produces particular kinds of judgements, actions,
policies and disputes, while also providing the calculative means of evaluating decisions,
adjudicating disputes, etc.62
The articulation of this new kind of 'truth' can be observed in Banco Lusitano, as
accounting information can be seen to be moderating managerial vocabularies, and
changing the conception of what is important and what is not. For instance, at a range of
levels in the bank, the cost to income ratio became newly significant as a key target that
was referred to as 'precise' and 'objective'. More generally, the vocabulary of business,
efficiency, profitability, financial strength, international expansion and organisation
became the basis on which claims of 'excellent progress' were made. In the Report and
Accounts (1997) we find the following accounting-infused observations:
62 The general argument is similar to that made in Hopwood (1990), which also emphasises the diverse but
related roles of accounting in: (1) creating visibility in the organisation; (2) functioning as a calculative
practice; and (3) playing an active part in creating a domain of economical action.
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'[T]he Group, in light of growth in total assets and customers' funds, made further gains in
market share... It continued to play an active and highly important part in the domestic
privatization process; it strengthened its presence in the insurance market, and expanded its
asset management side to new markets, specially Spain and Latin America.
When it comes to efficiency... there was a successful containment of costs, in turn reflected
in productivity gains, whether measured in terms of cost/benefits, or through the cost to
income ratio. Respecting profitability... [the group] posted record earnings, with a strong
increase in ROE.
We also took some major steps towards intensifying the Group's international expansion. In
effect, besides the organization active in our foreign branches, and our presence in the Far
East and in Spain, we completed the acquisition of a substantial holding in... the Brazilian
market.
On the organizational side, we draw attention to the rationalization carried out in the branch
network (the Excellence Project), and in the central departments (the Efficiency Project), as
also within internal services (Complementary Grouping of Companies), while at the same
time we intensified the process of horizontal and vertical communication between the Group
management structures, with particular emphasis on the travelling executive committees and
the Group conferences. At the same time, we took some important steps towards modernizing
the new information system, with some of its modules now in operation'.
Figure 6.1 is the bank's own summary, in 1999, of how it now sees its mission. Here, at
the heart of the bank's public discourse, accounting measures can be seen to be assuming
a key role in both communicating and implementing the strategy of the bank. This had
already been implicit in the public discourse, e.g. in the 1998 organic growth strategy
formally adopted by the Group to expand its activity significantly while maintaining good
profitability and operating efficiency levels. This was formally named as the Millennium
3 Programme, and approved by the shareholders at a general meeting in March 1998. In
the Programme, new accounting-based quantifiable strategic commitments were set forth
in terms of growth, financial strength, profitability and productivity. However, Figure 6.1
shows just how critical accounting practice becomes if the mission is to be accomplished.
Everything hangs on the twin links between 'Clients' and 'Growth', and between
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'Employees' and being 'Profitable', and what links each of these is accounting numbers
and practices. Get these right, the statement declares, and the cash flows will enable the
continued generation of investment and dividends to shareholders.
In this discursive context, within this organisational 'field', the consultancy discourse of
ABC fits perfectly. ABC can be made to appear to respond to this new realm and to create
just the sense of alignment with the new strategic vision that will promote the new
climate of change in the bank. The following extracts from one of the first Consultancy
Reports for the ABC project illustrate this perfectly:
'It is expected that ABC techniques will be applied in the near future in the bank, similar to
what is happening in the international banking sector. The main reason for the use of ABC is
the need to evaluate the performance of the operations in a dynamic environment, for which
the traditional accounting tools are less efficient. This performance is measured by the costs
of activities consumed by certain cost objects.
The only way to keep or increase the profitability of the bank is through cost reduction, and
the increase of the offer of value-added services to its customers in terms of quality, time
response or innovation. To reach higher profitability it is fundamental to eliminate activities
that do not increase the value added to customers.
To monitor the performance of the bank and to support decision-making, it is necessary to
have information about cost, quality and time measures at the bank, team and individual
levels.
Information about costs should: (1) provide the current position; (2) support the identification
of the causes of inefficiency; (3) measure the efficacy of short-term actions to solve
inefficiencies; and (4) display the existing range of similar and repetitive activities. It will be
necessary to adopt a costing methodology that will capture this information for any cost
objects that management needs to analyse or measure, such as customers, services or
products' (Consultancy Reports: ABC Project).
Thus we can see how far the kind of analysis made by Hopwood (1990), Miller (1994)
and with reference to ABC by Ezzamel et al. (1990; cf. Ezzamel et al., 2001a), is borne
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out in this banking context, regarding the accounting role. Accounting can be seen at the
heart of what gets said, influencing perceptions, changing vocabulary and infusing the
dialogue that circulates both formally and informally, because the concepts expressed in
ABC discourse 'make sense' for actors within the bank. Secondly, it makes new
profitability and customer-oriented issues visible, while older concerns focussed on
budgets and internal procedures recede from view. In this way, it is easier for top
management to convince employees of the importance of the change initiatives that are
going on. Thirdly, it provides a 'legitimisation' of job losses, presenting them as
inevitable to the bank's adaptation to the evolving competitive environment (which is
now defined as the European Union and global). In this range of ways, accounting plays a
key role in re-shaping the everyday reality of employees, making it inescapable for the
'lucky' remaining employees, and all the new hires brought in to make the new vision
work, that they must accept (whether reluctantly or with enthusiasm) the new
performance goals.
Finally, we can also suggest that accounting contributes to promoting an image of being
modern and well-managed, that can be grasped and shared across different bank levels,
even when there is scepticism about how well it is being realised. So a manager from the
organisation department, after claiming that top management does not support ABC
because they do not see efficiency as a key issue, modifies his statement, drawing on the
'image' metaphor:
'Probably I am giving a negative image of the top management of the bank, and those
responsible for its strategy. They are aware of the efficiency problem. After all, it was
considered more than two years ago a strategic issue. Therefore, we are all conscious of the
problems over competition and margin reduction, and that we cannot rest on the laurels given
by the bank's past profits, we all have to realise that is no guarantee of continued success. It is
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just that there has been priority given to other areas' (Interview: Organisation Dept.
Manager).
To sum up then, it is apparent that discourses of strategy, marketing and accounting are
all circulating out there and so have migrated into the organisational field of this banking
sector, with not insignificant help from consultant companies. It is apparent that within
Banco Lusitano, as elsewhere, the discourse and practices of accounting have significant
roles to play, with an increasing presence of the ABC type of approach under the current
form of marketing-led strategy. A new kind of managerial culture can be celebrated as a
result, as one more extract from the 1999 Annual Report and Accounts confirms:
'The Group's mission is to extend to its clientele — private and corporate clients as well as
institutional clients — a high degree of satisfaction by providing financial services that meet
the market's ever-growing requirements in terms of information and sophistication.
In addition to our institution's GROWTH, the strategic goals defined privilege its
transformation into the BEST and MOST PROFITABLE Financial Group operating in
Portugal. Hence, and although the creation of value for the shareholders constitutes a basic
concern, the interests of both customers and employees are also duly taken into account'
(Report and Accounts, 1999, original emphasis).
In such statements, as perhaps is best captured in Figure 6.1, accounting is no longer
present simply in the back office functions with which it is traditionally identified, the
financial and management accounting systems and practices used to run the old-style
budget-focussed approach and to generate the financial reports. Accounting is both
different technically, it is more visibly present in the formal discourse and strategic plans
of top management, and it is circulating as part of a new kind of management discourse in
the organisation.
At the same time, it does not do so without friction, conflict and failure, as well as
success. The next section analyses how the change process can be seen as unfolding, from
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the viewpoint of managers in the key departments involved in the implementation, and in
terms of its perceived effects in both commercial and central departments. Here again,
documentary and interview data are drawn upon.
6.4 The effects of ABC implementation on management: conflicts,
resolutions and reformulations
To understand how the new regime was implemented, it is important to understand the
nature of the old-style accounting regime 'owned' by the accounting department, and how
accounting was therefore generally perceived at departmental level across the bank at the
point when the ABC initiative took off. As already noted, in change processes there can
be problems caused by a failure to 'unlearn' old ways of doing things, or a failure to
recognise how different the new is from the old. In the case of accounting, since many
people will understand accounting only from a distance, it may not be appreciated just
how much changes with the implementation of an ABC system, or how much more
significant a presence accounting may therefore have. In such a context, the potential for
dysfunctional interactions is considerable.
At the same time, it is important to recognise that the older accounting system had already
evolved considerably, first from the system used in pre-privatisation days, and then as the
SOI system had been introduced. Back when the bank was nationalised, much accounting
information had been produced to provide information to the Bank of Portugal for
regulatory control, while internally the budget system allocated direct costs to
responsibility centres. Even then, the lack of information for managerial purposes was
evident. Following the re-privatisation, there was a commitment to integrating the budget-
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focussed accounting system into a more managerial approach to running the bank, and the
SOT was a major step in that direction, even though, as seen above, it had very mixed
results. At the same time, as the sector developed the marketing-led approach to being
competitive, increasing concerns were voiced across the bank about the system's
shortcomings. These included concerns about the lack of information for managers, the
lack of comparability between different sources of information, the lack of timeliness of
the information that was available, and the lack of information about product/service
costs.
Because of the lack of information on profitability, managers from the commercial area,
and even from central departments, felt the need to generate relevant information. The
sense of frustration in central departments is clear from the following:
'There is still a significant amount of data that needs to be collected. Each time an operation
is analysed we need internally to calculate the profitability of the customer. We have to
conciliate data that comes from the accounting department, leasing and insurance companies,
and so on. The data is not yet linked but it will be in the future. Nevertheless, this information
is already important for us, since we deal with corporate customers with very low margins,
and therefore we should have a global and complete analysis of the situation' (Interview:
Other Central Dept. Manager).
'At the operational level, for daily management, I do not have relevant management
information. The process owners have to arrange data manually, which often takes weeks to
get' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
Given the new regional structure, which was supposed to be the organisational means to
deliver the customer-focussed strategy, the regional top management had a particular
need for customer-relevant accounting numbers. But as one regional director explained,
the old accounting regime was still locked into the old branch focus:
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'The accounting department collects data by home branch, while all commercially focussed
data and effort is directed at the level of the banking customer' (Interview: Regional
Director).
Another problem that managers complained about was the delay in providing data. As
one manager explained:
'We receive data with about three weeks delay. It is too late; I need to follow the outputs
daily to eliminate variances and ensure a uniform growth' (Interview: Regional Director).
The fault here did not necessarily lie with the accounting department, since there were
ongoing timeliness problems that people often put down to the outsourcing of the IT
function. Nevertheless, this did not help the accounting department's reputation for
quality or relevance, or the image of accounting as such. Given that, it was perhaps not
surprising that other departments saw an opportunity to expand their sphere of influence,
through being more in tune with the new ABC system. For instance, marketing were
already tooled up for the segmentation model with its differentiation of customer types,
while the accounting department lagged behind, as one department manager observed:
'The marketing department tried to separate business that belongs to the commercial network
from business that refers to special departments (private, corporate, municipals and
institutional). In terms of commercial network business it was segmented — SME, micro
companies, special individual customers, and ordinary individual customers. This partially
explains the difference between the accounting and the marketing departments... Accounting
should evolve for the same concepts of segmentation if we want to create a coherent
profitability model' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
Another department that saw both the problem and the opportunity was the organisation
department, as the comments of one of their managers show:
'The bank knows how much money it earns and the costs, but cannot separate them by
customers or products. ... There is an obsession, not only here in the bank, for downsizing by
reducing jobs. In Portuguese banks there is the belief that to improve efficiency it is necessary
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to reduce the number of employees. However, we cannot look only to the number of
employees and their cost. ... ABC will allow us to get the cost to income by process, to
compare that with the profitability of customers' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
This manager could see that the organisation as a whole still ran the danger of not
switching mind-set and management systems, but instead remaining trapped into a narrow
focus on costs, of the kind that the old accounting system provided. This in a sense
dramatises how much 'unlearning' still had to take place.
6.4.1 Resistance to change and the battle for 'ownership' of ABC
There was arguably a double kind of battle that developed over ABC's implementation.
At one level, the accounting department stood against it, and was seen by some at least as
part of the problem rather than the solution, as the comments above indicate. At another
level, the accounting department was fully aware of the potential loss of power to the
organisation department, given their claim to having a better understanding of the bank's
key activities. Here the fact that the accounting department was an 'old' powerful
department potentially worked against it, since what it was responsible for — external
reports (financial accounting), the budget and its control — began to be seen as less
relevant and dysfunctional. The accounting numbers it generated did not match with what
was needed to determine profitability under a marketing-led strategy. As one Regional
Director put it:
'The accounting department collects data by home branch, while all commercial data and
effort is directed for the banking customer' (Interview: Regional Director).
This therefore put the organisation department in a strong position to own the 'significant
accounting', both as the 'new' powerful department involved in all major change
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initiatives in Banco Lusitano since its re-privatisation, and as the department that had
developed the first internal analysis of key activities, as noted in Chapter Five.
However, the department had two significant problems. First, because it was so centrally
involved in previous 'change initiatives', it was seen as the department that cut jobs, and
therefore did not necessarily get enthusiastic support from other departments. In addition,
it did not have the counterbalance of clear top management support, since there was, at
least to start with, no clear top management commitment. The situation in the bank
remained very much as Fligstein (1991:316) describes, where:
'organizations display great inertia because they are systems of power held together by the
interests of key actors in business as usual. ... In order for organizational change to occur,
those in charge must have both a perception of some new strategy and the power to act upon
it'.
The net result was that moves towards the ABC initiative proceeded at first in 'fits and
starts', with each department wary of the other. Meanwhile the attitude of top
management was perceived at departmental level as not interested, or scared of the
organisational implications of the change. The remarks of one manager involved in
lobbying for the project at that time are not untypical:
'Banks are used to earning significant amounts of money, so they do not get worried with
cost analysis. Compared to other companies, for them it is irrelevant'.
'They [the executive committee] know much about banking, they are bankers in the real
sense of the word, but they are not too sensitive to efficiency. They have a feeling that control
of efficiency is important, but as they do not know the basic concepts they are not too
demanding in that subject'.
'The administration wants to reduce costs and become a more efficient bank, but to do that it
is necessary to change structures and processes. Although they want that, they are afraid of
going too far in terms of change inside the bank. That is a constraint' (Interview:
Organisation Dept. Manager).
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Even after top management did give the green light, the project still proceeded with
a need to reach diplomatic agreements on key steps, and with outsiders unsure who
was really 'winning the war' for control of the new MAS 63 . At the same time, once
top management had come round to the project, the two departments did co-operate,
however reluctantly. This once again confirms the importance in change
management of top management support. As one consultant observed in this
context:
'When top management is totally involved in the project, things run quickly because those are
the people to make the remaining departments of the bank dance to the rhythm of the project'
(Interview: Consultant Company).
So how did the various departments dance to this rhythm? Not, the evidence suggests, in
the most smooth-running way: nevertheless there were accommodations reached, once
top management was seen to be on board, and particularly as the two lead departments
saw that they had more to gain by co-operating than competing.
The next section summarises some of the interview evidence that fleshes out the
unfolding scenario. It considers in turn how the various key parties involved in project
implemenation saw things, Sc. the accounting and organisation departments, the
consultants and the IT company. It then considers how the 'objects' of the project, the
63 The relations between the two departments and their respective relations to top management remained
unclear. Although in practice the organisation department managed to carry out the project as intended, it
was only possible with the 'agreement' of the accounting department. This was essential, because the unit-
level cost information required to feed the new MIS was a project that at that time was the responsibility of
the accounting department. Furthermore, the dominance issue became more clouded as the ABC project
progressed. Many of the key senior managers from each department who were responsible for the project
were allocated to other projects, while a new department head was appointed in the organisation
department. A typical view was that the old order had changed, but that both departments were still very
powerful: 'there are two forces and two different interpretations of control, definitions of costs and
information systems... that also has to do with the history of the bank. Till a few years ago the accounting
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other departments, saw things, before concluding with some more general and insightful
overview observations that participants made. This hopefully shows how participants
were not purely concerned with their own narrow self-interest, but had wider and often
perceptive views on what was good for the bank as a whole.
6.4.2 Implementing ABC: departmental interplays and wider reactions
Looking first at views from within the Accounting Department, it is apparent that some
staff at least saw their role as central and originating. This was in part because they were
at the financial heart of an innovating leading-edge organisation. One of the managers
was aware that they would be distinctive in the Portuguese banking sector with this
innovation. As he put it:
'In the Portuguese financial sector, there is one bank that has implemented ABC but not with
the same philosophy of feeding an integrated MIS. Organisations like Portugal Telecom,
Marconi, SONAE, TMN and Telecel have also implemented ABC' (Interview: Accounting
Dept. Manager).
At the same time, he recognised that they were fortunate in being able to benefit from the
experience of a Spanish partner bank:
'In terms of information for management, the relevant bank is a Spanish bank. One of the
most profitable in the world and that has one of the best MIS. We are partners with them in a
new business. They have the bank completely reflected in their system. They seem to be the
most electronic and efficient bank in Spain in terms of operating costs' (Interview:
Accounting Dept. Manager).
department was the structure of planning and they intervened in almost everything. Today, the bank is
facing great change...' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
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Such connections could make it apparent that they were the obvious people to lead the
initiative". As one manager put it:
'We imposed ABC. The organisation department reacted negatively, but today we are
working perfectly. Initially, there were negative reactions inside the bank, not only from the
organisation department. I do not know if the outcome will be what we expect; nevertheless I
think it is a useful work that will pay off when we start to use it. ... The organisation
department was not enthusiastic, probably due to other concerns, but at this moment there is a
perfect fit between us and them.' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Manager).
This then made further sense, at least to some in the department, because of their
experience in what they saw as the relevant existing forms of management control,
including their 'success' with the SOI model:
'We consider that the bank has a very refined cost control system. It improved substantially
with the SOI that came to motivate those who were less alert. If there was less attention to the
accomplishment of the budget, the SOT came to give priority to the budget. That occurs
because strategically it has the cost to income ratio as a priority. It is a conjunctural issue: the
reduction of margins. When margins were high, the bank was not concerned with efficiency
measures' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Manager).
Even down the line from management, this view was accepted, although the following
employee comment recognises that nothing is certain:
'The accounting department is going to be fundamental [to the MIS project], unless they
break the department... I do not know the future, but I believe this area is going to provide
relevant information' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Employee).
64 As mentioned earlier in this Section, the two departments became sponsors of the project. Although
initially the accounting department stood against it and was perceived as creating difficulties, later they
claimed that they were the promoters of the project. On the other hand, the organisation department
recognised the importance of this alliance: 'We had to congregate forces. Things are facilitated because
luckily we are working with two directors who are quite powerful inside the Group — the senior directors of
the accounting and organisation departments' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
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Arguably this kind of perception was understandable, and even justifiable, insofar as the
ABC project was about getting a better knowledge of product costs (which after all was
the initial justification for the technique given by Cooper and Kaplan).
At the same time, when top management did buy into it, the project was clearly then
defined as more about helping implement the marketing-focussed strategy. Some at least
saw the implication of this, that the department had to come to accommodations with
others, and particularly the organisation department. But at the same time, that could be a
confirmation of their own competence, since they were not the cause of implementation
problems, those in charge of defining activities were. All these themes can be discerned in
the following comment:
'The ABC implementation problem was not because of knowledge about costs, but due to the
knowledge about activities and the resources they use. They said, and we saw that in ABC
books, that the implementation should be led by an entity other than the accounting
department, namely one related to the management of the organisation. As I mentioned, that
was one of the main problems of the implementation: if we had the activities well defined we
did not need the consultants' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Manager).
In other words, if the organisation department had been on the ball, the Bank could
arguably have saved a lot of money on consultants.
The view was predictably rather different from the organisation department side. Here,
where it was recognised that the key issue was about getting control of activities, it was
equally self-evident to insiders that they had the key role. As noted above, managers in
the organisation department recognised that the key was to track costs to 'customers and
products' and that needed their expertise in understanding processes. At the same time,
this meant that they necessarily had a much closer connection to the consultants, since
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with their past job-cutting reputation, they could not hope on their own to get buy-in from
other departments. As one member of the field-work team put it:
'I noticed that when I arrived at the branches, I was considered 'persona non grata'. In the
interviews I said 'attention, this is not to reduce the workforce, in contrast to other projects
that the organisation department was involved in'. They associate the organisation department
with job redundancies, so it was important to say that it was not to reduce people, but to
understand operational costs in the bank' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
Incidentally, one may read the following comment from an accounting department team
member as a recognition of that problem, and a further justification of their importance to
the success of the project. Talking about how the interviews were conducted in the
different clusters, he observes:
'Inside each cluster we chose branches that we thought were the ones where people would
have a better perception of the project. We promoted meetings with staff who were going to
be interviewed later. These interviews were made by mixed teams: consultants and staff from
the organisation and accounting departments. The idea was to avoid the threatening process
led by the consultants from previous projects' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Manager).
Minimising the perceived threat of the initiative was clearly a widespread concern. From
the organisation department view, however, this made effective input from the
consultancy firm essential. As one manager put it:
'First, they are not contaminated by our activity. They also have experience with several
customers, therefore several realities. Normally these companies have good research
departments and know what is happening and what the trends are, etc. That has high-added
value... Finally, we learn with them, especially those who work directly with them'
(Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
At this stage, the organisation department did not see any great value being input by the
accounting department. This was their opportunity to do what they were good at,
improving processes, as the following suggests:
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'This project is going to be interesting. It is going to be very important for us because it
enables us to analyse processes to see where we can optimise. Although to optimise processes
is not the aim of ABC, it will always be the aim of the organisation department' (Interview:
Organisation Dept. Employee).
However as the project developed, and it became apparent to all involved that the change
management process was both complex and frustrating, the things said began to change.
Some of these were recognitions by departments of having taken wrong steps (though
usually for the right reasons, e.g. being conscientious). So for instance, from the
accounting department we have this:
'Our problem is that activities are very detailed. Probably we did an ABC too rigorously,
namely in the central departments, where we have a big number of activities and we have
difficulties in terms of volume drivers. For some activities we are being pragmatic and using
alternative drivers for which we have volume data. Since those are not the ideal drivers, that
impacts in terms of rigour' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Employee).
Or we have this from an organisation department employee:
'When we have a high cost, we should try to know if there is any application that is not
providing volumes or not sending all data. If that does not have problems, then we need to
check if the time allocation to activities is correct. Those are the two points that could
influence costs by cost object' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
But more often the comments were directed at failures or inadequacies elsewhere, with
the IT company and the consultants being particular targets, the former because of the
perceived lack of relevant information and footdragging in providing it, the latter because
they were seen as delivering less than they promised. So we find the following sort of
things being said about the IT company:
'IT was always a problem. We had to change our system not long ago. Last year, due to the
year 2000 and other projects like the Euro, we analysed processes, evaluated our hardware
and made several changes regarding machines that were already out of date. The IT company
has made significant efforts to minimise the situation, but our applications look like a
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'blanket cut into pieces', so that aggregating everything is complicated' (Interview:
Organisation Dept. Employee).
It was seen as having too much independence in terms of how it collected data, with no
control exercised from within the bank.
'Many applications are stand-alone and are not centrally registered. So a great effort is
necessary to collect data. It also leaves us uncomfortable, because it is not a central database
of the bank' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
Too often as a result, the IT company could provide neither relevant nor reliable
information. As one employee observed:
'The numbers from the IT company were not reliable. There were numbers that were
definitely not correct. In some branches, we had costs of deposits or withdrawals of 19 or 20
thousands escudos, that does not make sense. We realise that volumes were not reliable. It is
impossible that the bank should have volumes so reduced that the unit-level costs should have
increased that much' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
When it came to the consultants, observations were made (with hindsight) about the youth
and inexperience of many of their team, about the poor coordination between them, and
about what their motivations really were. Comments made included the following:
'They had some experience but note that the consultants are recent graduates. Some are
trainers, other managers, but they are youngsters of my own age [26-27 years old]. Only the
command team has some know-how and eventually some external contacts that co-ordinate
them. In Portugal there is no experience and the team is composed of Portuguese. The co-
ordinator is Spanish and he is quite good in this project (besides the French consultants;
however they just support them)' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Employee).
'I think that the articulation between them was not very good. There was a lack of
communication between those who were in the branches and those who were in the central
departments. They were facing the same problems; some have already been overcome'
(Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
'The consultancy costs are high. I believe they work significantly to show off. Their
presentations are great, only the methodology did not work because it was their first attempt.
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Next time, they will apply the methodology only with some adjustments. It will be easy. In
the beginning we thought they had already implemented ABC in one bank, but we concluded
that they had not' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
In addition, one perceived problem was that as the personnel changed, the link to top
management was lost. A key moment here was when the local head of the consultancy
firm moved on:
'A few people left the consultancy company, including the one who was known previously in
the bank. I believe they lost the direct link they had to the executive committee. Now all their
activities have to be negotiated purely at department level' (Interview: Organisation Dept.
Employee).
Such comments are understandable in the context of the frustrations being felt as the
project ran over time and into difficulty. At the same time, it is important to see things
from the other side as well.
From the IT company side, a number of the problems that arose were seen as coming
from within the Bank itself, either through failure to understand what IT can deliver, or
through an over-optimistic specification of requirements. The following observations are
as reasonable and justifiable, from the IT perspective, as many of the comments made
above:
'It is impossible to create a new IT system from the beginning. We have to take care with
what we do because we are working on a running horse that we cannot stop. We have to keep
the same level of performance (and the bank has many customers), customers can only notice
improvements, not the changes themselves. We have to update systems without problems for
the customer' (Interview: IT Company Manager).
This manager perceived a failure in the bank to appreciate just how much the accounting
system had to change:
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Tor a long time accounting was the coherence matrix, since it was the source to feed the
MIS. Personally, I do not agree... the accounting system can give management information,
but it is not the main system. Accounting is a technique that needs to be in balance... but each
branch has its own "little accounting", the accounting of the bank is a summing up of all the
branches. This means that movements between the branches or between branches and central
departments are made through transitory inter-departmental accounts. This means a big
number of transitory accounts that have to be controlled. I used to understand the reason,
accounting was the information source and we needed to have each branch autonomous to get
the information about their products. Today there are other ways, things have evolved. If the
quality, coherence and completeness of data is guaranteed, we can know the position of each
customer without the accounting. Imagine if we had everything in the accounting, it should be
monstrous' (Interview: IT Company Manager).
Further, there was a failure (much noted by IT specialists) to recognise the technical
difficulty involved in what would seem a simple management change. For instance:
'There are certain activities that are manual, not automatic. If the IT system covered all the
activities of the bank, we would have everything. However, in a certain circuit there are parts
that are automatic and parts that are manual... In some cases they want us to merge data on
existing 'events tracked' (and that we can do), but sometimes they want us to break 'events
tracked' down into sub-events, but that affects other applications. We could not afford to
disrupt a whole series of applications just because of the ABC project. Therefore they should
try to change their approach and look at that activity differently' (Interview: IT Company
Manager).
A similar set of reasonable objections was made against bank expectations by people in
the Consultancy firm. They felt that they had acted in good faith in their negotiations with
the bank from the start:
'I think the starting point was well identified: there was a good knowledge of the bank, what
they had available and what their needs were. The approach was systematic and clear
regarding how we would carry out the project, and we had a rigorous calendar. We proposed
a rigorous and deep project, in a very acceptable time, with an approach that revealed
experience from us, and that might have given security to the bank' (Interview: Consultant
Company).
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However, there was a feeling that the bank had overstated how advanced they were
(possibly through giving too optimistic an impression of the depth of earlier activity
analyses). As the following puts it:
'When we started the project, we thought the bank had their processes clearly defined.
However, they were not in a transactional perspective, so we had to re-think all the processes
and activities of the bank. If we had already had that, we would only have had to go to
departments and control the time they spent on each activity' (Interview: Consultant
Company).
There were then continuing problems in terms of communication with the bank, in
particular with the IT company that created significant difficulties in overcoming the IT
problems:
'First, there are communication difficulties. Some of our requests go, move backwards and
onwards and they did not understand what we wanted. There is no critical analysis of the data
that we asked for. Applications are dispersed, we have a new repository of information but
the program is being tested.., and they do not make any critical analysis of the data'
(Interview: Consultant Company).
The net result was that on all sides, and beyond the project team, there was a sense of
complexity and confusion. Interviewees reflected on this in different ways, but often with
an acute and insightful form of critical reflection.
So for instance, there is this view from within the Consultancy team:
'In my opinion, due to the requirements of the bank, the model is too complex and it does not
have the main objectives clearly defined. There are too many activities and cost objects. The
bank did not prioritise which cost objects were more important in terms of costing.
Eventually, there are cost objects in the model where it is not very important at this stage to
know their costs. We should have advanced by phases, starting with the activities and cost
objects that are important in terms of costing, and later increasing their number as the data
becomes reliable. Complexity is due to the existence of two sponsors with different
objectives. The organisation department needed detailed activities and the accounting
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department needed information detailed in terms of cost objects' (Interview: Consultant
Company).
The perspective from the branch is that it is all too much:
'Currently we have an excess of information. So much information that it is like a big stream
of water and we cannot control it. It is information in excess and we do not have time to see
it' (Interview: Branch Manager).
At regional level, one view is that there is still confusion between old and new-style
measurements in the operation of the management control system:
'Profitability from SOT is just a volume effectiveness because we use standard rates. Someone
that does more business has advantage, independently of the actual interest rate used...
Besides, we need the effective profitability because the data we receive from the accounting
department is not related to what we manage... We abandon managing the client account and
now we use the concept of banking customer. Banking customers who independently of the
domicile of their accounts are to be managed by somebody, either an organic unit or a person.
Anyway, the information we receive from the marketing department is more relevant than the
information we receive from the accounting department' (Interview: Regional Director).
The same kind of confusion shows up in a different way in the marketing function, where
the blame is particularly put on the accounting department's failure to change:
'The only data we use from the accounting department are management measures. This year,
top management decided to introduce the ratio cost to income. However, this is not correctly
calculated because the data we use is from the profitability model and that has the total
amount by branch. By doing that I am considering corporate and private customers which
shouldn't be considered' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
Thus, overall there can be seen to have been a lot of concern and uncertainty associated
with the attempted change. But perhaps the last word should go to a manager from one of
the central departments, who had this more general reflection on what had gone wrong:
'If the project is well explained and if the institution has a good reputation in terms of the way
it has treated people in the past, change is not very complicated. However, if we close all the
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"lab scientists" in a room to produce a fantastic thing, but the organisation does not 'live the
project', problems are likely to arise, up to and including a failure to implement the project...
Projects must be lived, people have to understand why we are doing this project, the
advantages they will have, and its impact. If there are negative impacts in terms of human
resources, the solution, in one word, is communication... But too often people do not
remember what the MIS is for, they are not living the MIS' (Interview: Other Central Dept.
Manager).
6.5 The spread of accounting as unintended consequence: Accounting
operates more 'intensively' and 'extensively'
If we finally consider this project in the context of the changing roles of accounting in
Banco Lusitano, there is a case for saying that, despite all the specific problems the
project faced, one general outcome was a further dissemination and intensification of
accounting across the bank.
Looking back over a decade or more, there had always been a role for the kind of
accounting information prepared in accordance with accounting principles and practices,
established by the Bank of Portugal as applicable for the financial services sector
(Portuguese GAAP'). Traditionally, as noted above, the accounting role had focussed
less on internal control needs, and was almost exclusively concerned with preparing
external reports, with the incremental budget system being perceived as a 'ritual' to which
the departments of the bank did not give too much attention. Certain departments might
even see themselves as 'beyond' the budget, as in this example:
`[The budget] does not influence this department. Although we had taken some measures and
people collaborate with those measures, this department is too important to be subject to the
budget' (Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
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However, following re-privatisation, as noted, the management of the bank did become
more cost-conscious, and one of the consequences was a big focus on the cost to income
ratio. Over the last decade, therefore, accounting had been operating more intensively and
extensively in various ways. This had arguably already triggered a situation where
accounting was migrating as a significant presence beyond the accounting department. At
least managers from the accounting department could have that perception:
'We are the co-ordinators of the budget, no longer the owners. The budget has three entities:
the users who make their own budget and define objectives, the manager responsible for
indirect costs, who is a specialist in a particular area, and us in terms of co-ordination'
(Interview: Accounting Dept. Manager).
But this migration could also be seen at the level of the formal systems being introduced.
So as figure 6.2 indicates, the situation had become one where the accounting department
was now co-ordinating the MIS project for the bank, but the more specific responsibilities
were allocated out to a different responsible department. As the figure shows, the
strategic marketing department had responsibility for the profitability of customers, the
commercial marketing department for profitability of products, the credit risk department
for the risk model, and the organisation department for the ABC project. Here is a clear
example of formal systems making accounts more extensive and intensive, and at the
same time imposing a new set of interdependencies, both at the organisational level and
between different kinds of disciplinary expertise. Risk management theory had cross-
overs to accounting and accountability and vice versa, and strategy and marketing
knowledges were drawn into this network too. But within all this, accounting had a
particular role as a key aspect of the MIS, since it was the basis for articulating the newly
significant 'value chain' of the bank:
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'Each branch was a mini-bank, therefore we had to know the business of each branch,
because each one of them had customers from all segments. The bank changed strategically
and said 'we are a multi-specialist bank, but with a segmented business orientation', so now
the relevance is on profitability by products and customers, not by branch. Nowadays, the
main objective is profitability of products and customers, and cost control. We already had
budget control, but now it is better because we link everything considering the value chain.
We have four models: profitability of customers, profitability of products, risk model, and a
cost model (ABC)' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Manager).
Within this general context, the impact of the ABC initiative was to produce, as an
unintended consequence, a general visibility and significance for all forms of accounting
in use. As the unit of analysis changed from branches to products, customers and
distribution channels, a range of performance measurement and accountability practices
became more essential and inevitable. New MAS needed to be developed in order to
work with the new managerial reality. Figure 6.3 can be read alongside Figure 6.2 as
together summarising in a formal representation the ways in which the strategic
management process now proceeded via accounting through a mix of traditional and
'new' accounts, integrated together to define and track value-adding.
This kind of 'unintended consequence change' can be seen beginning to show up in other
departments. A manager from the marketing department explains how he understands the
importance of ABC for the bank:
'Activity-based costing will allow more accountability to each process. There are products
that are very profitable and subsidise areas that are less profitable or even unprofitable. If we
had reliable management information the correct decision would be to close those areas'
(Interview: Marketing Dept. Manager).
At regional level, a Director sees a different kind of specific benefit:
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Figure 6.3 — Value chain of Banco Lusitano
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Tor the regional directorates [ABC] is important in relation to our special customers, to
whom we have to provide custom-made solutions, as clients are increasingly more
demanding and haggle over the terms and conditions. It is important to know the actual cost
of each operation, to be able to decide whether we should accept those conditions of if we are
instead losing money with the operation' (Interview: Regional Director).
The interconnection to other expert knowledges is also recognised, as in the following:
'Changes in the MIS are the result of changes of the marketing philosophy and of profitability
analysis. The existing information systems were not adjusted to the new commercial
approach. The improvement of the bank's profitability was limited by the lack of vision to
assure the new commercial philosophy' (Interview: Accounting Dept Employee).
In addition to these discursive shifts, there was a range of structural effects which could
be seen to be connected to accounting's new significance. For example, there was a
transformation from a bank culture based on relative job security and, for some,
hierarchical careers, to another based more on the strategic marketing discourse of
interpersonal customer-orientated skills with individual performance.
Task redefinition was another consequence, here associated with the use of new
technologies and the increasing range of services offered. Imposed by reorganisation
projects, in particular the Efficiency Project, there was automation of back-office
functions (simplification and elimination of tasks), diversification in terms of distribution
channels (e.g. ATMs, telephone banking, internet banking), and centralisation and
specialisation to obtain economies of scale. There is a strongly felt sense of rapidly
changing employment practices, 'things are changing fast and there are people that adapt
easily, while others have difficulties in terms of adaptation' (Interview: IT Company
Manager).
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This has led to a new set of tensions inside the bank in which the role of accounting may
not always be evident. For instance, there is a division between the branch network and
central departments, where senior managers are located (a division between 'them', who
are seen as the 'big thinkers', and `us'). As the old sense of identity held by branch staff
with their local branch (or their region) was lost, there was as yet little identification with
head office. There are claims that 'central departments have to increase their capacity of
reply' (Interview: Branch Manager) and that:
'Central departments should treat us with the same level of quality as we treat our customers,
in order to increase the quality of the service we provide. Therefore, central departments
should have as their main aim to satisfy their customers — the branches — so they can satisfy
the bank customers' (Interview: Regional Director).
There is a rather sarcastic or ironic sense that they are very different and distanced people
who see themselves as superior:
'Probably the "big thinkers" that are up there have a huge capacity, and the IT system could
be wonderful, but at first sight I cannot see it' (Interview: Branch Manager).
'People who are up there, our graduates, IT staff, accountants and economists, often use a
language that is not perceivable for people who are in charge of a branch, who do not have a
higher degree. They should use a more perceivable language, more down to earth' (Interview:
Branch Manager).
At the same time, there were real changes in the level of responsibility and power held in
the branches. The changes in the commercial structure affected branch managers at two
levels: the number of staff they were responsible for, and their level of autonomy and
technical expertise. Branch managers supervised fewer staff, because part of the work that
used to be done at branches was centralised in the regional directorates or head office. At
the same time, the creation of segmentation reduced the autonomy of branch managers,
since there were new managers responsible for each segment. It also reduced their
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responsibility, for example, in terms of decisions on lending, because of centralisation
and the introduction of credit guidelines. Additionally, new technology meant that work
flows and targets could be closely monitored, and there were difficulties in updating their
knowledge. To sum up, branch managers, who previously were in a very powerful
position, were facing a reduction of responsibility and job insecurity due to the significant
renovation of staff.
At the same time, as noted above, many of those initially promoted to regional directors
who were former branch managers were now replaced by younger and more highly
qualified people. Meanwhile, branch staff were expected to accept the new focus on sales,
building and developing relationships with customers, in which they were given precise
business objectives and demanding growth targets.
In this situation, there was an increased presence of accounting in the branch, in defining
and measuring these targets, and there was at the same time an increased dependence on
those young qualified new entrants, since they typically ran the new accounting-based
MIS. Some senior managers could see the ensuing problems very clearly.
'There is a cultural shock between those who have knowledge derived from the everyday
routine and who are convinced that this is very important because it requires years to acquire,
and others, young, educated and probably satisfied to have found a working position. This
new generation question the activity and knowledge of the more experienced. The reaction of
the latter could be summarised: "old people serve for nothing, only young people have access,
only graduates are managers" (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
This generational shift affects the relative sense of insecurity. For the older generation,
job redundancies had already undermined the sense of employment security that was a
central aspect of the Portuguese banking culture. The banking career was a secure and
long path, with positions filled by male, school leaver and full-time staff. Entrants from
301
universities were not particularly important except at the highest levels, due to the fact
that almost all promotions were from within. Promotions and payments were based on
seniority with annual increments. The changes in career patterns involved insecurity, job
evaluated and differentiated pay. Individual performance based on the SOI is a key
element since employees have performance targets imposed from strategic and marketing
priorities65 . Additional pressure is due to job redundancies and the bank's policy
regarding reduction and renewal of staff. As one manager explains:
'Change is important to three areas: staff reduction, renewal of staff and the bank's
reorganisation in two aspects: IT and the organisational model... I consider that the
organisational model does not correspond to reality, and IT systems do not provide a capable
answer to the bank's activity' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
For the older generation, it is not only the younger generation that becomes an object of
suspicion. There are claims that the bank has had to adapt itself to the IT systems, instead
of the IT providing solutions to the bank's needs:
'The IT company provides tools and we have to install them. We were under pressure,
because top management considers that it is the solution for everything, but it is not. That will
be when the IT system provides an answer to the organisational model of the bank, but today
it does not' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
Predictably, in the light of the experience of managing IT change generally, software has
frequently not given the expected answer, as a director explained, saying that he often
hears complaints such as: 'I am working with the same or worse means than I had, and I
am not being compensated', although his own view of this was that 'it is not true but it is
what people are assuming' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager). One manager
65 The implementation of this efficient objectives scheme (SOI) includes volume, profitability, cost, and
service quality objectives, with direct impact in the individual bonuses.
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summed up the feeling that job cuts are happening, to reduce the workload, before IT
innovations are completely developed:
'The commercial staff is afraid of the applications, since they do not dominate them
conveniently. They have powerful tools but are afraid of using them. They complain that they
cannot follow the new tools. I hear them complain about small inconveniences of the
applications; nobody defends their philosophy, potentialities and timesaving' (Interview:
Other Central Dept. Manager).
The situation can be partially explained: 'the old generation is critical, because they are
out of touch. They are criticising and creating a bad environment inside units' (Interview:
Other Central Dept. Manager). There are also claims that 'ignorance and the lack of
knowledge are the main causes of insecurity' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager):
'Within this context, people have fear and in the absence of explanations from who should
provide them, they tend to find their own explanations creating the rumour. The rumour
creates confusion' (Interview: Other Central Dept. Manager).
As a consequence, some resistance or at least lack of co -operation towards ABC was
expected:
'In the entire financial sector, but particularly in banking, unions are strongly structured.
When we try to do something, unions and commissions of workers start to complain... If you
go to a department, structured in a dodgy way, to see what they are doing and how much time
they spend doing it, people in that department will easily think that you will see them as not
working hard enough and immediately conclude that someone will get the sack. Therefore it
is hard to find co-operation within the department' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Manager).
Summing up this section on unintended consequences, it is fair to say that the structures
of the bank are changing significantly, due to the new strategic and marketing discourses.
At the same time, the accounting discourse also has an important role in the bank's search
for efficiency, profitability, and improvements in the cost to income ratio. There was a
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strong expansion in the commercial network, accompanied by a significant reduction in
the average number of employees per branch. Further structural changes in the
commercial area include the creation of regional commercial divisions, responsible for
managing their branches, and the creation of centres for medium-sized companies, during
2000. The structural transformation and technological change has significant impact on
employment practices:
'A decade ago branch managers had a very important position which they do not have
anymore. If we analyse who defines objectives and stimulates branches' activities are the
regional managers. These regional managers are young motivated graduates, critical people
with value. Even in the central departments there is a significant number of young people'
(Interview: IT Company Manager).
Central departments are also changing, allowing for an increased specialisation of their
activities and close support for the branch network. These changes involve the creation of
new departments and the reorganisation of the existing departments:
'The bank is changing and that creates difficulties for the ABC project. There are thirteen
new departments since the summer till now [April 2001] and this requires an update of the
model' (Interview: Organisation Dept. Employee).
The change initiatives that are happening in the bank are also creating a sense of
insecurity in the departments involved in them, because they are questioning the taken for
granted ways of being. For instance, the accounting department is facing insecurity and
tensions because of their situation regarding the MIS and the ABC projects. They were
one of the co-sponsors of the MIS, but the executive committee, after delays and some
problems with the consultants involved with the MIS project, decided to create a new
structure just for this complex project (see Figure 6.4) that involves several departments
of the bank. The new structure is starting the development of the data warehouse from
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scratch with new suppliers of hardware and software. It is co-ordinated by the IT
company and does not include staff from the accounting department. However, a manager
from the accounting department claims that:
'The accounting department has to be a sort of co-ordinator, in order to establish a link with
the external reports and management control. One development in one area has transversal
implications in the other. In this moment, the project is in the hands of an IT person. That was
a mistake, because they have a narrow vision... IT staff are supposed to talk with the
machines. Accounting is the only methodology that allows aggregating variables through the
notion of value. Besides, it provides rigour. For instance, if you do not use accounting as the
base in the MIS you face the risk that, only luckily, things will be fine' (Interview:
Accounting Dept. Manager).
In terms of the ABC project, they had a secondary role compared to the other organisation
department with whom they formally had joint-ownership of the project. This partnership
was based on two objectives. The organisation department was pleased with the outputs
in terms of the map of processes in order to implement ABM, but the unitary cost
objective that was the main purpose of the accounting department was not giving
'reliable' numbers. Moreover, the organisation department was the one that was going to
'own' the ABC information. This could explain that while discussing other issues
regarding the MIS, a manager from the accounting department seems to be worried about
the future of the department:
'The accounting department is going to be fundamental [to the MIS project], unless they
break the department... I do not know the future, but I believe this area is going to provide
relevant information' (Interview: Accounting Dept. Employee).
The organisation department is also facing tensions. For instance, during the final stage of
the ABC Project the senior managers associated with the project were allocated to other
activities, as the department was split in two. The manager formerly responsible for the
commercial marketing department has become the new senior manager for the
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organisational department, while the manager formerly responsible for that has become
responsible for the part that does not include ABC. The clusters of people associated with
the ABC project were disruptive.
'The change in the senior managers of the project brought some additional difficulties... [the
new manager] has to get involved not only in this project but in all projects in progress in the
department. He also starts new projects and has to get involved in the department, reorganise
it... of course this has affected the time allocated to the ABC project' (Interview: Consultant
Company).
6.6 Conclusion
This research is clearly valuable for identifying key factors that may be found in a more
longitudinal and 'contextually rich' sort of case study. This is the kind of study that is
being undertaken here, recognising that this type of research project is more time-
consuming and less immediately `generalisable' than some other approaches, precisely
because it is so intensive within one organisation. One similar study that has attempted to
contextualise the introduction of an ABC 'solution' within the financial services sector is
Soin's research carried out in a UK clearing bank (Soin, 1996). Like the present study,
Soin's research involved a longitudinal examination of organisational change, focusing
on a single organisation, and as here, that organisation was a leading player in the
banking sector. Both studies therefore can be seen to develop a 'rich description'
approach, where archival materials from within the organisation are combined with
interview data, thus covering people's understanding both of past developments and of
ongoing innovations.
MAS dealt with changes in the internal and external interdependencies in the contexts of
the organisational strategy and structure, the organisational field and the state. The state,
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although it has reduced its own power in the sector during the last 15 years, still maintains
an important role. For instance, just a few months ago it intervened in the sale of a
financial group to a Spanish group. Its influence is also important as it still has a
controlling interest in the country's most important financial group. This state-owned
financial group also intervened to help the process of selling one of the banks to a
Portuguese group, as part of the agreement reached with the Spanish group. The sale of
that bank was very important — the group that bought the bank became the biggest private
bank in the country.
Thus, the organisational field has, as Fligstein observes, become redefined over time, and,
importantly, the relations between banks have become more competitive (particularly in
the form of a battle for market share). Product lines have become more diversified and
managers now concentrate on differentiating their products. Yet, as Fligstein (1990:302)
argues, managers rarely know what is economically efficient:
'They have a sense of controlling a market or market share and to some degree they can
control costs. But the driving force for managers, just as it is for any kind of social actor, is to
preserve their organizations and further their individual and collective interests. To do so they
must define their situations, including what constitutes a market. In that process, they
construct a conception of control that includes strategies and structures and helps to define
their organizational fields'.
In that respect, change processes are shaped by a combination of random, systematic and
inertial forces (Burns and Scapens, 2000).
Accounting is becoming more visible in the organisation and has been implicated in
recent developments over the past ten years. It is operating more intensively and
extensively, and the ABC initiative is part of this process. Accounting is significant
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beyond its technical roles. Accounting based management discourses are coming from
outside, with the influence of consultant companies.
MAS are influenced by strategic and marketing discourses. They can be changed and are
being changed in the name of discursive developments. However, accounting can also
help to create a powerful discourse. As Hopwood (1990:9) argues, accounting 'can
influence perceptions, change language and infuse dialogue, thereby permeating the ways
in which priorities, concerns and worries, and new possibilities for action are expressed'.
Accounting has an important role, as MAS have the power to shift patterns of
organisational visibility so that the concerns of the external world can influence an
organisation's internal affairs:
'Accounting thereby can play a role in strategically changing managerial awareness away
from the problems of just internal interdependences towards a view of the external
positioning of the organisation or a particular segment of the organisation. The language,
pressures and requirements of the marketplace can be infused into the organisation as a result
of a strategic realignment of organisational structures, internal patterns of organisational
segmentation and flows of information, including accounting information'. (Hopwood,
1990:11).
Accounting numbers can, together with strategic and marketing discourses, provide a
'legitimisation' of job losses, presenting them as inevitable to the bank's adaptation to the
evolving competitive environment. Similarly, they can pressurise the 'lucky' remaining
employers into performance goals. The budget system was designed to emphasise
performance goals and the SOT was used to reward those goals (and simultaneously
increase awareness of the importance of reaching those goals). ABC can be made to
appear to respond to a new realm and to create a strong sense of alignment with a new
strategic vision and promote a new climate of change in the organisation (cf. Ezzamel et
al., 2001).
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Accounting numbers can also have social effects, as they can become a means for the
bank selectively to focus on particular customers, rather than the customer in general.
Accounting numbers can be used to increase business profits by extracting wealth from
customers and by disciplining identifiable groups of people to use cheaper distribution
channels (e.g. offering electronic services) through the charging of fees for services. Far
from being perceived as the raison d'être for the bank, customers — or at least some of
them — are seen as consumers of resources. This is a vast shift from the notion of
providing a superior service to customers and placing them at the centre of the bank's
priorities (cf. Boyce, 2000).
This research shows how important it is to understand the dynamics within and between
the key implementing departments. If we have more accounting discourse (intensive and
extensive) across the organisation, why does effective change not automatically follow?
The battle over ownership between the accounting and the organisation departments is the
factor that made other factors background issues. More widely across the organisation,
this means that it is not clear what ABC is really about, and also that people can 'evade'
(rather than resist) its impact as a means of enabling downsizing. This has been the
widespread objectively-based perception of what all the change initiatives have been
about.
Accounting, perceived as not neutral but a powerful set of practices and discourses, that
influence perceptions and change language, is potentially the source of power issues, but
also of the sense of insecurity and tensions that characterised the bank over the last years.
The ABC project started with high expectations and after facing a significant amount of
problems and delays there was some disappointment, in particular because the numbers it
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was providing were not reliable. Furthermore, the ABC information became rapidly out
of date, because its implementation took place at a time when the organisation was going
through significant change. However, the investment made in this project may still bring
results, because there is an awareness of the potential value of the information.
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7 Conclusions
7.1 Overview of the study
This thesis is the result of a longitudinal case study of a Portuguese bank, where an ABC
system has been trialled for implementation, as a means to improve the economy,
efficiency and effectiveness of employee activity. The bank is facing a significantly more
competitive environment and is remoulded by new discourses particularly those
concerned with 'strategy', 'marketing' and 'change'. A critical and interpretative
theoretical form of analysis hopes to contribute to the generation of a new kind of
empirical understanding of how accounting change works in practice in different cultures,
and in that way to help deepen our theoretical understanding of accounting's role in
modern management. Although based in the interpretive tradition since it is concerned with
actors' perceptions, interpretations and beliefs, it also draws on a Foucault-inspired critical
framework of the kind developed in the work of Hoskin and Macve (e.g. 1986, 1988, 1994,
2000), and in the research into the financial sector undertaken by Morgan and Sturdy (2000).
The particular model developed here is designed to permit the exploration of the effect of
accounting practices on change from three perspectives — changing structures, changing
discourses and the effect of both of these processes on power relations. It also draws on
Fligstein's (1991) institutional framework to understand change in terms of the interplay
across three relevant institutional contexts — the organisational field, the state, and the
existing strategy and structure of the bank.
The ABC literature provides 'guidelines' to help organisations implement ABC initiatives
(e.g. Brimson, 1991). Nevertheless, this research has shown that there are unforeseen
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characteristics and situations that create difficulties and can have a major impact on
implementation. ABC principles are simple, but the design is complex and requires
considerable effort and resource allocation (cf. Pryor, 1990). During the implementation,
the ABC team faced significant technical difficulties that imposed important restrictions
and prevented the optimisation of ABC. The ABC model design was too complex due to
the range of different objectives for the new system. This complexity was translated in the
difficulties faced by the IT company in providing the data required for the
implementation, namely cost driver quantities. As the efforts were partially frustrated,
there were claims that the IT company had too many projects and did not consider the
ABC project as a priority. Nevertheless, the TT problem reveals that an adequate
preparation/evaluation of the existing situation prior to the project's commencement was
not done. Consequently, there was a need to design and install data capture systems or
change some cost drivers. IT was the main factor causing delays in the project, but it was
also the easiest area to blame because it was a different entity, not the bank itself.
The delays due to the failure to provide a 'good' outcome brought to the surface several
problems, creating a tense relationship between the consultants and the bank. For
example, for the bank the youth and inexperience of many of the consultants and the poor
co-ordination between them were the main explanations for the problems that arose. For
the consultants, difficulties were due to the fact that the aims of the ABC system were not
clearly prioritised, and this created difficulties when they tried to meet all the needs.
The bank faced other technical difficulties, including resources allocation, lack of staff
time, choice of activities, and the selection of cost drivers, that can influence the
successful implementation of an ABC system (cf. Innes and Mitchell, 1992, 1998;
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Anderson, 1995a; Shields, 1995). All these issues created serious concerns over the
subjective nature of, and lack of accuracy in, the cost information generated by the
management accounting system.
However, although technical issues can create difficulties in the implementation and
development of the system, they are perceived as having an 'easy' solution (cf. Donevan
and Kaplan, 1998). It is important to keep such problems in perspective. The accounting
literature suggests that failure to implement ABC is not attributable to theory, technique
or application. Rather, it is due above all to resistance to change, and the structural
barriers that managers encounter when attempting to implement ABC (cf. Kaplan, 1990;
Roberts and Silvester, 1996; Shields and McEwen, 1996). Organisational issues like the
firm's characteristics (e.g. sector, dimension, history, cost structure), organisational
structure (cf. Schultz and Slevin, 1975; Gosselin, 1997), strategy (cf. Gosselin, 1997), and
culture (cf. Hofstede, 1993; Brewer, 1998) influence the design and implementation of an
ABC system.
A key organisational and behavioural issue concerns the perceptions and interpretations
of ABC held by the various organisational actors involved, regarding its technical
characteristics, utility and impact on the organisation (cf. Hopwood, 1987, 1990;
Gosselin, 1997). In Banco Lusitano, there were different views of the purpose of the new
system. The promoter of ABC within the bank was the organisation department. For this
department the activity-based model was seen as an information system, not necessarily
as part of the accounting system. They understood that ABC information would enable
them to manage activities and business processes because it provides a cross-functional
and integrated view of the bank. Based on process analysis made during previous change
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initiatives, the department had taken action in terms of reorganising certain product line
processes. ABC was seen as the best way to lead to ABM and proceed further with
reorganisation. Nevertheless, the organisation department was not able to convince top
management of its importance. Nor did they have the 'expertise', resources and
knowledge to implement it alone, and they did not have the support of the accounting
department, which was even seen as creating obstacles. In the accounting department
perceptions of the ABC system were mixed. The initial perceptions, when efforts were
made to communicate the merits and potentialities of ABC, were confused. There were
some questions about the feasibility of the new system, but there was no open antipathy to
the introduction of the ABC system. In fact, there was some support, because it was a
fashionable innovative management tool, touted by consultants, that other banks and
organisations were adopting. After it was made clear that ABC was an important feature
to provide the bank with cost information about unitary cost information to provide
profitability by product, customer segment, and channel, some attitudes changed, and
managers began to accept it as they claimed the project as their own. Part of the problem
might have been that the accounting department initially did not feel they owned or
managed the project. Initially perceived as creating difficulties for the project, the
accounting department was now willing to participate in the implementation of the project
and co-sponsor it. The result of trying to answer and reconcile different purposes for the
system was design complexity.
To summarise, a key behavioural issue is resistance to change by organisational members
due to the cost and benefits of ABC, power and political reasons, or the organisational
culture (cf. Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Mahni, 1997). There were a number of forces
retarding the project from the start. As managers were locked in a power struggle and the
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accounting department was resisting implementation, as the researcher was told
informally, this assumed particular relevance while the remaining factors for 'success'
became background issues.
Consequently, the real impact and value of ABC was not clear, and as a result there were
different levels of involvement in and commitment to the project. It appears that the bank
departments involved, until the end of the implementation, did not discuss the uses to
which the information would be put in any detail, and the contradictions between the
positions held on the new system were evident to all involved.
After this overview of the problems and difficulties faced during the implementation of
the ABC project, this concluding chapter reviews the key contributions and brings
together the major arguments of the thesis. As such, Section 7.2 describes the theoretical
contributions of the study. Managerial implications of the research findings are then
discussed in Section 7.3. Finally, Section 7.4 describes the limitations of the study and
outlines possible directions for further research.
7.2 Theoretical contribution of the study
Initial expectations were that the empirical findings would contribute to a better
theoretical understanding of MAS, and to an emergent series of research projects into
accounting and the financial services. The methodology used was a combination of
interviews and archive analysis in a single case-study-type approach. Within that, moving
between empirical analysis and theorising, using three lenses to interrogate both the
material gathered and the possible explanations — changing structures, changing
discourses and the effect of these processes on power.
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The main contribution of this research is related to the increase in the visibility and
perceived importance of accounting in the banking sector. As organisations change
accounting has become more significant. Since the reprivatisation, and more specifically
over the period when the ABC initiative was being promoted and developed, accounting
becomes more visible in the organisation and so perceived, at the level of what people say
and write, as important to it. The research shows how, with the arrival of ABC, what
becomes sayable internally includes alongside the two 'obvious' discourses of strategy
and marketing, a new kind of extensive and intensive accounting discourse. The
discourses of strategy, marketing and accounting 'migrated' into the banking sector, in
particular over the last decade, with consultants having a key role in this process.
Discursively, accounting permeates the organisation, alongside and inside marketing and
strategy discourse. Measures of accounting, such as the ratio of cost to income, are crucial
as, for instance, strategy uses them (intensive significance). 'Old' accounting is still out
there but now it is more than that (extensive significance). From the traditional roles,
preparation of external reports and preparation of the budget, accounting is migrating
outside the accounting department, for instance through the SOT, and specially with the
development of the new MIS that includes the ABC system.
The study provides new insights into how management accounting practices and
discourses, along with other organisational systems, play an important role questioning,
visualising, analysing, and measuring implemented strategies. These practices and
discourses have an important influence on strategic decision-making, and help to
legitimise action. As the language and practice of management have shifted towards
strategy and marketing discourses, patterns of work, organisation and career are being
restructured. Consequently, there are tensions and a feeling of insecurity inside the bank.
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Tensions, for instance, between the branch network and central departments, and between
staff with experience and a young, flexible and more educated generation. Redundancies,
TT innovations, and several change initiatives undermined the sense of employment
security that was a central aspect of the Portuguese banking culture.
There is an increased appreciation of the importance of accounting, since it is significant
beyond its technical roles. Accounting is increasingly important in the 'doing' of
management generally, including strategy and marketing. Accounting is contestable for it
is a means of distributing new modes of acting and thinking/speaking across the
organisation. Cost and resource levels become areas of conflict and debate (this is not
necessary the same, since debate is not always conflictual). New discourses of value (e.g.
in terms of value added) can be mobilised even as it becomes clear that precise measures
of value added or profitability remain elusive or the subject of dispute.
7.3 Managerial implications
Theoretical and empirical insights derived from this study have several implications for
managers. From the research, it becomes clear that the problem of power in the bank
arises from non-co-operative behaviour of different departments. This is sometimes for
opportunistic reasons, but at other times it is because of the different perspectives held by
different departments concerning their missions. The implementation of an ABC system
highlighted the tension between the accounting and the organisation departments, in
particular regarding who owned the relevant accounting. ABC was perceived as a system
that could provide relevant information and it has overcome the barrier of accounting
being the exclusive domain of the accounting department.
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The issue of power is crucial for the development of initiatives such as ABC, since their
needs are not initially defined in terms of resources and responsibilities, so there is a level
of voluntarism in the behaviour of the participant departments. At Banco Lusitano they
tried to overcome the power limitation in three ways. Firstly, the organisation department
assumed responsibility for the project and followed its development closely. This
signalled the importance of the project to the department, in particular for activity
management. Secondly, the accounting department assumed co-responsibility in
particular regarding questions related to costs. This helped to prevent a clear dispute
between the departments. Thirdly, all departments relevant to the project were induced to
get involved in its development. This was important because ABC was imposing a new
culture, associated with visibility of costs and redundancy.
The project initiators were managers from the organisation department. However, there
were difficulties in building top management support. The ABC project was not initially
recognised as a strategic initiative and the accounting department was perceived as
creating barriers to its development. These difficulties, associated with the existence of
other projects considered priorities — the Euro and the Year 2000 projects, were the main
reasons for the delay of two years. After gaining top management support, the problem
was creating and maintaining organisational support for the initiative. The conflict
between the accounting and organisation departments had a significant impact on the
implementation of ABC. The lack of a clear supportive attitude, namely through the
involvement of someone from top management, made the 'turf wars' between the two
departments the central issue, while other factors identified by the literature as key to a
successful implementation become secondary. In this sense, the research shows that to
understand fully the effects of change it is necessary to consider organisational context,
319
power structures and involvement (cf. Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Malmi, 1997).
Resistance to a new MAS like ABC may be due to its non-consonance with the
distribution of intra-organisational power in organisations
In practical terms, the model of key factors (see Appendix I) can be used as a checklist as
managers are thereby more likely to implement ABC successfully in the presence of those
factors. Top management support and commitment is considered the key factor in the
success of ABC implementation. Consensus about clarity of the objectives of ABC is
necessary to ensure that the information that can be produced by the ABC system is
efficiently and effectively used. Non-accounting ownership, integration with performance
evaluation and compensation, and integration with competitive strategies such as
TQM/quality initiatives and JIT/speed initiatives are important factors in obtaining
organisational support. The process of designing and implementing an ABC system
requires adequate resources and training. Technical problems are considered relatively
insignificant compared with the organisational factors mentioned. Nevertheless, the
considerable indirect costs and the difficulties in obtaining volume outputs may
undermine its effective value in practice.
Managers may find inconsistencies in the key factors model, since it does not recognise
MAS as a powerful discipline/technique. It is important to check if the new MAS is
consistent with the dominant organisational culture and if it respects the distribution of
power in the organisation. If it is perceived as a threat, resistance will tend to emerge.
This research raises awareness of the need for an approach that recognises accounting
itself as a complex input to the change process management.
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7.4 Research limitations and future directions
A few issues must be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this study. This
research has several limitations that can be viewed as opportunities for further research.
The first limitation is related to its being an intensive single case study. As a result, the
findings can provide little basis for generalisation, although this is not the aim of a case
study (Scapens, 1990; Yin, 1994), This research is not trying to 'do' generalisation, but
offer one set of insights into possible patterns of 'accounting change' implementation, the
'limits of the possible'. Future research should attempt to replicate this study in different
organisational settings. The second limitation of the research concerns the methodology.
There is no such thing as an 'objective' case study. Social systems are not natural
phenomena, they 'must be interpreted by the researcher and, thus, case studies represent
interpretations of the social reality' (Scapens, 1990:277). The aim of this research is to
provide a rich contextualist study (Pettigrew, 1985) within accounting and change. This
does not mean that the findings will in all respects be the same in all organisations.
Instead the aim is to employ a rich case study, as suggested by Yin (1994) for the
purposes of (1) describing complex events in some detail, (2) exploring and analysing the
relevance of different models of accounting change and thus, (3) providing an explanation
of such complexity. This study is seen as having some regular or regulatory effects, which
may vary with context (cultural, economic, and social) far more than traditional studies
looking to find underlying generalisable factors have typically looked to find. This study
is therefore not 'objective', but it is also not purely a culturally relativist study, which
ends up seeing everything as `interpretativise. At the same time the researcher needs to
be open to the phenomena, and events of the particular context, and to the need to
interpret what is done and said in that context.
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Three further issues should be mentioned. First, access or subjects' views can often only
be gained if confidentiality is assured. This situation may prevent the researcher from
presenting a full picture of what has been found, as well as sometimes making it difficult
to check the validity of evidence (e.g., when access to relevant material held in
confidence is denied). Second, every case study is a 'translation' even if it is intralingual.
However, in this case the issue of translation presents itself at the interlingual level too.
The final issue relates with time constraints within the PhD. Delays in the implementation
of the ABC system prevent the research further exploring the consequences of the
implementation itself. Nevertheless, the research does not end here. It is important to
continue the research, to broaden it, and to test the statements made in the research.
This study opens numerous potential routes for future research. First, it would be
interesting to extend this analysis over time in Banco Lusitano, particularly the analysis of
how ABC is used and what are its organisational and behavioural consequences. A
second suggestion for further research concerns more intensive case studies in other
national or European banks that have adopted or intend to adopt ABC or other MAS
innovation, in order to improve the theoretical understanding of accounting's role in
modern management. Inter-country comparisons of financial institutions could provide
valuable information regarding how accounting change works in practice in different
cultures. A final suggestion for further research would be to shift the focus from the
organisational level to the industry level. In particular, the Portuguese financial sector,
would be an interesting case study. Although its liberalisation process was one of the
fastest in Europe — considering the starting point in terms of regulation and the pace of
introduction of the changes towards the single European market for financial services —
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the impact of the changes on financial institutions' MAS has not yet been analysed in
depth.
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Appendix I
Factors in ABC implementation
There are claims that the literature on activity accounting typically provides detailed
technical advice on design and implementation of ABC systems, with insufficient
attention given to the behavioural and organisational factors (Cooper et al., 1992a;
Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Shields, 1995). However, more recent studies have identified
important behavioural and organisational factors in ABC implementation: top
management support, integration with competitive strategies, integration with
performance evaluation and compensation, training, adequacy of resources, non-
accounting ownership, and consensus and clarity of objectives (Shields and Young, 1989;
Shields, 1995; Shields and McEwen, 1996; Foster and Swenson, 1997; Ma1mi, 1997;
McGowan and Klarnmer, 1997; Krumwiede, 1998a, 1998b; Friedman and Lyne, 1999;
Innes et al., 2000). Studies also conclude that these variables have reinforcing and
complementary roles, and their impact varies during the stages of ABC implementation
(Anderson, 1995a; Krumwiede, 1998a).
1. Top management support
Previous research concludes that top management support and commitment is the most
important factor in the success of ABC implementation (Cooper et al., 1992a; Shields and
Young, 1989; Shields, 1995; Shields and McEwen, 1996; McGowan and Klammer, 1997;
Friedman and Lyne, 1999; Innes et al., 2000). Shields and McEwen (1996) claim that this
finding is consistent with the more general finding that almost all successful innovations
require the support of top management. First, top management should focus resources,
goals, and strategies on the implementation of ABC. Second, they can provide the
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political help to reduce potential conflicts. Since innovations normally involve the
modification of the existing power structure, employees are likely to resist unless
specifically supported by top management. Third, top management must demonstrate
commitment to ABC by using it as the basis for decision-making, performance
measurement, control, or evaluation, and encouraging employees to use ABC
information.
Finally, to implement the top management commitment, a 'champion' is important to
drive the project and facilitate communication across the organisation (Shields, 1995;
Foster and Swenson, 1997; McGowan and Klammer, 1997).
2. Integration with competitive strategies
Linkage to competitive strategies, such as TQM/quality initiatives and JIT/speed
initiatives is also an important determinant of the success of an ABC implementation.
Where such linkages are effectively built, ABC information is more likely to help
organisations to achieve continuous improvement in terms of quality and time-base
performance (Shields, 1995; Shields and McEwen, 1996).
3. Integration with performance evaluation and compensation
Shields and McEwen (1996) articulate that the importance of the linkage between ABC
implementation and performance evaluation and compensation is natural because
employees pay attention to things that affect their welfare. Since the system used to
evaluate and compensate them affects their welfare, they will only be motivated to help
ABC succeed if they believe that the resulting system fairly represents their performance
(see also Shields, 1995; McGowan and Klammer, 1997).
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4. Training
Training in designing and implementing ABC systems, and in using ABC information, is
important to help employees understand how ABC differs from conventional MAS. It
also increases non-accounting ownership, and provides a mechanism for employees to
understand and accept ABC, and to feel comfortable with it (Shields and Young, 1989;
Shields, 1995; Shields and McEwen, 1996; McGowan and Klammer, 1997).
5. Provision of adequate resources
The process of designing and implementing an ABC system requires adequate resources,
either internal or external. Internal resources include the time and commitment of
accountants, top management, and operating employees. External resources include
software and consultants (Shields and McEwen, 1996; McGowan and Klammer, 1997;
Friedman and Lyne, 1999).
Shield and McEwen (1996) conclude that internal resources are a very important factor
for ABC success. However, their study also suggests that external consultants and
technical characteristics, such as the type of software adopted and the extent to which
stand-alone systems were developed, did not prove fundamental. Nevertheless, the use of
high quality consultants can benefit the design of the system and provide training on
ABC, if only because most companies have little internal expertise in ABC. Additionally,
consultants can overcome problems with the lack of suitable accounting resources and
staff time to install an ABC system, where staff are likely to have continuing
commitments to their regular activities.
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In their study, some companies had difficulties in committing enough resources to the
implementation of ABC, because they have other competing uses for resources to which
higher priority was given. This is frequently likely to be the case.
6. Non-accounting ownership
When ABC is owned only by accountants, there is a danger that it might be used only to
satisfy their needs. In such circumstances other employees will tend not to support or use
ABC. It is important, therefore, that non-accountants believe that the ABC system is of
practical use to people such as themselves, not just to the accounting department. If non-
accountants are involved in the initial decisions to invest in ABC, and in the design and
implementation of ABC, they are more likely to support and promote the system, and be
committed to its use (Shields and McEwen, 1996; Friedman and Lyne, 1999).
7. Consensus and clarity of objectives
Consensus on, and clarity of the objectives of, ABC is necessary to ensure that the
information that can be produced by the ABC system is efficiently and effectively used.
This requires that the objectives of the implementation process are clearly stated at the
outset and shared by all in the organisation (Shields and Young, 1989; Cooper et al.,
1992a; McGowan and Klammer, 1997). Designing an ABC system is facilitated if there is
a clear understanding of its objectives and how its information should be used. In fact,
one major source of problems can be the existence of different objectives, such as ABC
for product costing and ABC for cost management. The scope, rigour and sophistication
vary considerably according to the purpose defined (Innes and Mitchell, 1998).
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8. Other factors
A high level of IT sophistication seems to be an important factor in ABC implementation.
However, according to the literature, higher levels of IT quality may either encourage or
discourage ABC. Managers who are generally satisfied with the information provided by
the existing systems may be reluctant to invest in ABC (Anderson, 1995a; Krumwiede,
1998a). On the other hand, companies with higher quality IT are claimed in the literature
to have lower measurement costs (Cooper, 1988b).
Technical difficulties, including design complexity, resources allocation, lack of staff
time, choice of activities, and the selection of cost drivers, can influence the successful
implementation of an ABC system (cf. Innes and Mitchell, 1998; Anderson, 1995a;
Shields, 1995). However, Shields (1995) recognises that technical issues regarding the
implementation of ABC are not sufficient to ensure its success. Rather, they are viewed as
relatively insignificant in comparison with the organisational factors. Innes and Mitchell
(1998) highlight five of these problems related to the complexity of an ABC system:
amount of resources required, accuracy in terms of data collection, many activities
crossing departmental boundaries and areas of responsibility, priority given to other
change initiatives, and the work involved in ABC design and implementation (see also
Roberts and Silvester, 1996).
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Appendix II
Interview Guide
Introduction
First let me introduce myself and explain a little about who I am and what I am doing.
My name is Rui Vieira. I am a lecture in ISCTE, where I teach management accounting. At the
moment I am in England doing my PhD on management accounting in the banking sector. It
involves a case study. The main purposes of my case study are: (1) to study the change process of
the management information system in the bank; (2) to understand the environment of the change;
and (3) to understand historically the change initiatives that have occurred at the bank since its
reprivatisation.
After collecting some information at the bank, I am talking to people in various departments. I
would like to reassure you that everything you say to me today will be kept in the strictest
confidence. There will be no mention of names. In no way will individual comments be repeated
such that they can be traced back to the person who made them. At the end of the project I will
write a thesis to be presented to Warwick University (UK) and the bank will have access to it.
Our discussion will be focussed on your experience. It will help me with accuracy if I can tape
our discussion. Only myself and eventually my supervisor will have access to the tape. Would
that be ok?
The interview will last for an hour to an hour and a half. Would that be that ok?
I have a list of questions. These questions are really a guide; I don't have to stick rigidly to them, I
will follow up what you have found interesting or important.
Before we start do you have any questions?
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The first stage — research in Banco Lusitano
Career and work experience
First of all I'd like to ask you a little about your career history and your work.
How long have you worked for the bank?
What are your actual functions in the bank?
(Try to have his career history in the bank)
Department
What are the main activities of your department?
Which of those activities do you consider the most important?
What are the main objectives of the department? (short run / long run)
How are the objectives defined? Who defines them?
Which objective is the most important to you?
How is that objective quantifiable?
(If applicable — ask how those numbers are determined?)
Information from the Accounting Department
What kind of information do you receive from the Accounting Department?
(Ask to see a report)
How often do you receive information?
(Which is the most important info)
What kind of information do you receive relevant to decision-making?
[Profitability Model — usefulness, problems, ways to overcome them]
What kind of information do you receive relevant for planning, control and performance
measurement?
What kind of information do you feel is necessary to your department that you do not have?
What kind of information do you give to the Accounting Department?
In what way do you think accounting numbers influence your department?
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Systems of objectives and incentives (SO!)
How would you assess whether the department has worked well on something?
Are there formal incentive systems in the bank? How do they work in practice?
How are people affected by these systems?
(If only negatives mentioned — Are there any positives?)
(If only positives mentioned — Are there any negatives?)
Do you agree with the reward structure used? Why?
(If not — which criteria do you think would be better?)
What would you say promotion decisions are based on here?
How would you describe the 'successful' people in the bank?
Budget
How would you describe the budget process? Where does it start?
(Ask for formal documents describing the process)
What have been the most significant changes in the last few years?
How do you understand the term "owner of process" in the budget system?
What is the role of "the owner of the process" in the budget process?
What is the link between the budget and the SOI?
(If there isn't one — can this cause any problems?)
What impact will ABC have on the budget process?
Changes in the management information system
There are possible changes to the management information system.
What in your opinion are the major changes?
Who decided these changes? What input did you have [if any]?
In what way do you think the new system will improve the quality of the information available to
your department?
(If ABC was not mentioned ask if he/she is aware of the possible implementation of ABC in the
bank? What do you think are the main advantages of that new system to the bank? Do you expect
any difficulties?) Bank level/Department level (note choice)
What changes would improve existing information for management?
[Levels of info/types of info/info content]
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Change initiatives
AVA Project
Why this project?
What were the main advantages of the project for the bank? And for the department?
What were the main problems with the project?
What happened in the department as a result?
Which objectives do you think were not reached? Why?
Excellence Project
Why this project?
What were the main advantages of the project for the bank? And for the department?
What were the main problems with the project?
What happened in the department as a result?
Which objectives do you think were not reached? Why?
Efficiency Project
Why this project?
What are the main advantages of the project for the bank? And for the department?
What are the main problems with the project?
What is happening with this project?
In your opinion, in which areas is it important to improve? Why?
How are surplus workers identified?
How were workers' numbers reduced? Which was the most common way? 'Natural wastage'
Has this process been a problem in the workplace?
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The second stage — focusing on the ABC system
Implementation of Activity-Based Costing
What were the reasons that led the bank to adopt ABC?
How was ABC implemented? (Ask to see reports)
What is the situation of the project?
Team?	 [Role of consultants / staff from the bank]
Target area?	 [Operational Area? Why? What are the objectives? Pilot?]
What has been done? [Describe it / Problems]
Next steps?	 [What and when?]
How were activities defined?
How were cost drivers selected? Which cost drivers did you adopt?
What were the main difficulties in the implementation process of ABC?
What sort of problems are still unresolved regarding the ABC model?
What is the department involvement within the project?
What can you conclude so far? Are things going as planned? What changes were necessary to be
made?
Consultants
How often have you seen consultants in relation to ABC project? Where were they from?
What was the role of the consultants before the start of the project implementation?
What were their roles during the implementation?
IT
What changes in terms of TT have happened recently?
Have you had consultants involved in TT changes? Where from?
What is the role of IT in the ABC project?
Do you consider IT as a potential problem in the ABC implementation? Why?
(If there are problems — can you explain them?)
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Activity-Based Costing*
Were you involved with the definition of activities in your department?
How were activities defined in your department?
What were the difficulties in defining the activities?
How were standard times defined to perform each activity?
Do you think that activities and times defined in your department are:
An accurate reflection of work?
An effective means of managing / improving performance?
Conclusion
That's all my questions.
Is there anything I haven't asked that you expected me to ask or think I should know about?
Is there anything you would like to ask me?
Thank you very much...
* Questions prepared for departments not involved directly in the ABC team.
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41#110401
Number'
.4;A"t4 4I
71Z.
Department
'
Length
(minutes) k
Position
Interviews
1 July. 1999 Operations executive department General manager 90
2 July. 1999 Corporate banking department General manager 90
2a July. 1999 Corporate banking department Employee (*)
3 July. 1999 Private banking department Manager 90
3a July. 1999 Private banking department Employee (*)
4 July. 1999 Strategic marketing department Manager 45
5 July. 1999 Commercial marketing department Senior manager 65
6 July. 1999 Municipals and institutional department Manager 50
7 July. 1999 Treasury and market research department Manager 60
8 July. 1999 Credit risks department Senior manager 80
9 July. 1999 Regional directorate Regional director 75
10 July. 1999 Branch Manager (**)
11 July. 1999 Regional directorate Regional director 45
12 July. 1999 Personnel department Senior manager 80
13 July. 1999 Organisation department Manager 60
14 July. 1999 Organisation department Senior manager 90
15 July. 1999 Advisor to the board of directors (budget supremo) General manager 90
16 July. 1999 Organisation department Senior manager 135
17 July. 1999 International department General manager 45
18 August. 1999 Regional directorate Regional director 90
19 August. 1999 Branch Manager 45
20 August. 1999 Personnel department General manager 45
21 July.2000 Accounting department Manager 90
22 July.2000 Accounting department Employee 75
23 July. 2000 Personnel department Senior manager 30
24 July.2000 Operations executive department Manager 40
25 July.2000 Organisation department Employee 70
26 July.2000 Organisation department Employee 45
27 July.2000 Accounting department General manager 90
28 July.2000 Organisation department Employee 60
29 July.2000 Consultant company 90
30 August.2000 Regional directorate Regional director 45
31 August.2000 IT company Manager 135
32 August.2000 Operations executive department General manager 45
33 August.2000 Organisation department Manager 55
34 January.2001 Accounting department Employee 120
35 January.2001 Accounting department General manager 75
36 January.2001 Consultant company 90
37 January.2001 Organisation department Employee 90
38 Apri1.2001 Organisation department Employee 55
39 Apri1.2001 Organisation department Employee 30
Notes:
(*) Additional interviews with staff from the same department with the purpose of clarify some issues. Interviews not tape-recorded. Notes were taken.
(**) The interviewee asked to not tape-record the interview. Notes were taken.
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Total number of interviews — summary
epartmen 	
	
Number;	 Intemews.h.,p,
Central departments
Accounting department 5 21,22,27,34,35
Organisation department 10 13,14,16,25,26,28,33,37,38,39
Marketing department 2 4,5
Other central departments 14 1,2,2a,3,3a,6,7,8,12,17,20,23,24,32
Commercial network
Regional directorates 4 9,11,18,30
Branches 2 10,19
Others
Budget supremo 15
IT company 31
Consultant company 2 29,36
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Other primary sources
Annual Report: Form 20-F (1997), Securities and Exchange Commission
Financial statements prepared according to Article 9 of Regulation S-X of the US
Securities and Exchange Commission.
AVA Project: Internal Weekend Presentation (1993)
Slides presented by a senior manager of the accounting department
Consultancy Reports: AVA Project
Consultancy Reports: Excellence Project
Consultancy Reports: Efficiency Project
Consultancy Reports: MIS Project
Bank folders of consultancy reports on each change initiative.
Consultancy Reports: ABC Project
Copies of consultants presentation materials and output reports, given to the bank
at the time of meetings (provided on average every two weeks during from
January 2000 till April 2001).
Increase share capital documents
Releases and presentations of a proposed capital increase.
Report and Accounts (1996)
Report and Accounts (1997)
Report and Accounts (1998)
Report and Accounts (1999)
Report and Accounts (2000)
Report and Accounts (2001)
Financial statements of the bank and its group, prepared in accordance with
accounting principles and practices, established by the Bank of Portugal, as
applicable for the financial services sector ("Portuguese GAAP").
Balanco Social (1992-2001)
Information about employees prepared to the Bank of Portugal.
Strategy day (2001)
Strategy day (2002)
Presentation materials, used during meetings where managers of the bank
discussed the key strategic issues faced by the bank.
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